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Introduction- The negative turn 
 
 
 
       Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, the question concerning the meaning of being, continues 
both to   provoke a critical response and to inspire creative expressions of thought.  
Nevertheless the fundamental identity and value of Heidegger’s enterprise is still a matter 
of ongoing debate. All too naturally, the essential identity of Heidegger’s project is at 
least superficially connected with methodological questions. There is a huge body of 
literature which explores Heidegger’s employment of the transcendental, 
phenomenological and hermeneutical methods. Scholars often debate fine points of how 
and the extent to which these methods are utilized by Heidegger.  Yet this exploration of 
issues of methodology rarely succeeds in illuminating the central concern of Heidegger’s 
work: the question concerning the meaning of being.  Doubtless the complexity of 
methodological concerns in Heidegger’s work contributes to this problem. All too easily 
the investigations of these concerns become ends in themselves, while the central aim of 
Heidegger’s employment of these complex methodologies, the Seinsfrage, is neglected.   
     There are at least two viable responses to this situation.  The first is to assess the 
conclusions of the most current state of understanding of the methodologies which are 
universally acknowledged to be actually present in Heidegger, and then to explicitly 
make the connection to the question concerning the meaning of being. While this 
approach is feasible, it risks the twin dangers of either a superficial treatment of the issue 
of methodology in Heidegger, or of becoming bogged down in the quagmire of 
methodology without making a successful connection to the Seinsfrage. The second 
response, the one actually followed in this dissertation, is to attempt to illuminate the 
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central concern of Heidegger’s life’s work through a methodology which is not explicitly 
present in Heidegger at all.  Risks abound in such a bold approach, above all the dangers 
which are inherent in taking any voyage to realms unexplored without the benefit of 
familiar guides. Nevertheless this second approach contains significant potential for 
illuminating Heidegger unencumbered by a complex and over-determined 
methodological apparatus. Paradoxically, such an approach can succeed only through an 
acute awareness of the methodologies which are explicitly present in Heidegger. Only an 
informed awareness of the nature of the transcendental, phenomenological and 
hermeneutical methods and how they are employed in Heidegger can provide the basis 
for knowing the precise points at which any of these can be safely and effectively 
bypassed. 
       This type of idiosyncratic   approach to Heidegger interpretation would not have 
been possible without the groundbreaking work of the contemporary thinkers of the 
“theological turn” movement which has taken place in continental philosophy in the last 
twenty-five years, most notably  that of Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida. The 
“theological turn” in modern continental philosophy in part describes the involvement of 
the projects of certain thinkers in the negative theology of Meister Eckhart and Pseudo-
Dionysius.  The concept of a “theological turn” on the part of a philosophical thinker 
might well send out alarm bells warning of methodological danger.  Yet significantly 
enough, the “theological turn” in modern continental philosophy can be understood at 
least in part to be essentially methodological.  Derrida, for example, sees the presence of 
negation which lies at the very center of the work of Dionysius and Eckhart to form a 
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paradigm for thinking about philosophical issues.1 Derrida’s fascination with the work of 
Dionysius and Eckhart essentially involves the attempt to apply the paradigm of negative 
theology to his own project of deconstruction.  In the case of Jean-Luc Marion, who is 
both a philosophical and a theological thinker, the connection to negative theology is 
essentially ontological. Inspired by Heidegger’s critique of what he called 
“ontotheology,”2  and persuaded that the primal Christian heresy has been the fateful 
identification of God with being, taking Dionysius as a guide Marion sets about to think 
the meaning of God apart from the categories of Western metaphysics.3  The manner in 
which Derrida and Marion see and apply paradigms of negative theology in working out 
their own projects suggests a tantalizing possibility for Heidegger interpretation. Might 
some of the same paradigms of the negative theology of Dionysius and Eckhart be 
utilized to illuminate Heidegger? There are many reasons to support such a bold 
enterprise.  First, as we will discover, Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology is both a 
critique of metaphysics and a critique of our inherited God concepts.  Both of these 
aspects are also deeply present in the thinking of Dionysius and Eckhart.  Eckhart’s 
enactment of the movement from God to Godhead is carried out under the necessity of 
rethinking the concept of God as ground. Might Eckhart’s critique of the inadequacy of 
God as ground help to illuminate Heidegger’s critique of grounding ontology? Might 
Eckhart’s argument for the necessity of moving from God to Godhead illuminate 
Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology as a critique of our inherited God concepts?    Since 
                                                 
1 Cf., Jacques Derrida, “How to avoid Speaking: Denials” in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. by Harold 
Coward and Toby Foshay (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992) pp.75-142. 
2 What Heidegger calls “ontotheology” has in part to do with the way in which in the Western tradition our 
God concepts have been massively influenced by metaphysics. We will deal extensively with this concept, 
as well as other meanings this term has in Heidegger in Chapter Four.   
3 Cf.,  Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. by Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991) 
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Heidegger’s critique of grounding ontology is intimately related to his attempt to raise 
anew the question concerning the meaning of being, an affirmative response to the former 
question would put us solidly on the right track of understanding how being is to be 
thought in the later Heidegger. With regard to Derrida’s insight that the primacy of 
negation in the work of Dionysius and Eckhart contains a paradigm for thinking about 
philosophical issues, might this paradigm be applied directly to Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, 
the issue concerning the meaning of being?  The manner in which Heidegger 
systematically rejects ways of understanding being in terms of beings, while affirming 
the priority and the necessity of the being question, puts us at the very center of the 
problematic of negative theology. Might the way in which affirmation and negation are 
related in the problematic of knowing and speaking about God in negative theology 
illuminate   the problem of the meaning of being in Heidegger?   
      Based on the above, it should be clear that there is more potential in negative 
theology than what can be described as methodological. This potential is also ontological.  
Briefly put, thinkers in the negative tradition are frequently exploring the same 
ontological landscape as Heidegger.    For these reasons, interpreting Heidegger through 
methods and through insights and paradigms which are not explicitly present in 
Heidegger makes what may initially have seemed like a questionable approach now 
assume real plausibility.     In terms of our earlier metaphor, the potential benefits of such 
a journey to unexplored realms now appears to outweigh the dangers.   
    To carry out such a project will require that the area to be illuminated in Heidegger be 
sharply focused. Our focus will be on the central concern of Heidegger’s life’s work—the 
Seinsfrage--the question concerning the meaning of being. We will begin by asking: what 
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does Heidegger mean by the question concerning the meaning of being? How is this 
question unique and different from all other metaphysical questions? In exploring this 
question we will follow Heidegger’s own directions.  We will regard fundamental 
ontology and the analytic of Dasein to be a preparatory phrase for raising the being 
question. Accordingly, after becoming familiar with Heidegger’s project as a whole in 
chapter  One, and after laying the foundations for an understanding of negative theology 
in Chapter Two,  we will begin in Chapter Three to turn our direction toward the later 
Heidegger.  Although Chapter Three formally initiates the turn toward the later 
Heidegger, it does so in terms of an attempt to illuminate the Seinsfrage and what 
intelligibility about being is contained in the early Heidegger based on our newfound 
understanding of the negative theology of Dionysius and Eckhart laid down in Chapter 
Two. In Chapter Four our turn toward the later Heidegger is complete, and there we will 
examine Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology both as a critique of our inherited God 
concepts and as a critique of metaphysics, and do so in terms of Eckhart’s understanding 
of the necessity of rethinking the concept of God as ground. In Chapter Five we will 
focus on what intelligibility concerning being is contained in the later Heidegger, 
specifically in terms of Heidegger’s attempt to think the meaning of being as “difference” 
or “difference as such” contained in The Ontotheological Constitution of Metaphysics. 
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Chapter One- The early Heidegger and the question of the meaning of being.  
 
(I)     RAISING ANEW THE QUESTION ABOUT THE MEANING OF BEING 
 
          (a) Reawakening our perplexity  
 
           In his first major published work, Being and Time,  Heidegger announces the issue 
which will essentially define his life’s work, the issue of being. The book begins with a 
quote from Plato’s   Sophist (244a): “For manifestly you have long been aware of what 
you mean when you use the expression ‘being.’  We however, who used to think we 
understood it, have now become perplexed.” 
         In the commentary which immediately follows the quote Heidegger laments the fact 
that the perplexity concerning the meaning of being is apparently not shared by us 
moderns. “But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the 
expression ‘Being’?  Not at all.”4  Heidegger’s project in Being and Time of  “raising 
anew the question of the meaning of being”5 (die Frage nach den Sinn von Sein) begins 
with an attempt to reawaken a sense of perplexity concerning the meaning of being. This 
reawakening of perplexity follows the classic Socratic paradigm wherein the recognition 
of ignorance becomes a requisite feature for knowledge. A sense of perplexity needs to 
be reawakened precisely because, as Heidegger will shortly attempt to demonstrate, we 
today still do not actually know what we mean by being.  
                                                 
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962) p. 1.  
5 Ibid. 
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      In the pages that follow some of the history behind our lack of perplexity becomes 
explicit. The question of the meaning of being provided the greatest stimulus for the 
thinking of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger argues, but since has been neglected and 
forgotten.6  
 
     (b) Problematic aspects of the above  
 
     At this early stage some obvious questions arise.   First, what precisely is the question 
concerning the meaning (Sinn) of being? Can this be formulated as one specific and 
unique question, different from all other ontological questions; or is the question 
concerning the meaning of being synonymous with what we might call ‘the issue of 
being,’ which actually subsumes under it many other ontological questions?  Second, 
how has either the question concerning the meaning of being, or the ‘issue of being’ in 
general, been neglected and forgotten?    In the seventeenth century ontological concerns 
were replaced by epistemological ones, just as in the twentieth century the newly formed 
epistemological model initiated by Descartes was once again displaced by philosophy of 
language;7 by virtue of these facts the defining paradigm of Western thinking has been 
ontological.8  Nevertheless, Heidegger’s claim that the meaning of being has been 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 2. 
7 Cf. Richard Rorty, Introduction to The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method(Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992) pp. 3-35. 
8 This version of the history of philosophy famously expressed by Rorty, and now widely accepted by 
analytic philosophers, would certainly be challenged by Heidegger,  for whom being has always been the 
driving issue in philosophy, even in neglect and forgottenness (vergessenheit). In the case of Descartes 
Heidegger attempts to demonstrate how beneath epistemic concerns Descartes was wrestling with the issue 
of the meaning of being but was prevented from developing an adequate ontology because of an a priori 
presupposition of being as substance. Cf. Being and Time pp. 123-128.  For a more developed exposition of 
the same topic see Heidegger’s History of the Concept of Time trans. by Theodore Kisiel (Indiana: Indiana 
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neglected and forgotten is not meant to implicate only modern thought, but is directed to 
the very center of Western philosophy, and will not spare even Aristotle.  How, then, in 
light of the fact that by all accounts the Western paradigm has been clearly ontological, 
has the question concerning the meaning of being been neglected and forgotten?   
 
(c) The meaning/nature distinction   
 
     To approach the second question first, standard commentators address this issue by 
making a distinction between the ‘nature of being’ and the ‘meaning of being.’9  
Traditional ontology treats the former question.  The essential question of ontology is 
‘what is being?’  In response to this question there is no shortage of attempts in the 
history of philosophy to provide answers. Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel, and Marx 
can all be said to have presented us with theories of being which directly address this 
question. Being for Spinoza is nature, for Marx historical-dialectical matter, for Hegel 
Absolute Spirit.  The ‘meaning’ of being on the other hand is a question about the 
significance of existence for human subjects. To make an analogy we might distinguish 
between the questions (a) ‘what is a human being?’  and (b) ‘what does it mean to be 
human?’ The former question is one which is addressed in the science of physical 
anthropology.  This question already presupposes that human existence is an object on a 
continuum with nature. Proceeding within this naturalistic framework scientific 
anthropology seeks to determine the uniqueness of human beings in relation to other 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1992) pp. 172-185. Whether we accept Heidegger’s or Rorty’s reading of the history of 
philosophy,   the defining paradigm still remains ontological.   
9 Cf. Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time(London and New York:Routledge, 1996) p. 7. See 
also Michael Gelvin, A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time(Illinois: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1989) pp.7-11.  
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natural phenomena, particularly that of animal life.  On the other hand the question about 
the meaning of human existence is in a different realm entirely. It is a philosophical-
existential question for self- reflection, rather than one which can be addressed in a 
purely objective manner.  The second question cannot be adequately dealt with within the 
methodology of science because in engaging this question human beings are already part 
of the horizon they are observing.  It is not then accidental that the second question is 
explored in art and literature rather than in science.  It is also addressed in philosophy by 
those thinkers who explicitly reject the adequacy of the paradigm of science for the 
examination of philosophical issues. Soren Kierkegaard, who famously challenged the 
adequacy of the paradigm of scientific objectivity for issues of human meaning, dealt 
with this question extensively.10 
 
       (d) Evaluating the meaning/nature distinction  
 
       Perhaps then the question about the ‘meaning of being’ is more analogous to the 
question about the ‘meaning of human existence.’  If this is the case then indeed the 
question about the ‘meaning of being’ shows potential for emerging as unique.  The 
meaning/nature distinction then has serious potential for illuminating the fundamental 
issue in Heidegger, but requires more in the way of textual support.  It is however not 
completely unproblematic.  As indicated earlier, the question about the meaning of being 
appears to be a question for human subjects. Yet as we will see, Heidegger will for good 
reasons reject any view of what is real which is grounded in the radical opposition 
                                                 
10 Cf. Soren, Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by Reidar Thomte (Princeton:Princeton 
Universtiy Press, 1981) 
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between subjective knower and object known.  In these terms the primacy of the subject, 
embodied in the tradition of transcendental subjectivity from Descartes to Husserl and 
including Kant, and the objectivist paradigm of positivism, are two sides of the same 
epistemological error. At the risk of jumping ahead of ourselves we can go so far as to 
say that the primacy of epistemology itself in modern philosophy and the many puzzles 
and paradoxes it engenders is itself a symptom of an inadequate ontology.  If the 
nature/meaning distinction is to endure it must come to terms with what will turn out to 
be Heidegger’s ontological critique of the ‘worldless’ subject.11 This cannot be 
accomplished without serious qualification of the distinction itself.   
 
(e) Another problematic aspect of the meaning/nature distinction  
 
     Here a second objection might be raised, namely that there is something which is 
disconcerting about the simplicity of the nature/meaning distinction. The suspicion is that 
it will not hold up under analysis. Returning to some of our previous examples of thinkers 
who have addressed being in terms of ‘nature’ rather than ‘meaning,’ we might take the 
case of Marx. Marx attempted to explicate the nature of being as historical-dialectical 
matter. Did he thereby entirely neglect the issue of the meaning of being? A powerful 
argument can be made that Marx laid the foundations for an exploration of the meaning 
of being in human existence, precisely by demythologizing and challenging an 
inadequate understanding of being contained in Hegel.  Many examples can be adduced 
of Marxist philosophers who address the issue of the meaning of being from a materialist 
perspective. The fact that they do so with the aid of categories which are shamelessly 
                                                 
11 Heidegger deals with this extensively in the early part of Being and Time. Cf 53-188. 
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borrowed from Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein,12to say nothing of his critique   of 
technology,  indicates both that the meaning/nature distinction requires clarification,  and 
that there is some unique perspective on the ‘meaning of being’ expressed by Heidegger.  
This perspective can be invaluable even for one whose starting point is with ‘nature’ 
rather than ‘meaning’. Let us then attempt to clarify the meaning/nature distinction and to 
disclose Heidegger’s unique perspective by following the course of his exposition in the 
early part of Being and Time.       
     
  ( II)   THE INADEQUACY OF COMMONLY ACCEPTED ANSWERS TO THE 
SEINSFRAGE  
     
     In the first introduction to Being and Time Heidegger attempts to reinforce the 
necessity of raising anew (wiederfragen) the question of being in terms of a failure of 
very commonly accepted answers to the question.  He undertakes to examine and refute 
three traditional answers.  We will examine each of these to see what insight they contain 
which might illuminate the question about the meaning of being.  
 
(a) Being is the most universal concept 
 
      Here the claim is that we arrive at the concept of ‘being’ by an exercise of progressive 
abstraction.  Beginning for example on the level of ‘dog,’ we abstract to form the concept 
                                                 
12 The critical theory of the “Frankfurt School” of Marxism represented by such figures as Max 
Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno and Herbert Marcuse  may serve as a prime example. In his book Heidegger 
and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History (London:Routledge Press, 2005) Andrew 
Feenburg traces the dependence of Marcuse’s concepts on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.   
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‘animal’.  From ‘animal’ we abstract to form the concept of ‘living thing,’ from ‘living 
thing’ to ‘nature.’ Each level of abstraction brings us to a higher genus until  finally 
arriving at the concept ‘being.’  ‘Being’ is therefore the most universal genus or general 
type. Heidegger does not doubt that being is in some sense a general, even the most 
general, concept.  What he rejects is the claim that the question about the meaning of 
being can be exhausted by this insight. Simply put: “Being transcends any universality of 
genus.”13   Hurbert Dreyfus is very helpful on this point.  Essentially ‘being’ transcends 
the universality of genus because it does not behave like an ordinary universal.14  If we 
take for example the predicate ‘red,’ no doubt a universal or general type; when presented 
with a number of objects, fire engines, tomatoes, cherries, it is perfectly obvious that 
these share in common the general feature of redness. If ‘being’ is essentially a universal 
concept, albeit the most universal, then by hypothesis it should be possible to make an 
inference from the set containing waterfalls, subatomic particles and thoughts to ‘being.’  
Yet this is clearly not the case. The fact that ‘being’ does not behave as an ordinary 
universal indicates that it has a unique status in our experience.  This fact in turn supports 
the view that the question about the meaning of being needs to be explored further.  
     Here the argument is powerfully reminiscent of, even identical in structure to, the one 
used by Kant in his first critique, to lead into his main argument which proves the a- 
priority of space and time.  To demonstrate that space and time are forms of intuition 
Kant has to first disable the view that they are objectively inherent features of things. 
This Kant does in the “metaphysical deduction,” by arguing that space and time 
obviously do not share the features of ordinary objects of experience.  It is possible to 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 22. 
14 Hurbert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991) p. 10. 
13 
 
‘think away’ any or every object of experience and to retain the concept of empty space.  
It is not possible to abstract from space and retain any coherent concept of an object.15 
The same is true of time. Only when Kant has by appealing to our experience indicated 
something unique about the status of space and time does he in the “transcendental 
deduction” develop his primary argument that as forms of intuition these make pure 
mathematics possible.16   
     Heidegger notes that awareness of the fact that being is not a true universal has been 
present in Western philosophy since the time of Aristotle. “Aristotle himself knew the 
unity of this transcendental ‘universal’ as a unity of analogy in contrast to the multiplicity 
of the highest generic concepts applicable to things.”17   For Aristotle being is properly 
predicated only of substances.  Yet substances are given in a multiplicity of types. 
Aristotle denied that there was a unity among these substances.  When we use the word 
‘being,’ we do so not univocally, as when we refer to the concept of ‘human substance,’ 
but rather analogously.18  Dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s conclusion regarding the 
manifold meanings of being, as well as awareness of how deeply this doctrine has 
influenced Western ontology, had  a decisive effect in convincing Heidegger that the 
question of being needed to be raised anew.19   
       The fact that Aristotle did not detect any unified sense of being and evidently saw no 
need for further inquiry on the matter again raises the question: why does Heidegger 
press on to make ‘being’ into a problem?  Why not simply rest with Aristotle’s 
                                                 
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A-24. 
16 Ibid., B-41-B46.  
17 Being and Time, p. 22. 
18 Cf. Dorothea Freda, “The Question of Being:Heidegger’s Project,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. by Charles B. Guignon(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993) p.45. 
19 Cf. Martin Heidegger, “My Way to Phenomenology,” tran. by J.L. Mehta in Martin Heidegger: An 
Ilustrated Study,  ed. by Walter Biemel(New York and London: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich,1976) p. 
9. 
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conclusion that ‘being’ has no univocal meaning? What reasons does Heidegger provide 
for thinking that Aristotle’s conclusion was in fact preemptive?   We must address these 
questions as we proceed.  
 
(b) Being is not definable. 
 
     This claim derives from the supreme generality of the concept. It is not possible to 
subsume being under a higher concept in terms of which it is adequately comprehended; 
but all that this demonstrates is that being is not an entity, that the status of being in our 
experience is unique.   Heidegger wholeheartedly endorses this conclusion but rejects the 
idea that it proves that being is not for that reason worthy of further inquiry. “But does 
this mean that Being no longer offers a problem? Not at all.”20  
 
(c) Being is self- evident.   
 
 Here Heidegger can at least partially agree with the conclusion but denies that it   
offers any basis for neglect of inquiry into being.  Human beings do have a pre-reflective 
understanding of what it means to be. Yet this ordinary everyday understanding is still 
shrouded in mystery.  In the pages that follow Heidegger will attempt to mine this pre-
reflective understanding of being, thus reinforcing the claim that it is self-evident, while 
demonstrating that this fact is a starting point, not a resolution of the question.  
 
     (d) Reflection on Heidegger’s responses  
                                                 
20 Being and Time, p. 23. 
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     We should pause at this point and examine the implications of Heidegger’s three 
responses for our earlier attempt to clarify the question about the meaning of the being 
question.  The first response might at first seem to indicate that Heidegger’s Seinsfrage 
seems to involve something in terms of understanding the ‘nature of being.’ It might be 
asked: what if being were a true universal?  Presumably, then, further inquiry into the 
meaning of being would be superfluous.  In such instance our questioning concerning the 
meaning of being could come to rest in the form of a very determinate answer.   This is 
however not the case.  The point is that failure of being as a universal concept is one 
more indication of its unique status in our experience. It is then impossible to do justice 
to the meaning of being in the manner of other concepts or entities, i.e. by an appeal to 
higher or more universal concepts. This fact invites rather than obviates the need for 
further inquiry.  Based on the above the first response points strongly away from thinking 
that the Seinsfrage involves an understanding of ‘the nature of being.’ At this point we 
begin to develop a real sense of what is inadequate about some of the traditional 
metaphysical responses to being indicated earlier. The claim that being is nature, God, or 
historical-dialectical matter all involve the subsumption of being under a higher or more 
universal concept. In traditional metaphysical systems the ‘ground’ of the system 
functions in effect as the highest universal concept.  In the case of ‘God as ground’ this 
fact, as well as its unacceptable theological implications, was recognized by  Duns Scotus 
and  became the impetus for developing a more adequate ontology.21 
                                                 
21 Duns Scotus also recognized the philosophical inadequacy of traditional ontology and the medieval 
philosopher’s attempts to develop an adequate ontology had a decisive effect on Heidegger’s own 
development. Cf. Dorothea Freda, “The Question of Being in Heidegger’s Project,” op cit. pp-45-50.The 
influence of Duns Scotus on Heidegger has been well documented.  For an excellent and penetrating 
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     The conclusions above are further reinforced by the second response. Since being is 
not an entity at all, the Seinsfrage can’t be a question about the ‘nature of being,’ or  an 
attempt to delineate its essential features in a manner which is on a continuum with 
entities. With this second response we begin to develop a sense of how the inquiry into 
being will require a unique methodology.  We come to understand the genuine appeal 
which the nature/meaning distinction offers to commentators, as well as its limitations.  If 
the Seinsfrage is not about the ‘nature of being,’ then it is tempting to wholeheartedly 
endorse the claim that it is about the ‘meaning of being.’  While this contains some 
insight, it also harbors a great danger namely that the Seinsfrage   is reduced to the realm 
of pure subjectivity.  The requirement of a unique methodology arises from the unique 
status of being in our experience. The endorsement without qualification of the view that 
the Seinsfrage is a question about ‘meaning’ does not do justice to the requirements of a 
unique methodology.  It was precisely the inadequacy of a methodology which reduces 
being to the realm of purely immanent consciousness which led to Heidegger’s break 
with Husserl.22 It still remains to be seen what type of methodology can do justice to the 
meaning of being in our experience without succumbing to the subjectivism and 
solipsism which seem to be implied in this alternative.   
     With regard to the third response, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of 
the fact of being as self-evident.  With this response we begin to understand Heidegger’s 
refusal of Aristotle’s conclusion that there is no univocal sense to being.  It is rejected 
because it is not adequate to the meaning of being which is already present in human 
                                                                                                                                                 
philosophical summary and analysis see John B Caputo, “The Grammatica Speculativa: A Study in 
Heidegger’s Habilitationschrift” in Journal of the Society of British Phenomenology, Vol. 5, 1974.  
22 Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction Vol. I (The 
Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) pp. 282-283 
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experience, even if this understanding is also shrouded in darkness.  The claim that being 
is self-evident requires support, and in the succeeding pages Heidegger will attempt to 
provide it. The third response also gives us a clue about Heidegger’s methodology. If the 
fundamental starting point of the inquiry will be with an understanding of being as it is 
present in human awareness, then his methodology will be one which attempts to draw 
out or make explicit something which is already contained in human understanding; 
hence it cannot be the methodology of empirical science with its radical disjunction 
between subject and object.  Such an approach obviously lies open to the charge of 
‘circular reasoning,’ and this charge will at some point have to be addressed.  
 
     (III)   THE VALUE OF THE BEING QUESTION  
 
     (a) Why the question of being should be raised at all 
 
       The task of inquiry into the meaning of being raises the question, why should the 
question of being be raised at all?  What merit can we hope to gain through the endeavor?  
Here the danger is that the question might turn out to be an exercise in abstraction which 
is ultimately not constructive. Heidegger is aware of this objection: “Does it simply 
remain--or is it at all--a matter for soaring speculation about the most general of 
generalities, or is it rather, of all questions, both the most basic, and the most concrete?”23 
     It is the latter view which Heidegger endorses, and in the first introduction to Being 
and Time  the claim is supported in two ways.  In essence the question of the meaning of 
                                                 
23 Being and Time, p. 21 
18 
 
being is the most fundamental of all questions because it is both ontically and 
ontologically prior to all other questions. (p.28-35) Let us examine each of these reasons. 
 
    (b) The ontological  priority of the question of being: Heidegger’s arguments 
 
    The question about the meaning of being is ontologically prior to the sciences because 
an understanding of being is already presupposed by the sciences. “The question of Being 
aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the 
sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type and, in do doing, 
already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those 
ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their 
foundations.”24   
      We might call this first argument an argument from the nature of science. The upshot 
of it is that science deals with particular realms of being--biology with the realm of living 
things, chemistry with the composition of substances, etc.  Each of these investigations 
presupposes an understanding of being in general, or in the broadest sense, yet in none of 
these investigations is this meaning clarified or made fully explicit. This is, or should be 
the task of ontology.  
     A second argument which is presented first deals with the progress or the development 
of science.  It begins in the following way: “The real movement of the sciences takes 
place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is 
transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is 
                                                 
24 Being and Time, p. 31. 
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capable of crisis in its basic concepts.”25    The essence of this argument is that the real 
movement or development of the sciences takes place not on the basis of its day-to-day 
functions, i.e. collecting and analyzing data, but in the foundations of a science.  Often it 
is a crisis in the foundations of a science which is the prelude to its development. 
Sciences develop and grow out of these crises.   Examples are given from biology and 
physics: 
       The relativity of physics arises from the tendency to exhibit the interconnectedness 
       of nature as it is ‘in itself.’ As a theory of the conditions under which we have access 
       to Nature itself, it seeks to preserve the changelessness of the laws of motion by  
       ascertaining all relativities, and thus comes up against the question of the structure  
       of its own given area of study--the problem of matter.  In biology there is an awak- 
       ening tendency to inquire beyond the definitions which mechanism and vitalism  
       have given for ‘life’ and ‘organism,’ and to define anew the kind of being which  
       belongs to the living as such.26     
 
 
  (c) The ontological priority of the question of being: evaluating Heidegger’s  
  arguments  
 
 
      What can be said by way of evaluation of the above arguments, and how can they 
help to clarify our understanding of the question of the meaning of being?  First, the 
argument that ontology forms the basis of science is not new.  What is historically new is 
the concept of the autonomy of science.  Historically the modern sciences developed out 
of philosophy; philosophy has always been seen as the foundation of knowing more 
determinate aspects of what is real that is expressed in science. Once the sciences began 
to develop into the specific branches we are familiar with today, as they did in the 
seventeenth century, philosophy was still understood to reside at their foundations.  A 
classic form of this view was expressed in the seventeenth century by Rene Descartes.   
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 29. 
26 Ibid., p. 30. 
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In Descartes’ analogy knowledge forms a tree in which the sciences are the branches and 
metaphysics is the root.27  Descartes’ claim regarding the foundational status of 
metaphysics derives from the fact that the sciences are not fully reflective enterprises, 
although some basic forms of reflection are necessary in order to evaluate the results of 
the theories and hypothesis in terms of which science operates.  Nevertheless, the nature, 
scope and limits of a science, what its proper objects of inquiry are, is not established by 
the sciences themselves but in the reflective space inhabited by philosophical reason. 
Since the sciences cannot determine their own scope and limits, neither can they 
reflectively establish their own foundations.  In our own time a refurbished mode of 
Descartes’ argument has been repeated in a powerful form both by modern Thomists and 
by Edmund Husserl.28  The conclusion of the Thomist argument is that the enterprise of 
science is not fully intelligible apart from a wider context of meaning.  For this context to 
be real and enduring it must be ontological.29   
     In terms of an evaluation of Heidegger’s argument it should be pointed out that when 
the claim is made that the question about the meaning of being is ontologically prior to 
the sciences, the type of understanding of being which he has in mind is not that of 
traditional ontology,  which is a flawed enterprise, but his own “fundamental ontology.” 
(die Fundamentalontologie) On the basis of this claim many commentators on Being and 
Time defer evaluation of  the argument at this early point because to do so first requires 
an explication of the program of   fundamental ontology,  which will take up the first half 
                                                 
27 This claim appears in the preface to the French edition of Descartes Principia Philosophiae written in 
Latin and  translated by Claude Picot, published in 1647.  The preface was originally written as a letter to 
Picot. An English translation of this letter can be found in Rene′ Descartes: Philosophical Essays and 
Correspondence ed. by Roger Ariew (Indianapolis:In: Hackett Publishing Company,  2000) pp. 221-230. 
28 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology  (The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999) pp. 1-7.  
29 Cf. Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959) p. 
86.  Here the entire chapter VI-“Philosophy and the Special Sciences,”pp.83-92  is helpful. 
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of the book.30 This approach is only partially correct. Heidegger’s argument wavers 
between (a) explicating the presence of an understanding of being which is at the basis of 
science,  and (b) concluding  with the imperative to think the meaning of being in a more 
adequate way so as to provide a basis for scientific development and progress.  To 
paraphrase (a), the sciences are concerned with particular realms of being; the question of 
being deals with the meaning of being as such and so is prior to the inquiry of the 
sciences. The argument here is merely formal because no clear claim is established to the 
effect that clarity concerning the meaning of being can enhance understanding in science. 
However, (b) is much more ambitious. The clear implication of (b) is that clarity 
concerning the meaning of being is at the very foundation  of the forward movement of 
science.  Heidegger even goes so far as to say that ontological understanding can and 
often does “run ahead” of the sciences.31  Since the formal character of (a) makes it very 
difficult to evaluate we will concentrate on the more ambitious (b). 
          Historians of science can easily agree that a  giant leap forward was made in 
physics when we moved from a mechanistic view of nature, as presented by Newton, to 
that of nature as a unified field of energy as is expressed in the theory of relativity. At the 
bottom of this distinction lies the issue of the nature of matter itself.  Something similar is 
true in the case of biology.  Real progress and development is made at the foundations.  A 
decisive step forward was made when biologists began to understand the structure of life 
on the molecular level.  This new dimension in turn offers a new perspective on the 
nature of organisms. Such a change cannot help but impact our understanding of the 
nature, scope and limits of the science of biology itself. Here the point is that if progress 
                                                 
30 Cf. E.F. Kaelin, Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reading for Readers (Tallahassee:Florida State 
University Press, 1987) pp.26-27. 
31 Being and Time, p 30.  
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in science is made at the foundations, and these foundations have to do with the nature  of  
the objects of   scientific inquiry-- matter in physics, organisms in biology--we are 
moving so to speak ‘dangerously’ close to the realm of ontology.  The wider context of 
matter and living things is ‘being.’  This insight can be put in a more determinate form, 
namely that some understanding of the meaning of being was already present with 
Newton and formed the context out of which his research developed.  In the case of 
Newton being was understood within the framework of what Heidegger will call 
substance ontology.32  Likewise it is not too far-fetched to think that suspicions 
concerning the adequacy of a view of the universe consisting of a series of 
interchangeable parts formed the context of the research of Einstein, which succeeded in 
ultimately replacing Newton’s mechanistic view with the theory of relativity.  In either 
case it is difficult to believe that research which deals with truly foundational issues of a 
science   takes place in a realm which is ontologically neutral.  Evidence in favor of this 
view might be adduced in the form of the fact that once scientific theories are produced, 
attempts to explicate their meaning and relation to previous theories is not ontologically 
neutral.  Some understanding of being must be presupposed as a context in terms of 
which the shift in paradigm from Newton to Einstein makes sense, or can even be 
recognized as a shift in paradigm.    We should note the similarity between Heidegger’s 
argument and that of modern   Neo-Thomism.  In the modern Neo-Thomist argument 
ontology forms a context of meaning for science because the former represents a purer or 
more sublime form of knowing; in the same way that knowledge which is based on 
universal principles represents a higher form of knowing than that which is based on 
                                                 
32 Heidegger discusses substance ontology in relation to Descartes  in detail on pp.125-134.  What is said 
there would appear to apply to Newton as well.  
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sense experience, the highest or the most universal principles are supplied by 
metaphysics.33 Heidegger’s view is also hierarchical.34  This fact will become clearer 
once we examine in the next section concerning the issue of the ontical priority of the 
question of the meaning of being.  
 
(d)   the argument from the human sciences  
 
     Another issue to keep in mind when evaluating Heidegger’s claim is that for English- 
speaking readers the term ‘science’ inevitably has the connotation of empirical science, 
whereas Heidegger is employing the term in a much broader sense, in the sense  of what 
is contained in the German term Geisteswissenschaften. This term, which means 
‘sciences of the human spirit’ or ‘human sciences’ includes the study of literature,  
sociology, psychology,  biblical studies, aesthetics, history, law and  theology.  It is clear 
that Heidegger has this wider sense of science in mind since he mentions specifically 
“those humane sciences which are historiological in character” (historischen 
Geisteswissenschaften),  adducing theology as an example.35  
 
      (e)       Evaluating the argument from the human sciences.  
 
                                                 
33 Cf. Jacques Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, trans. by Gerald Phelan( Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1999) p. 267. 
34 Heidegger’s hierarchical ontology, which is grounded above all in an attempt to recapture an originary 
sense or meaning of being, will prove to be a major stumbling block to Derrida. Cf. Of Grammatology, 
trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976) pp.19-24. 
35 Being and Time, p. 30. 
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      Hopefully at this point we have at least established the plausibility of Heidegger’s 
claim regarding the empirical sciences. The fact that his argument includes the ‘human 
sciences’ now opens the entirely new possibility that the argument for the ontological 
priority of the question of being is better exhibited in the human sciences than in the 
empirical sciences.  We will now attempt to explore this option.  
    We might take the example of psychology.    If the object of psychology is human 
psychical life, it is impossible to think that this realm is ontologically neutral. Some 
understanding of the nature of the psyche and its relation to that which is non-psychical 
must be at the starting point of psychology even if this is never made explicit.  Where the 
psyche is understood as an entity within the temporal, spatial, causal nexus of nature with 
no awareness of viable alternatives, there an empirical psychology dominates. What is 
unavoidable is the task of understanding the nature of the psyche in its relation to the 
world. This however is a task for ontological understanding   It is precisely at this point 
that the question of the meaning of being is most relevant.  It is reasonable to think that 
an entitative understanding of being would be correlated with a substantalist doctrine of 
the psyche. Likewise recognition of the inadequacy of being as substance leads to 
suspicion with regard to its adequacy for understanding psychical life.36 Heidegger also 
adduces theology as an example: “Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of 
man’s being toward God.”37  Here once again an understanding of the meaning of being 
impacts an understanding of how human being is thought, and so the relation between 
human beings, as well as the relation of human beings to a world or to God. Once being 
                                                 
36 In History of the Concept of Time, op cit., pp. 123-126  Heidegger provides a critique of personalistic 
psychology along  similar lines. The problem with it is that while personalistic psychology attempts to 
begin with a unified understanding of ‘personhood’ which is behind the performance of acts, the 
ontological status of this primary datum is never clarified.  
37 Being and Time, p. 30. 
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is understood in an entitative manner, as some form of substance, it is inevitable that God 
as the ground and origin of substance is understood as the highest or the purest form of 
substance. Human beings as created substances are dependent on divine substance. The 
relation between human being and God is then clearly one of one substance to another. In 
Thesis I of Chapter Three we will explore this dynamic in some detail. What we should 
gain at this point is a sense that theological issues thought on a foundational level are 
directly influenced by an understanding of being.  In the absence of serious inquiry into 
the question of the meaning of being, inevitably one understanding of being prevails by 
default.  
      Based on this it would appear then that the priority of the question of being is more 
fundamental in the case of the ‘human sciences,’ supporting the imperative to think the 
meaning of being in a more originary way.  
 
    (f) The ontical priority of the question of being: understanding of being as a    
    characteristic of Dasein’s being.  
 
 
     By “ontic” Heidegger means the kind of understanding which is appropriate to 
entities. A good approximation of the term ontic would be empirical. Ontic would then be 
opposed to ontological. When applied to human beings ontic understanding reveals 
objective features and processes of human beings as entities within the nexus of nature. 
These are the aspects which are studied by the science of anthropology. However  
Heidegger says that “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.”38 By this 
cryptic formulation is indicated that when we look at human beings from an ontic 
perspective seeking to determine our most distinctive feature we discover something 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 32. 
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which is not ontic at all but ontological, namely that being is an issue for us. This fact 
includes first of all an awareness of being as such, the ability to raise questions 
concerning the meaning of being.  “Understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein’s Being.”39  It is only a human being which can ask questions 
concerning the meaning of her life in the context of the whole of existence. Nevertheless 
the term “ontological” here does not mean merely that human beings develop formal 
ontologies of the kind we study in philosophy books.  Rather it has to do with the 
condition for the possibility of formal ontologies. Dasein can develop formal ontologies 
only because in its very being, being is an issue for it. It is therefore critical to understand 
the aspect of being “at issue.”  Part of this has to do, as indicated above, with an 
awareness of being and all of the implications which come with this fact. But this cannot 
be its complete meaning.  The question we must ask is: how is Dasein at issue in its very 
being? Rather than address this question specifically at this point, it will be more 
effective to allow a response to unfold in the course of our exposition. The question will 
also be reconsidered again in Chapter Three.   
 
(g)     Undermining entitative understanding of being-human, Dasein as a relation.  
 
     At this point it is most helpful to remember that Dasein is not something  which is on 
a continuum with other entities in nature,  rather the term is meant to overcome the type 
of entitative understanding which is implied in traditional language such as ‘mind,’ 
“subject,’ ‘animal rationale,’ etc.  Each of these involves the presupposition that human 
being is an entity essentially constituted by the paradigm of substance,  juxtaposed beside 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 32.  
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or present within the objective space of the world. Heidegger’s term Dasein is meant to 
undercut these ontological presuppositions.  It is employed as an abrupt reminder that 
human existence is never worldless. Likewise ‘world’ is not an objective area in which 
human beings are contained, but an aspect already present as a distinctive feature of 
being human. Accordingly the term Dasein does not describe a substance but a relation, 
the relation of self to world. It is in that relation that the true ontological identity of 
human existence derives. The classical attempt to find the identity of human being in a 
fixed essence is for Heidegger a misguided enterprise precisely because it confuses the 
ontological basis of human existence in the relatedness of self to world with something 
‘founded,’ namely the self as a substance: “…And because we cannot define Dasein’s 
essence by citing a ‘what’ of the kind which pertains to a subject matter[eines 
sachhaltigen Was], and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has 
its Being to be, and has it as its own…”40  Paradoxically the ontology of substantialism 
which Heidegger works to overcome can be put to work in the effort to illuminate its 
shortcomings. Thinking in terms of ‘essential qualities’ which are the stock and trade of 
substantialism,  if we can by hypothesis accept the claim that the essence of a human 
being is found only in relation to world, the natural question which arises at this point is: 
what is the most essential feature of that relation?  To this Heidegger answers that it is in 
the fact that the self transcends itself in a dynamic and purposeful manner  in its 
involvement with world. There is then both a directionality and a dynamism to Dasein.  
The directionality is from Da to Sein, from the situationedness of the self to being as 
such.  The dynamic aspect has to do with the fact that there is, to use phenomenological 
language, a kind of intentionality to the relation between self and world.  Intentionality 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 32-33. 
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refers to the fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something.  In classical 
Husserlian language the concept of a conscious act, a noesis, apart from a noema is 
unintelligible.41Likewise for Heidegger the concept of a ‘worldless’ subject is an 
unintelligible abstraction.  The inexorable projection of self toward world is a condition 
of its intelligibility. Its name is Dasein. 
 
(h)     The self- understanding of Dasein and temporality    
 
      If on an ontological level Dasein is an entity that is a relation rather than a self- 
contained substance then there should be some confirmation of this on the level of our 
reflective life and this is indeed the case.  “Dasein always understands itself in terms of 
its existence, in terms of a possibility of itself.”42 The overcoming of the ontology of 
substantialism brings with it the critical importance of time and the relation of time to 
being.  Substances are what endure over time. Thus it becomes impossible to conceive of 
substance apart from time, even if in the ontology of substance the focus is on the way in 
which substances such as ‘mind’ and ‘person’ endure despite the passage of time. In the 
transition from substance to relational ontology the way in which time forms the horizon 
for being becomes fully explicit. Dasein’s projection toward plans and possibilities can 
only be conceived in terms of time.  Dasein’s self- reflection is immediately transparent 
toward plans and possibilities which are directed toward a future time.   The above should 
give us some indication of how Dasein is “at issue.” It is so because the structure of 
                                                 
41 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. Boyce Gibson 
(London: Collier Books, 1962) p. 229. 
42 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Dasein is temporal, never identical with itself but projected into the future defined in 
terms of possibilities.43    This fact assures that Dasein remains always “at issue.”  
 
(i)     Heidegger and the tradition: on being human 
 
     At this point we should not fail to notice the way in which Heidegger’s answer to the 
question of what the most distinctive feature of human beings is diverges markedly from 
the traditional one. Going back to Aristotle, the most distinctive feature of human beings 
is rationality.  Needless to say, Heidegger is not denying rationality to human beings, but 
denying that rationality is our most distinctive feature. This is because rationality is never 
given as a purely objective feature. Human beings do not possess rationality in the same 
way that computers possess certain features of intelligence, analytical abilities or 
memory. Rationality in human beings is not intelligible as an intrinsic feature but is one 
more function of a projection towards being.  From the above it should be clear why the 
question of being is ontically prior to other questions.  It is so because unlike other 
questions, the question about the meaning of being is an explicit formulation of 
fundamental aspects of Dasein’s being, an understanding of being and a projection 
towards being which is going on in experience all the time.  The ontic priority of the 
question of being works to forestall any attempt to obviate the question on a theoretical 
level.   If Heidegger’s description of Dasein is accurate, then the legitimacy of the 
question of being is already established on the “pre-ontological” level of human existence 
where being is already “an issue.”   
 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 38. 
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(j)   The ontic priority of the being question and being as self- evident  
 
       The ontic priority of being also helps to provide real content to a claim made earlier, 
namely that being is self-evident.  So much is this the case that the term now appears 
weak and ineffectual. We frequently use the term “self-evident” to refer to  what is 
obviously or intuitively clear. It is self-evident that two aspects which are equal to one 
another are equal to a third. It is now apparent that the familiarity of Dasein with being is 
deeper than what is involved in a simple inference. Understanding of being belongs to 
Dasein long before it is expressed on a reflective or theoretical level.  To make an 
analogy we might say that human beings also have an understanding of space on a deep 
or fundamental level.  Long before the concepts of ‘space,’ ‘spatiality,’ and ‘geometrical 
relations’ are formed we are already orienting ourselves in space.44 Nevertheless the term 
“self-evident” is deliberate.  It is meant to refute the claim that the meaning of being does 
not require clarification.   
 
    (k)   The ontic priority of the being question and being as self- evident  
 
        How has understanding the ontological-ontical priority of the Seinsfrage helped to 
clarify its meaning?  It has done so by providing much substance to our earlier suspicion 
that there is something which is deeply flawed about the meaning/nature distinction.  
Upon encountering Heidegger’s Seinsfrage for the first time it is all too natural to attempt 
to clarify it and understand its meaning within our inherited epistemological and 
                                                 
44 This is more than a mere casual analogy since  Heidegger will actually discuss  the spatiality of Dasein in 
a very similar way. Cf. Being and Time, 138-148.  
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ontological frameworks. Immediately the shopworn concepts of ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ so 
irreducible in the philosophical tradition, are put to work. These become expressed as 
‘meaning’ and ‘nature.’ Yet these concepts inevitably distort Heidegger’s meaning from 
the start.   In working through the ontological-ontic priority with Heidegger we come to 
develop some genuine sense of how and why these frameworks are mistaken. In the final 
analysis the nature/ meaning distinction is ontologically flawed. It is based on a 
presupposition that being is an entity over and against knowing subjects. 
      In working through the ontological-ontic priority of the question of the meaning of 
being we already begin to develop a sense for what Heidegger will later describe as the 
unconcealing or the disclosure of being.  Being is not an object over and against Dasein 
but it is only through Dasein that being is disclosed.45  Heidegger’s doctrine of 
disclosure, which includes an understanding of truth as alētheia  (unconcealment), is 
meant to do justice to the unique situatedness of human being in relation to being as such. 
Here the problem is that if neither being nor Dasein is a substance, how should we 
describe the way in which being is known by Dasein?  Above all such a description must 
come to terms with the fact that we are always already (immer schon) familiar with being.  
Heidegger attempts to capture this unique situation by saying that Dasein is the clearing 
(Lichtung) or the place through which being is illuminated.   In these terms the Seinsfrage 
is indeed a question about the meaning of being, but this meaning can never be opposed 
to nature understood as that which stands over and against it. 
       We come to understand that the Seinsfrage as a question about the meaning of being 
is indeed both unique and prior to all other ontological questions.  It is unique because it 
is a question about the meaning of being which nevertheless does not reduce the issue to 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 256. 
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one of purely subjective meaning. It is one which comprehends what is implied in 
attempts to express the nature of being without surrendering to the substance ontology 
which is most often implied in these endeavors. It is more fundamental in relation to 
other questions because most ontological endeavors either presuppose or require 
intelligibility about the meaning of being, even while blocking full access to this realm 
and the intelligibility it might disclose through an a priori starting point which cannot do 
justice to the character of being as it presents itself.  
 
(l)    Gaining access to being: how the ontic-ontological priority of the being question 
has clarified its meaning  
 
     Once Heidegger has established both the ontical and the ontological priority of the 
question about the meaning of being, the issue of how to gain access to being is raised. 
The most basic answer to this question has already been established.  It has been 
established that Dasein is not simply one being occurring alongside other entities,  but 
that it is only in Dasein that anything like the meaning of being is first disclosed. Both  
understanding of being and openness toward being are  constitutive states of Dasein’s 
being.  The strategy then becomes one of laying bare the relationship of Dasein to being 
as the horizon for understanding the meaning of being.  This task involves the analytic of 
Dasein as an exercise in what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology ( die 
Fundamentalontologie).  The meaning of being is then revealed in the existentials 
(existenziale): the various ways in which Dasein’s orientation toward being and 
understanding of being is expressed.  The existentials can be understood after the 
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paradigm of the Kantian categories.  Like the Kantian categories they have a 
transcendental function.  They are never actually given in experience, but make 
experience possible. But whereas the Kantian categories make phenomenal existence 
possible, the existentials are categories of Dasein’s actual involvement in being.  While a 
cultural anthropologist might identify any number of categories which form the basic 
constituents of human existence, derived from experience, the existentials are ontological 
structures which lie at the basis of the empirical. Where human beings mate, gather food 
and form communities there is already an involvement in being, a projection toward 
being, an understanding of being which is articulated in the various existentials.   The 
existentials begin with the one which is most general, being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-
Sein). This is followed by worldhood (Weltlichheit), being-with (mit Dasein), projection 
(Entwurf) and others.  The most primordial existential is Care (Sorge) because it it the 
most encompassing.  Sorge makes explicit what is already contained in the other 
existentials. It describes the dynamic manner in which Dasein stands out to or projects 
toward being. In Sorge the temporal basis of Dasein and the way in which time forms the 
horizon for an understanding of being becomes illuminated.  
 
     (IV) ASAPECTS OF NEGATION  
 
(a)  The negative existentials and anxiety       
 
      It is impossible for any serious consideration of the ontology of Being and Time to 
neglect what we might call, broadly speaking, the negative elements--aspects of lack, 
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privation,  finitude and limitation--expressed in such existentials as being-towards-death 
(Sein-zum-Tode), fallenness (Gefallen), and thrownness (Geworfenheit) as well as the 
phenomenon   of anxiety (Angst).  These aspects are essential because of the way in 
which they impinge upon and define the final meaning of the affirmative aspects.  If we 
take for example being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-Sein), this existential reminds us that 
da and Sein are a unitary phenomenon. Dasein dwells in a world with which it is always 
already familiar. But Geworfenheit also refers to being-in-the-world. Dasein does not 
simply dwell in a world in an idyllic fashion, but rather its being is already “thrown” 
being-in-the-world.46  Anxiety also impinges on being-in-the-world.  Dasein is anxious 
for its being-in-the-world. Likewise we have already touched upon the claim that Dasein 
is defined in terms of its potentiality. Yet the potentiality which is most uniquely 
Dasein’s own is being-towards-death. Finally, both the concept of being-in-the-world and 
projection express the way in which Dasein transcends or surpasses every attempt to be 
comprehended as a substance. Yet Dasein as projected toward world, as being-in-the-
world, is already fallen. Fallenness refers precisely to the way in which Dasein is liable to 
understand itself not in terms of possibilities, but in terms of entities within the world. 
The negative aspect of fallenness then works to neutralize or negate the positive or 
affirmative aspects of dwelling in a world and projecting toward possibilities. Any 
attempt to address the issue of the meaning of being in Being and Time  would ultimately 
have to do so  in terms of the play of affirmative and negative aspects. Such an endeavor 
would have to address questions such as: what kind of understanding of the meaning of 
being emerges from Being and Time?  How does this meaning coincide or conflict with 
                                                 
46 The concept of Dasein as “thrown being- in- the- world’ as well as the phenomenon  of anxiety  will be 
explored further in Chapter Three.  
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that which is expressed in the major traditions of Western philosophy?  Is being for the 
early Heidegger finite or is it infinite?  If being is finite then what can be said of Dasein’s 
understanding of being and openness toward being, which clearly appear to be 
expressions of a transcendence of finitude?  If being is infinite then what of the powerful 
expressions of finitude which permeate and limit  being at every point?  Is being 
something like a plenum which becomes permeated with negativity, or are the negative 
aspects finally overcome or negated in being’s disclosure?  Do the traditional concepts of 
finite and infinite simply no longer apply in a Heideggerian ontology? If so, then what of 
the negative aspects which clearly appear to be expressions of finitude? Questions such 
as these must be squarely addressed if we are to arrive at any kind of coherent  
understanding of the meaning of being in the early Heidegger. 
 
(b)  Recapitulation and redeeming the meaning/nature distinction  
 
        It might be helpful to reflect at this point on what conclusions we have come to thus 
far before going further.  We have seen how Heidegger’s project in Being and Time 
begins with the fact of our vague, average understanding of the meaning of being, one 
which requires clarification.  We have established both the ontical as well as the 
ontological priority of the being question. The former has pointed toward Dasein as the 
primary route toward access to the meaning of being. We have also noted the importance 
of coming to terms with the negative aspects of anxiety, thrownness, and fallenness. At 
this point the question becomes sharply into focus: what is the meaning of being for the 
early Heidegger? The necessity of squarely addressing this question is implied in the very 
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nature of Heidegger’s enterprise of raising anew the question about the meaning of being.  
Nevertheless Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, specifically the way in which 
metaphysics reifies being, or more strongly Heidegger’s attempt to overcome 
metaphysics and the reification of being which is implied in metaphysics, would seem to 
make any objective, discursive, theoretical understanding of being impossible. This 
problem is compounded if we take into account Heidegger’s critique of the worldless 
subject. Meaning as in the phrase “meaning of being” is in traditional language 
intelligibility, which arises from the side of consciousness, it is meaning about an 
objective world.  But have we not said that meaning should not be opposed to nature in 
Heidegger? Does this mean that when seen through Heideggerian eyes there is nothing at 
all problematic about the classical metaphysical endeavor to express the nature of being?  
This question must certainly be answered in the negative.  For Heidegger there is a real 
necessity for surpassing, passing beyond, overcoming, destroying,47 which is to say 
negating metaphysics.  It is only in and through the negation of metaphysics that the 
meaning of being can emerge. Yet if negation is employed in the way in which it is 
operative in the dominant traditions of metaphysics, which is to say as the simple 
opposite of affirmation, then the negation of theories concerning the nature of being 
would indeed result in meaning as a subjective phenomena.  If we are to redeem the 
meaning/nature distinction, to take advantage of its legitimate insights while avoiding its 
pitfalls, then a more complex understanding of the relation of affirmation to negation in 
the meaning/nature distinction must be worked out.  
                                                 
47 Heidegger’s project of the Destruktion of the history of ontology while not simply synonymous with 
what we normally understand by the English  destruction involves a real attempt to overcome and surpass 
inherited forms of ontology embodied in the Western tradition. Cf. Ibid., pp.41-49.  Here Derrida’s term 
“Deconstruction” is not far from Heidegger’s meaning.  
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     (c) The promise of negative theology  
 
 
 
      A reader of Heidegger struggling to address the question of the meaning of being in 
terms of the many ways in which the relation between affirmation and negation impinge 
on the question might be struck with the resemblance of this problematic to that of 
negative theology.  The primary starting point of the tradition of negative theology is 
with conditions of lack--of negativity uncertainty, limitation, and ignorance,  in modern 
language--what we might call epistemic impotence. In its Christian expressions, 
represented by such figures as Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart, negation is 
expressed in terms of the impossibility of knowing the divine being.  Since all of our 
knowledge is derived from finite human experience, and the divine being transcends what 
is finite not merely in scope but also in kind, the possibility of obtaining any real 
theological knowledge might appear to be all but impossible.   Based on the above one 
might conclude that negative theology must simply renounce all possibility of knowledge 
of the divine and follow a path of silence.  Yet this is not the case.  In its classical 
Christian expressions negative theology remains committed to the project of knowing 
God, even if such knowledge must be shrouded in darkness and mystery.  This fact 
suggests a tantalizing possibility for Heidegger interpretation.  Might the way in which 
the relation between the negative aspects represented by the impossibility of knowing 
God and the affirmative aspects represented by the quest for divine illumination clarify 
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the relation between the affirmative aspects represented by the necessity of raising anew 
the being question and the negative aspects represented by the repudiation of the 
reification of being implied in metaphysics in Heidegger?   Could a paradigm of negative 
theology also help to illuminate the relation between the affirmative aspects such as 
being-in-the-world and Sorge  and negative aspects  represented by Geworfenheit and 
anxiety, in such a way as to clarify the meaning of being in  Heidegger?  
      To explore this possibility will require a solid understanding of the nature of   the 
Heideggerian project. Above all this involves understanding that the analytic of Dasein   
which is central to the project of fundamental ontology is meant to lay the ontological 
groundwork for raising the question of being.48 Accordingly, without neglecting the 
Seinsfrage, and while attempting to address the understanding of being contained in the 
early period represented by Being and Time, we will place more emphasis on the later 
period. It is in the later period that Heidegger puts aside the elaborate exercise of 
fundamental ontology expressed in the analytic of Dasein  and, beginning  from the 
perspective of the direct involvement of human being in being, most directly addresses 
the issue of the meaning of being.  We will discover that in the later period the necessity 
of relating negative to positive aspects discussed earlier is not only present but present in 
a more acute form. Accordingly, what we will call the ‘dialectic of negation’--what will 
turn out to be the paradigm of the relation between affirmation and negation expressed 
and embodied in negative theology--will be especially helpful in illuminating the 
meaning of being in the later Heidegger.  To carry out such an endeavor will require a 
solid grounding in the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart. To an 
examination of these figures we now turn.    
                                                 
48 Ibid., pp. 36-49. 
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Chapter Two A- Pseudo Dionysius 
 
 
(I) HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS 
 
      
       (a) The question of identity  
 
 
 
        Virtually the only thing known about the historical figure behind the Dionysian 
corpus is that he lived sometime between the close of the fifth century and the early sixth 
century.  It was during this time that the earliest citations of his writings appear. From 
these early citations and extending up until about the fifteenth century it was believed that 
the author of the Dionysian corpus was identical to Dionysius the Areopagite (judge) 
mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 17:34).  Doubtless the conviction that the 
author of the Dionysian corpus was none other than the first Athenian convert of St. Paul 
greatly enhanced the status of his writings, lending them a kind of apostolic authority.49 
For this reason discussion of the Dionysian texts figured prominently in various 
theological debates leading up to the Lateran Council of 649, where in particular the 
authority of Dionysius was frequently cited against the Monothelite heresy.50 However by 
the fifteenth century profound doubts concerning the apostolic origins of the Dionysian 
corpus began to emerge. These doubts concerned such issues as 1) the influence of neo-
Platonism, 2) The striking similarity between the Christological language of the Council 
                                                 
49 Cf.  Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality,” in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete 
Works, trans. by Colm Luibheid and Paul Roem (New York:Paulist Press, 1987) p.22. 
50 Cf., Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (Conn:Geoffrey Chapmann, 1987) Chapter 1.  
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of Chalcedon (451) and that of the Dionysian texts, and  3) the total silence of the earliest 
Church Fathers. By the nineteenth century, with the development of greater historical 
awareness and methods of textual analysis, the theory of apostolic identity was no longer 
tenable.  Henceforth the author of the Dionysian corpus became known as “Pseudo-
Dionysius,” or “Dionysius the Pseudo Areopagite.”51  
 
      (II ) THE DIONYSIAN TEXTS  
 
(a) Major works  
 
       The major works of Dionysius are The Divine Names, The Mystical Theology, The 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, The Celestial Hierarchy, and ten letters.  At various points in the 
above mentioned works the author makes reference to two of his other works,   The 
Theological Representations and The Symbolic Theology, but these texts are no longer 
extant.  
     There is some consensus that the works of Dionysius form a unity around the central 
motif of the problem of speaking about the divine, which by its nature utterly transcends 
human knowledge.  Accordingly The Celestial Hierarchy is ostensibly a work of 
ontology which concerns the hierarchical structure of being, and The Ecclesiastical 
Hierarchy an analysis of the hierarchical structure of the church as a reflection of the 
celestial hierarchy. Yet at bottom both of these works concern the hierarchical structure 
of reality as it relates to the problem of religious knowledge. In both of these works the 
                                                 
51 Cf. Karl Fried, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century,” in Pseudo-Dionysius: 
The Complete Works, op cit., p. 38 
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attempt to articulate the hierarchical structure of reality will give rise to an ‘ascending’ 
and a ‘descending’ pathway.  Epistemologically expressed, these pathways are the 
affirmative (cataphatic) and negative (apophatic) aspects of knowledge of the divine. 
Likewise The Divine Names has been described as a work of cataphatic theology; it 
involves an attempt to articulate what can be positively known about the divine being.  
Yet this positive aspect will not stand apart from the negative.  It is in The Mystical 
Theology that Dionysius outlines his methodology, which involves both cataphatic and 
apophatic modes in the context of religious knowledge. For this reason The Mystical 
Theology provides a kind of master key to an understanding of Dionysius’s works. 
 
(III) THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY   
 
(a) The two poles of the Dionysian project  
 
      Undoubtedly the most fundamental presupposition of The Mystical Theology is that 
of the incomprehensibility of the divine being.  In fact it might be said that the whole of 
the Dionysian corpus involves an attempt to systematically articulate this starting point.  
Here methodological considerations, and hence the  The Mystical Theology, are 
paramount because, as both Marion and Derrida hold, the incomprehensibility of God, 
which is Dionysius’s starting point, is not simply and only incomprehensibility but is 
itself part of a discourse about God.   In this way it might be said that the fundamental 
problem of The Mystical Theology is how to understand the divine being which by its 
nature is incomprehensible. There are then two poles of the Dionysian project: first the 
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incomprehensibility of the divine being, and second the imperative to know and articulate 
this incomprehensibility in a systematic way. In the second chapter of The Mystical 
Theology Dionysius identifies these two poles as the negative and the affirmative aspects. 
In the first paragraph of chapter one Dionysius overwhelms the reader with the negative 
aspect:  
     For this I pray; and, Timothy, my friend, my advice to you as you look for a 
     sight of the mysterious things, is to leave behind you everything perceived  
     and understood, everything perceptible and understandable, and all that is  
     not and all that is, and with your understanding laid aside, to strive upward  
     as much as you can toward union with him who is beyond all being and know- 
     ledge. By an undivided and absolute abandonment of yourself, and everything, 
     shedding all and freed from all, you will be uplifted to the ray of divine shadow 
     which is above everything that is.52  
     Thus it would seem that the nature of the divine being obviates any possibility of 
comprehension since God is not only beyond perception but beyond understanding as 
well.  Yet already in the first chapter Dionysius speaks of the divine being in positive 
language as well, namely as cause.53  This markedly affirmative language 
immediately introduces the question of the relationship between the positive and the 
negative aspects.  If the divine being is utterly incomprehensible, beyond both 
perception and understanding, then in what sense can it be named as cause?  
Dionysius’s answer, although hardly adequate by itself, is significant, because it 
opens up a pathway in which the complex relationship between affirmation and 
negation will be explored. “Since it is the cause of all beings, we should posit and 
                                                 
52 Psudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, Chapter I, 997A-1000A All quotes from Dionysius are from 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, op cit. 
 
53 Cf. 1000B. 
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ascribe to it all the affirmations we make in regard to beings, and more appropriately, 
we should negate all those affirmations, since it surpasses all being.”54 
     The first part of the above quote follows a classic pattern: affirmative language is 
appropriate because the divine being has at least as much reality as any finite being.  
Yet in the second part we are told that these affirmations must then be negated.  Here 
it seems that affirmative language, far from introducing any epistemologically 
ampliative  aspects of the divine being, any aspects by which we can truly amplify 
and expand our knowledge, instead plunges understanding into the same darkness and 
unknowing which characterizes the negative aspect. Clearly what is required is some 
way of relating the negative to the positive aspects in a systematic way. In Chapter 
two Dionysius responds to this imperative. Its subtitle is: “How one should be united 
and attribute the praises to the Cause of all things who is beyond all things.”  It is here 
that Dionysius describes the affirmative and negative aspects of theology as 
descending and ascending.   
      When we make assertions, we begin with the first things, moving down through  
       intermediate terms until we reach the last things.  But now as we climb from the  
       last things up to the most primary we deny all things so that we may unhiddenly  
       know that unknowing which itself is hidden from all those possessed of knowing  
       amid all beings, so that we may see above being that darkness concealed from all  
       the light among beings.55 
 
       As Dionysius indicates in the third chapter, in the affirmative descending way we 
begin with those aspects which are the most congruent with the divine being. Along 
this pathway we can claim that God is “good,” “existent,” “life,” “wisdom,” and 
“power.” By contrast, in the negative ascending way we attempt to find aspects which 
are appropriate to the divine being only to discover the void of infinite qualitative 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 1000B. 
55 1025B. 
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distinction between the finite and the infinite. This void is filled by negativity. It is 
only possible to say what God is not.  Like the affirmative descending way, the 
ascending way takes place on different levels.  In the process of negation the mind 
ascends from gross to more refined levels: “when we deny that which is beyond every 
denial, we have to start by denying those qualities which differ most from the goal we 
have to attain.”56  
     The divine being is obviously not material or physical or spatial.  Yet that obvious 
negative insight forces understanding ‘upward’ to more subtle qualities such as 
‘spirit,’ “life,” “plentitude,” “fullness,” and “power,” only to discover that these too 
are inadequate.   
 
(b) Possible questions 
 
           The foregoing helps to introduce some systematic unity between the affirmative 
and negative aspects, yet it raises many serious questions, the most obvious of which has 
to do with the connection between the ascending and the descending ways.  If 
understanding begins on the descending pathway where there resides some positive 
intelligibility concerning the divine being, what then initiates the ascending turn?  Why 
not simply remain on the descending pathway where possession of certain knowledge of 
the divine being is assured? Secondly, if this upward turn is initiated, since the result is 
the destruction of all positive intelligibility it would seem that this would collapse the 
integrity of the descending movement entirely.  If indeed the upward or negative 
movement has precedence, as might be expected in a negative theology, then what value 
                                                 
56 1033C. 
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remains for the positive?  Moreover, if the negative movement has precedence must not 
all speech about God finally end in silence?   
 
(c) Negation and affirmation  
 
       To make any sense of the Dionysian project it is necessary to renounce both the 
concept of a simple opposition of negation and affirmation as well as that of the priority 
of negation over affirmation.  In the very first chapter Dionysius is careful to forestall 
these errors. “Now we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposite of 
the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond 
privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.”57  
     Negation is obviously the simple opposite of affirmation, and as such they are intrinsic 
aspects of the identity of any object.  This being the case, neither negation nor affirmation 
alone can have any deep ontological priority.  Denys Turner uses the concept of 
‘existence’ as an example.58 The claim ‘God exists’ is inadequate because there is an 
infinite qualitative difference between human and divine existence.  Given the 
inadequacy of affirmation it is natural and inevitable that the mind tends toward negation, 
yet there it can find no resting place, since the simple negation of ‘God exists’ is the 
equally inaccurate ‘God does not exist.’ Neither can it be confidently stated that the 
divine being is dissimilar to existence, since dissimilarity itself presupposes certain 
shared or similar features in terms of which others are not shared.  
                                                 
57 Ibid., 1000B. 
58 Cf. Denys Turner, The Darkness of God (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 47. 
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     Here the following objection might be raised.  Are the above conclusions not relative 
to individual properties or predicates? Obviously existence is a unique feature.  But what 
of the properties of materiality, or changeableness, or perceptibility?  Certainly it would 
be more accurate to say that God is ‘immaterial’ or ‘unchangeable’ rather than 
‘changeable’ or ‘perceptible.’ Then at least in regard to those particular properties 
negation would have priority over affirmation.   
     In replying to this objection it can be freely admitted that certain negative attributes 
seem to be more appropriate to the divine being than others.  Nevertheless, we must 
avoid the temptation to think that such terms are adequate since all attributes whatever 
remain wedded to finitude.  Specifically the terms ‘unchangeable’ or ‘imperceptible’ 
implicitly require a being in which those properties inhere.  Once this untenable 
assumption is rejected claims about the divine being in which these attributes are featured 
collapse into incoherence.  In chapter five Dionysius speaks to the point: “We make 
assertions and denials of what is next to it but never of it.”59  Thus when we claim that 
God is ‘unchangeable’ or ‘imperceptible,’ we don’t mean that these are inhering 
properties in the divine being, but only that God is not like other beings in which these 
properties do inhere.   
 
(d)     A metaphor  
 
      Is the term ‘negative theology’ then entirely a misnomer?  In an attempt to address 
this question Denys Turner suggests a wonderfully illustrative metaphor, that of a person 
                                                 
59 1048B. 
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at a loss for words.60  Imagine a person who is questioned with regard to an experience, 
perhaps a very ordinary experience, but one of deep personal significance.  No words 
seem to be adequate to capture its meaning.  When pressed every response is in the 
negative. “No it was not like that …I am not sure how to explain it….I would not 
describe it that way at all.”  Here it would be woefully inadequate to claim that this 
person has found an effective way to communicate the significance of his or her 
experience, the way of negation. Rather the employment of negation is testimony to the 
inadequacy of conceptual language to represent the irreducible uniqueness of a human 
experience.  Just as logicians fully admit that natural languages contain an excess of 
meaning which is not expressed in transition to artificial language, so nothing guarantees 
the absolute congruence of either natural or artificial language with being. One form of 
excess significance which is not fully expressible in any rational language has to do with 
the irreducible uniqueness of the experience of human subjectivity.  No objective 
conceptual language can express what it means to be a unique, concretely existing 
individual person; just as no ethical system can do justice to the irreducible elements of 
risk, commitment and involvement which are intrinsic to any ethical life experience. It 
was awareness of these insights which led Soren Kierkegaard and other existentialist 
philosophers to formulate a sustained critique of traditional philosophy with its emphasis 
on objective systematic understanding.  The foregoing suggests that negation plays a 
deep role in our human experience with regard to knowledge.  Specifically it embodies a 
poignant awareness of dimensions of our human experience which are not cognizable in 
terms of the binary thinking of categorical logic. For Dionysius the experience of the 
sacred is one of those dimensions.  Yet here we must ask: does this exhaust the meaning 
                                                 
60 Cf. Denys Turner, op cit p. 39. 
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of negation in Dionysius’s system?  Does negation then simply have a limiting function? 
It will appear that this is not the case.  
 
     (e)  Pushing the metaphor a step further  
 
       To return to the above metaphor, and in order to make the best use of it, we should 
push it a step further. If the irreducible uniqueness of our human experience can issue in a 
loss for words, nevertheless silence is rarely taken as the ‘last word’ about a situation of 
significance.   Rather the void of silence is inevitably filled with attempts at speech, even 
if these attempts prove woefully inadequate.  In a similar way negation as a primary 
ground of Dionysius’s vision is hardly an independent or autonomous mode which can 
function apart from affirmation.  The inextricable connection between affirmation and 
negation forms a basis for the methodology implicitly at work in The Divine Names, 
which involves a commentary on the meaning and significance of the conceptual albeit 
biblical names of God (goodness, light, beauty, justice, etc.). At the foundation of the 
attempt to articulate the significance of naming God lies the subtle play of apophatic and 
cataphatic modes.  In the final sense the transcendent God remains nameless since none 
of the many names of God succeed in capturing the divine essence.  Yet paradoxically 
this insight is reached only in and through the enterprise of naming. “This surely is the 
wonderful name which is above every other name and is therefore without a name….And 
yet on the other hand they give it many names…”61 
     The above illustrates in a precise way how the apophatic and cataphatic modes must 
be connected as part of the ongoing process of knowing the divine.  The namelessness of 
                                                 
61 The Divine Names, Chapter 1, 596A. 
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God is not happenstance, as one who has yet to be matched with a suitable name.  Rather 
no possible name of God is adequate.  It should then be obvious that awareness of the 
inadequacy of naming can paradoxically only be concretely realized in and through the 
process of naming.  It is only through the enterprise of naming that naming itself can be 
brought to its limits.   
      A similar situation occurs in The Symbolic Theology (not extant), as described by 
Dionysius in The Mystical Theology.   Whereas The Divine Names treats only of the 
conceptual names of God, in The Symbolic Theology images of God are taken from 
perceptible things.  “In my Symbolic Theology I have discussed analogies of God drawn 
from what we perceive… I have spoken of his anger, grief, and rage, of how he is said to 
be drunk and hung-over, of his oaths and curses…”62  The very concept of taking images 
of God from perceptible things would appear to be contrary to any reflective theology, 
yet such a practice is commonplace in the biblical, particularly the Old Testament 
tradition, and in The Celestial Hierarchy Dionysius provides a compelling argument for 
its reasonableness.63  Dionysius reasons that perceptual images of God might be actually 
thought of as superior to conceptual thoughts.  When the divine being is thought in 
abstract conceptual terms such as Being, plentitude, or cause, there is a natural tendency 
to think that these concepts actually reflect the divine essence itself, e.g. “God as pure 
Being,’ ‘God as ultimate cause,’  By contrast, perceptual images of God are so obviously 
incongruous with the divine that they are self- transcending. In and through the utter 
untenableness of perceptual images the mind is forced beyond them to a state of 
emptiness.   
                                                 
62 The Mystical Theology, Chapter 3, 1033A-1033C.. 
63 Cf. The Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter 2, 141A. 
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     We have argued that for Dionysius negation of a particular type has a kind of limiting 
function in our human experience.  It embodies an awareness of a transcendent dimension 
not expressible in the language of categorical logic.  We have also seen that negation 
cannot be effectively realized apart from affirmation.  Based on the above passages from 
The Symbolic Theology and The Celestial Hierarchy it might appear that the connection 
between affirmation and negation is largely superficial; specifically it is didactic. It is 
simply difficult for the human mind to effectively utilize the concept of pure negation.  In 
the case of The Symbolic Theology affirmation is employed as an indirect route to 
negation.  However, by consulting one of Dionysius’s own analogies developed in The 
Mystical Theology we learn that the connection between affirmation and negation is in 
fact more substantial.   
 
       (f)    Dionysius own analogy  
 
       In an attempt to explore the meaning of negation we introduced Denys Turner’s 
analogy of a person at a loss for words. It might be helpful to further explore this analogy 
as a route to the examination of one of Dionysius’s own analogies.  Earlier we observed 
both how silence is a response to ineluctable subjectivity and how nevertheless this 
silence is inevitably filled with speech.  At this point a natural question to ask is: why is 
this the case? If some aspects of our human experience in principle resist and oppose all 
attempts at objectification, would not the most prudent response to this situation be one 
of a respectful silence?  Can any speech which is a response to what is unsayable possess 
any claim to legitimacy?  To the extent to which Turner’s analogy is correct, exploring 
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these questions might help to further illuminate the way in which affirmation and 
negation are connected in Dionysius’s vision.   
     The fact that silence is inevitably filled with speech is an indication that the two are 
connected in inextricable ways. Upon reflection it is clear that the deepest silence, silence 
which is a response to irreducible subjectivity, is itself a basis upon which authentic 
speech is contrived.  Reflecting on this fact, Marion is disparaging of the early 
Wittgenstein’s relegation of das Mystiche  to the realm of total silence.64  This sharp 
distinction is rejected for the same reason it was rejected by the later Wittgenstein, 
because it is ultimately simplistic and untenable.  It would be simplistic to think that our 
experience of ineluctable subjectivity is the simple binary opposite of objectivity in a 
manner which would allow the former to be hermetically quarantined without doing 
violence to our human subjective experience.  Rather the manner in which these elements 
are inextricably connected is intrinsic to our identity as human persons. For these reasons 
some of the highest expressions of art, literature and philosophy involve an attempt to 
express and embody ineluctable subjectivity even if these attempts must ultimately prove 
to be inadequate.  In Marion’s language, it is only the unspoken which can be properly 
seen as the simple binary opposite of what is said.  We can be silent about the unspoken  
but never about the unspeakable because the unspeakable  is the wellspring from which 
the most significant forms of human speech issue forth.  
     The foregoing suggests a much deeper connection between affirmation and negation 
than what was discussed previously.  This deeper aspect is indicated in one of 
Dionysius’s own analogies: that of Moses’s ascent to Mt. Sinai.  It is clear that Dionysius 
                                                 
64 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “Denys,” in The Idol and The Distance:Five Studies, trans. by A. Carlson (New 
York:Fordham University Press, 2001) p. 193.  
52 
 
sees the upward movement of negation after the paradigm of the ascent of the soul to 
God.  Since the time of Philo of Alexandria, Moses’s ascent up Mt. Sinai has been seen 
as a symbol of the spiritual life, a paradigm which reached its purest form in Gregory of 
Nyssa, a thinker who undoubtedly exerted a profound influence upon Dionysius.65  So 
long as the effort of negation is seen in terms of the paradigm of ascent it is reasonable to 
ask: what is it that drives the upward movement of the soul to God?  Dionysius provides 
us with a clue in his opening prayer:  
                                  Trinity!! Higher than any being, 
                                  Any divinity and goodness! 
                                  Guide of Christians! 
                                  in the wisdom of heaven! 
                                  Lead us up beyond unknowing and light, 
                                  up to the furthest, highest peak 
                                  of mystic scripture, 
                                   where the mysteries of God’s word 
                                   lie simple, absolute and unchangeable  
                                   in the brilliant darkness of hidden silence. 
                                   Amid the deepest shadow 
                                   they pour overwhelming light 
                                   on what is most manifest. 
                                   Amid the wholly unsensed and unseen 
                                   They completely fill our sightless minds 
                                   with treasures beyond all beauty.   
 
     It is tempting to think that the movement of negation is driven by a pure vision of   
oneness, as each step upward is purged in the fires of negation, yet nothing is more 
foreign to Dionysius than a pure form of affirmation.  It is not knowledge and 
illumination which drives the soul upward but what is “beyond unknowing and light.”  
Likewise if it is the Trinity which is named as the driving force behind the upward ascent, 
it is a Trinity which is veiled in darkness and silence.  In Moses’s actual ascent, once at 
                                                 
65 Cf. Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius : A Commentary on the texts and an introduction to their influence 
(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 189-193. 
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the highest level “he plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing.”66  Here it 
is difficult to conceive how what is negative can be the driving force behind negation.  
Yet we must consider that if pure affirmation is foreign to Dionysius’s vision, then so is 
pure negation.  Describing Moses’s actual ascent up Mt. Sinai in the same chapter, 
Dionysius at times speaks in affirmative terms: when every  purification is complete, he 
hears the many-voiced trumpets.  He sees the many lights, pure and with rays streaming 
abundantly.”67  Then further on in the same paragraph Dionysius writes: “This means,  I 
presume, that the holiest and highest of the things perceived with the eye of the body or 
the mind are but the rationale which presupposes all that lies below the Transcendent 
One. Through them, however, his unimaginable presence is shown…”68   
     Here the language is affirmative but not purely so. Certainly the “Transcendent One” 
can be viewed as a symbol of pure affirmation, but it is a transcendence which is never 
experienced or known; rather it is known only in and through that which is below.  What 
is it then which finally drives the upward ascent? The manner in which affirmation and 
negation are intrinsically connected makes it difficult to provide a clear and unambiguous 
answer.  If it is affirmation which drives the ascent, it is an affirmation which only 
achieves its intrinsic identity through negation. If negation, then it is not a pure form of 
negation but one which is grounded in the affirmation of a transcendent ideal.  In the final 
sense it might be said that the transcendent ideal  drives the upward ascent, but it does so 
only in a disguised and concealed form.   
 
      (g)  Beyond affirmation and negation  
                                                 
66 The Mystical Theology, Chapter 1, 1000A. 
67 Ibid., 1000D-1001A. 
68 Ibid., 1000D-1001A. 
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 While it is critical to understand the deeply dialectical relationship between  
apophatic and cataphatic modes, it is not possible to make sense of the Dionysian 
project purely in terms of affirmation and negation, and so we must seriously consider 
Dionysius’s claim that the divine being ultimately transcends both. Marion has made 
this point a central focus of his appropriation of Dionysius: 
 
     But it is necessary to understand the meaning here correctly. It especially  
     does not mean that negation constitutes the last word of the discourse on  
     God.  For in being taken only as an inverted affirmation, negation would  
     persist in its categorical pretension. In place of saying what God is, it would 
     say what God is not.  Who does not see that the same intention is at work,  
     which in both cases, means to reach the essence of God, as if it were organ- 
     ized around any essence whatsoever?  Negation if it remains categorical remains  
     idolatrous.69 
 
 
     So long as we remain on the level of affirmation and negation we are committed  
to categorical thinking whose goal is to construct and articulate the nature of a being 
defined by certain essential features. Yet nothing could be more deeply antithetical to 
the Dionysian project than an essentialist understanding of divine nature.  Instead the 
goal of The Mystical Theology is to indicate how and why the divine being 
transcends any understanding in terms of essence. The starting point of Marion’s 
argument is with a section of chapter one of The Mystical Theology quoted earlier.70 
Earlier this passage was employed in order to articulate the dialectical relationship 
between affirmation and negation.  While the relationship between affirmation and 
negation is certainly dialectical, in this passage Dionysius clearly indicates that in the 
final sense the divine being transcends both.  If there is to be any access to the divine 
                                                 
69 Jean-Luc Marion, “Denys,” op cit., p. 147. 
70 Footnote 9, 1000B. 
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through rational discourse, it must be in terms of a modality which neither affirms not 
denies and is reflectively aware of the limitations of both.  It is only in terms of a 
“third way” that the truly subversive character of Dionysius’s thinking begins to 
emerge, for this type of thinking strikes at the very center of the Aristotelian 
metaphysical tradition.   
     Before going any further, let us observe that the shift to the lexicon of the  
     mountain climber, as strange as it might be, indicates at the very least that  
     one is attempting to undo oneself from the binary terms of the metaphysical  
     (in fact Aristotelian) doctrine of judgment and truth: the third way is played  
     out beyond the oppositions between negation and affirmation, synthesis and  
     separation, in short between the true and the false.71  
 
     Here the key terms are true and false.  In the final analysis affirmation and 
negation as aspects of truth and falsity are expressions of the binary thinking which 
characterizes and defines metaphysics. The divine being then transcends not only 
affirmation and negation but truth and falsity as well.  The goal of theology is thus no 
longer to construct or articulate an ontology of divine nature.  Any attempt to 
understand God in terms of essential features would have to be seen as fundamentally 
misguided.     
 
(h)    A challenge   
 
       One of the deepest challenges of Dionysian thinking can be put in the following way: 
Is it possible to think the divine being in a way which transcends metaphysics?  What 
would such a thinking be like? 
                                                 
71 Jean-Luc Marion, “In the Name, How to Avoid Speaking of it, in In Excess :Studies of Saturated 
Phenomena,  trans. by Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud  (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002) 
p. 137. 
56 
 
      The question is significant not only for understanding Dionysius. Insofar as 
Heidegger has assigned himself the task of thinking the question of Being apart from 
metaphysics, it will be significant for understanding the later Heidegger as well.  There is 
a natural tendency to associate the ending of metaphysics with the ending of thought, yet 
as we have argued, careful consideration of the text of The Mystical Theology indicates 
that although silence plays a significant role in a non-metaphysical thinking, such 
thinking would not simply be equivalent to silence.  With regard to the importance of 
silence in Dionysius it is clear that silence is an ever-present concomitant of speech 
which purports to transcend metaphysics.  If we may regard the upward affirmative phase 
as paradigmatic for speech, at each successive stage of the upward movement speech 
becomes ever more precarious. At the highest level of ascent to the divine speech finally 
threatens to pass into silence.  In The Divine Names Dionysius advises “honoring the 
unspeakable thinks with a sober silence.”72  Yet once again, no single aspect of divine 
knowing can be taken as autonomous.  Ultimately even silence before the divine must be 
given in continuity with speech. Commenting on this passage, Marion says: “But this 
silence still speaks, or rather completes a discourse that is sublimated into silence.”73   
     The continuity between speech and silence might be articulated in the following way: 
In metaphysical thinking speech, like presence, functions as a primary mode; in non-
metaphysical thinking this is reversed and silence is primary.  So much is this the case 
that silence itself becomes the primary ground of speech. If we might regard silence as an 
aspect of negativity, a non-metaphysical thinking must be thoroughly infused with deep 
aspects of negativity. In ordinary language this implies that non-metaphysical thinking is 
                                                 
72 The Divine Names, Chapter 1, 589B. 
73 Jean-Luc Marion, “Denys,” op cit., p. 143. 
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necessarily and deeply ambivalent.  It is a type of thinking which has renounced its claim 
to clear and unambiguous knowledge.  Not surprisingly, in this type of thinking 
symbolism and paradox play significant roles.  
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Chapter Two B- Meister Eckhart 
 
 
     (I )  BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MEISTER ECKHART  
 
 
   
              Meister Eckhart was born in Hochheim, Germany in the year 1260.  He was a 
member of the Dominican order and studied both theology and philosophy at the 
University of Paris.  Throughout his life Eckhart held a number of both administrative 
and teaching positions.  In his later years Eckhart was formally accused of heresy.  
Summoned before Pope John XXII, Eckhart attempted to mount a reasoned defense 
against the charge.  He died in the year 1327 before he could learn the outcome of his 
trial, and in 1329 twenty eight of his propositions were condemned in a papal bull as 
heretical.  
 
(II)     THE QUESTION OF SOURCES  
 
 
             Meister Eckhart’s writings are divided between his formal scholarly works, 
composed in Latin, and the less formal vernacular works, which were written in what is 
known today as middle-high German.  One might expect serious scholarly interest in 
Eckhart to be focused on the Latin works; this is however not the case. In the last thirty 
years a large body of scholarship has been concerned with Eckhart’s vernacular works, 
particularly his sermons.  Nor is this fact merely accidental.  As a member of the 
Dominican order, the ordo praedicatorum (order of preachers), at various points in his 
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career Eckhart occupied positions in which his major activity was preaching.74  Many 
Eckhart scholars believe that the primary focus of Eckhart’s creative energies was 
directed toward his role as Lebenmeister (spiritual master) in which preaching was an 
essential function.75 On the assumption that this is the case, the scholarly attention given 
to Eckhart’s vernacular writings would appear to be appropriate.  There were apparently 
substantial reasons why the Rhineland master reserved his most creative expression for 
oral communication in the form of preaching. These reasons reach to the very center of 
Eckhart’s identity as a thinker. Commenting on Eckhart’s relation to scholasticism, 
Reiner Schürmann writes: 
 
     Two families of languages confront each other: the ecclesiastical institution at the  
     end of a great period stiffens with an already curdled terminology, which can only  
     lead to the condemnation of one who breathes a new form into the old body of meta- 
     physical dogmata.76 
 
Schürmann’s metaphor of a confrontation between families of languages is a powerful 
one.   It suggests that the dispute between Eckhart and the ecclesiastical authorities, a 
dispute which resulted in his formal condemnation in 1329, was entirely linguistic.  
While this is not literally the case, the metaphor heightens our awareness concerning the 
way in which linguistic and conceptual aspects are inextricably intertwined in issues of 
thought77. Eckhart challenged scholastic metaphysics in subtle yet profound ways. 
Inevitably such challenges to prevailing ways of thought are accompanied by significant 
                                                 
74 Meister Eckhart:The Essential Commentaries, Treatises and Defense, trans. by Edmund Colledge and 
Bernard Mcginn (New Jersey:Paulist Press, 1981)  Cf. the Introduction by Colledge pp.- 1-15. 
75 Cf.  John Caputo, “Mysticism and Transgression: Derrida and Meister Eckhart,” in Derrida and 
Deconstruction, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman, p. 37. 
76 Reiner Schürmann, Wandering Joy (Massachusetts: Lindesfarne Books, 2001) p. 30. 
77 An excellent account of the whole matter of Eckhart’s condemnation and defense is provided by Bernard 
McGinn in an article, “Eckhart’s condemnation reconsidered,” in The Thomist, July, 1980. In this article 
McGinn demonstrates the extent to which Eckhart’s formal defense was marked by a persistent failure of 
communication between him and his accusers.  This fact lends much support to Schürmann’s metaphor.   
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disruptions in established modes of communication and speech.  Often inherited 
vocabulary proves all too inadequate for the expression of thoughts which have outgrown 
their linguistic forms.78   On this assumption Eckhart’s preference for oral 
communication would not have been merely circumstantial; rather it was at least in part a 
creative response to the over-determined meanings of scholastic vocabulary. While we 
must at all costs avoid a simple opposition between an orthodox, scholastic 
metaphysician of the Latin writings, and a creative-deconstructionist innovator of the 
vernacular,79 there is no denying the fact that contemporary ‘theological turn’ 
philosophers such as Derrida and Marion find the ways in which Eckhart undermined 
scholastic metaphysics to be most deeply expressed and embodied in the vernacular 
writings, particularly the sermons.   This, coupled with the fact that some of Eckhart’s 
most characteristic themes, such as Gottheit, are found nowhere else but in the vernacular 
provides an ample basis for us to focus our attention entirely on the vernacular.  
 
     (III)   APPROACH  
    
 
     Our analysis of Eckhart’s sermons will focus upon three major themes: (1) the critique 
of God and religion, including the concept of Gottheit (Godhead)  ( 2) the concept of 
                                                 
78 Another excellent article on Eckhart’s dispute with the ecclesiastical authorities is Oliver Davies’  “Why 
were Eckhart’s propositions condemned?” in New Blackfriars Vol. 71, issue # 7, 1990.  In this piece Davies 
begins with the fact of Eckhart’s near-universal rehabilitation in the world of theological orthodoxy and 
attempts to explain the condemnation in political terms.  The fact that Davies finds the  condemnation of 
Eckhart’s propositions to be inexplicable on a purely doctrinal level again lends support to the claim that 
the dispute between Eckhart and his accusers was characterized by serious miscommunication.    
79 Cf. Bernard McGinn,  The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (New York:The Crossroads Publishing 
Co., 2001)  p.33. While there is actually still much debate in Eckhart scholarship concerning the 
relationship between the Latin and the vernacular writings. McGinn argues that no hard and fast distinction 
is possible.  
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sunder war umbe (without a why); and ( 3) the concept of   
Abgescheidenheit/ichgebundenheit (detachment) or Gelâzenheit (releasement).   
 
(IV)     CRITIQUE OF GOD AND RELIGON  
 
 
      (a)       Critique of religion  
 
 
     One of the deepest ironies of Eckhart’s teaching is that such a God-obsessed thinker,  
a friar “from whom God hid nothing,” should have issued the very first critique both of 
God and of religion in Western civilization.  Like the violent assaults of Marx and 
Nietzsche   upon Judaeo-Christian foundations which were to follow five centuries later, 
Eckhart’s critique of God begins with a critique of religion; indeed there is a natural 
organic progression from the latter to the former.  All too significantly, the point of 
departure for Meister Eckhart’s critique of God and religion is essentially religious in 
character.  In a well-known sermon, “Intravit Jesus in Quoddam Castellum,” Eckhart 
denounces all forms of attachment which might deprive the Christian believer of perfect 
freedom to serve the will of God:   
 
     Attachment to any work (ichgebundenheit an irgendwelches Werk)  which  
     deprives you of the freedom  to serve God in this present now and to follow  
     him alone in the light by which he instructs you what to do and what not to 
     do, free and new in each now (frei und neu in jedem Nun) as if you did not  
     possess, nor desire, nor indeed could do anything else; every such attachment 
     (jedliche Ichgebundenheit) or every premeditated work which deprives you of  
     this ever new freedom, I now call it a year, for your mind  does not bear fruit  
     as long as it has not accomplished the work that you held with attachment.80 
                                                 
80 Schürmann, op. cit., p. 4,  Although  Schürmann’s text includes a translation of Eckhart’s sermons from 
the original German along with his commentary, the text  is entirely in English, I have provided translations 
of  key parts of all quotes from Eckhart with the assistance of Meister Eckhart:Deutschen Predigten und 
Traktate, ed. and trans. by Josf Quint ( Munich:Carl Hansen, 1963) p. 160.  Hereafter abbreviated as Quint. 
Translations are into modern German rather than the original middle high German in which Eckhart wrote.  
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     The imperative to separate oneself from worldly attractions that provide an obstacle to 
spiritual life has deep roots in the Christian tradition, ultimately reaching back to the 
gospels.81  Yet the attachments which Eckhart names are not worldly in character,  but 
essentially religious. Specifically they are the attachments of prayer (an Gebet), fasting 
(an Fasten), vigils (an Wachen), “and all other external exercises and mortifications.”82 
(allerhand  äußerliche Übungen und Kasteiungen.)  These ubiquitous religious 
paraphernalia provide a particularly insidious obstacle to spiritual life because in and 
through them attachment (ichgebundenheit) itself assumes  spiritual guise.   
 
     Some people want to see God with their own eyes (mit den Augen ansehen), 
     just as they see a cow; and they want to love God (wollen Gott lieben) just  
     as they love a cow (wie sie eine Kuh lieben). You love a cow because of the  
     milk and cheese and because of your own advantage (deines eigenen  Nutzens). 
     This is how people act who love God because of external riches (außern  
     Reichtums) or internal consolation (inneren Trostes).83 
 
    Here äußern Reichtums and inneren Trostes are placed on exactly the same level.        
If one seeks God because of some advantage, the spiritual quest has been corrupted.  God 
is then worshiped not in spirit and in truth but rather as a means to an end.   In a famous 
sermon entitled “Omne Datum Optimum” Eckhart writes: 
 
        Know that when you seek anything of your own, you will never find God 
        because you do not seek God purely (weil du nicht Gott ausschließich suchst). 
        You are seeking something along with God (du suchst etwas mit Gott) and you                               
        are acting as if you were to make a candle out of God in order to look for some- 
        thing with it.  Once one finds the thing one is looking for, one throws the candle  
                                                 
81 for example, the parable of the rich man, Matthew Chapter 19. 
82 Schur. p. 4/Quint p.160. 
83 Meister Eckhart:Teacher and Preacher, ed. and trans. Bernard McGinn and Frank Tobin (New 
York:Paulist Press, 1986) p. 278.  Tobin  and Mcginn’s book is also a translation from the original German 
rendered entirely in English.  I have again provided portions of the German text with the help of Quint- p. 
227.   Hereafter Tobin and McGinn’s translation  will be abbreviated Tobmac.   
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        away.84      
 
     The type of utilitarian  arrangement in which God is sought as a means to an end, even 
if that end is a ‘spiritual’(geistig) one in the form of enlightenment,  edification, or eternal 
life essentially trades one thing for another (das eine um das andere geben) and thus 
ultimately reduces an affair which should be spiritual and divine (geistig und göttlich) to 
a business deal (Weise markten).85     This insight has profound implications for the 
nature of spiritual life.  First, it is impossible to encounter Eckhart’s critique without 
asking: are not all spiritual practices ultimately utilitarian in character?  If so, the 
autonomous identity of the very concept of a spiritual practice itself becomes radically 
called into question.  Second, we must also ask: what about the notion of a spiritual 
quest?  The identity of any activity is constituted at least in part in terms of its goals. 
Goals are compared and the resources of life are apportioned according to the relative 
value of each.  This being the case, the spiritual quest is also utilitarian.  Earlier we 
argued that attachment corrupts the spiritual quest.  Yet if the spiritual quest is utilitarian, 
then once again the very identity of an authentic spiritual quest becomes problematic.86    
And what of the concept of God?  Eckhart’s argument makes it difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that God is the partner in the business deal in which religious practices are 
services offered in the hope of being exchanged.  Thus Eckhart’s critique of religion 
leads inevitably into a critique of God.   
        (b)   Critique of God  
                                                 
84 Tobmac p. 250/Quint p. 170- 171. 
85 This argument as well as the above italicized German  words  are found in Intravit Jesus in templum, a  
sermon in which Eckhart reflects upon the story of Jesus driving out the money changers in the temple. 
(Matthew chapter 21) See Quint pp. 153-155/Tobmac p. 240-241. 
86 It is significant that nowhere in the sermon Intravit Jesus in templum  are the terms ‘spiritual life,’ or 
‘spiritual quest,’ or ‘spiritual practice’ found.  Indeed it is difficult to find these or even synonymous terms 
anywhere in Eckhart’s sermons.  This fact lends support to the above argument.    
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        One of the deepest challenges posed by Meister Eckhart is that to a perfectly 
detached spirit the concept of God would become superfluous.  This insight takes a quite 
explicit form in these startling words: “The noblest and the ultimate thing that a person 
can forsake is that he forsakes God for God’s sake (Das höcheste und das Äußerste, was  
der Mensch lassen kann das ist, daß er Gott um Gottes willen lasse).87 
     Nevertheless Eckhart’s imperative to forsake God is itself solidly grounded within a 
theistic framework.  Like his master Aquinas, Eckhart never doubts that the final cause of 
nature which presumably includes human existence  is God.  “Nature in its most inner 
self seeks and strives secretly for God (heimlich im Innersten sucht und strebt die Natur 
nach Gott).”88   
     Yet paradoxically the natural striving of the mind toward its supernatural end 
ineluctably requires a forsaking of God insofar as God can be known and represented in 
any objective form.  In a sermon, “Modicum et iam non videbitis me,” Eckhart describes 
in a very poignant way how the longing of the soul for its ultimate ground must lead it 
inevitably beyond God: 
        The intellect penetrates within.  It is not satisfied with goodness or with wisdom 
        or with God himself.  In good truth it is as little satisfied with God as with a stone 
        or a tree.  It never rests, it breaks into the ground from which goodness and truth  
        comes forth (sie bricht ein in den Grund, wo Gutheit und Wahrheit ausbrechen),  
        and perceives it [God’s being]in principio, in the beginning, where goodness and  
        truth are going out ( wo Gutheit und Wahrheit ihren ausgang Nahmen) before it  
        acquires any name, before it bursts forth.89   
 
     This originary source or Ursprung  towards which the highest part of the mind (die 
Oberstes teil der Stelle)  transcends  is none other than the Godhead (Gottheit).  Toward 
an examination of this most fundamental concept we now turn.   
                                                 
87 Tobmac p. 268/Quint p. 214. 
88 Tobmac p. 313/Quint p. 346. 
89 Tobmac p. 315/Quint p. 348. 
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       (c)   The Godhead  
 
       Unfortunately Eckhart is not consistent in his terminology, often using the term Gott 
(God) where Gottheit (Godhead) might be more appropriate.  Nevertheless, the hiatus 
which separates the two concepts is unmistakable. God and Godhead are as distinct as 
heaven and earth (Gott und Gottheit sind so  weit voneinander  verschieden wie Himmel 
und Erde).90 
     In distinction from Gott, Gottheit is not a separate entity which can be known and 
understood in any objective manner. Thus it would be quite impossible to delineate 
objective features of Gottheit. At once we should note the distance between Eckhart and 
the traditional scholastic view.  In the latter God possesses a number of clearly defined 
features and properties such as immutability, eternity and goodness.91  Speaking of Gott 
but clearly intending, Gottheit Eckhart writes: 
      
       Unsophisticated teachers say that God is pure being(lauteres Sein). He is  
       as high above being( er is so hoch ̀über dem Sein ) as the highest angel  
       is above a gnat.  I would be speaking incorrectly in calling God a being (wenn ich  
       Gott ein Sein nennte), as if I called the sun pale or black. God is neither this 
       nor that.  A Master says: whoever imagines that he has understood God, if  
       he knows anything (etwas erkennen) it is not God that he knows.(der erkennte 
       God nicht).92 
 
 
     The last sentence summarizes the manner in which Gottheit must resist and oppose  
all attempts at predication.  Consequently the appearance of predication in language is a 
certain sign that we are not in the presence of a concept of  Gottheit.  In a sermon 
                                                 
90 Schur. p. 111/Quint p. 272. 
91 Aquinas, Summa, Ia. q.4-10. 
92 Tobmac p.256/Quint p. 196. 
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ironically entitled Unus Deus et Pater Omnium (one God and father of all) Eckhart refers 
to Gottheit as  Verneinen des Verneinens (negation of negation).93  We have encountered 
the same term in Dionysius.  For Eckhart the act of negation is an attempt to catch hold 
(erfasse) of an aspect of the divine being. This intention is doomed to be frustrated; hence 
the mind is forced to posit a second negation.   Eckhart’s own example, goodness 
(Gutheit), can be misleading.  We must negate the goodness of God because goodness as 
it is present in the divine being has no commonality with human goodness.  Yet this 
obvious example is open to an obvious objection: namely what of inherently negative 
qualities?  Can these not be predicated of God without further qualification?  Can it not 
be accurately claimed that ‘God is not an unjust ruler,’ or ‘God is not an evil tyrant’ or 
‘God is not an ignorant fool?’ 
       Denys Turner effectively eliminates this possibility.94 Negative predicates already 
presuppose a background of commonality in which they operate.  For this reason the 
more two things have in common, the easier it is to make negative statements about either 
of them.  Any two animals, e.g. a horse and a dog, share so much in common that it 
becomes quite easy to indicate how they are different:  ‘a dog does not have hoofs’, ‘a 
horse does not bark’.  The assignment is more difficult in the case of an animal and a 
number, or a number and a mountain range.  This highlights just how critical the 
background of commonality is for making negative statements.  If we begin by 
hypothesizing that a pair of objects have nothing whatsoever in common, and hence  no 
positive predication is possible, negative statements become equally impossible.  The 
statement ‘God is not an ignorant fool’ appears to be tenable because it surreptitiously   
                                                 
93 Tobmac p. 281/Quit p. 252. 
94 Denys Turner, “Tradition and Faith,” in The International Journal of Systematic Theology, Vol. 6. no. 1, 
Jan. 2004, p. 27.   
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imports positive predicates which function as a background for the negative. Thus the 
statement implicitly presupposes that God is a being sharing some features with other 
beings.  Once that presupposition is rejected, all value contained in the negative statement 
itself dissolves.  Thus Eckhart concludes that Gottheit can only be described as  
Verneinen des Verneinens.  This does not supply Gottheit with any objective content but 
rather leads thinking into an utter abyss (ganzen Abgrund).95All too naturally two of 
Eckhart’s favorite metaphors for Gottheit are desert (Einöde) and wasteland 
(Wüste).96Are these then negative images of God?  Not in the sense of concepts which 
actually embody some substantive content by way of negation.  Rather they are like 
symbols which point toward ultimate unknowability.   
 
            (d)    God and Godhead 
 
            The fact that the terms Gott and Gottheit  are used in the sermons almost 
interchangeably, even though they are distinct concepts, raises fundamental questions 
concerning their relationship.    The Sermon “Nolite Timere Eos” contains one of the 
most remarkable passages in all of Eckhart’s vernacular writings.   In it this relationship 
is explored in a very original and poignant way.       
 
        God becomes where all creatures enunciate God (Gott wird wo alle Kreat- 
        Uren Aussprechen). There God becomes. When I stood in the ground, the 
        soil, the river, and the source of the Godhead (Quell der Gottheit), no one 
        asked me where I was going or what I was doing. There was no one there 
        to question me. But when I went out all creatures cried out: “God.” If  
        some one were to ask me: “brother Eckhart, when did you leave home?” 
        This would indicate that I must have previously been inside (dann bin ich  
                                                 
95 Tobmac p. 268/Quint p. 213.  
96 Tobmac p. 263/ Quint p. 206. 
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        Drin gewesen). It is thus that all creatures speak of God.  And why do they  
        not speak of the Godhead? (Und warum redden sie nicht von der Gottheit?)  
        Everything that is in the Godhead is one, and of this nothing can be said 
        (Alles das, was in der Gottheit ist, das ist Eins, und vavon kann man nicht  
        Redden).97        
 
     The genre of the passage is clearly that of a poetic myth. Like all authentic poetry it is 
resonant with meaning.  With lyrical charm it beguiles the reader to extract an 
interpretation while defying a univocal translation into the language of prose.   In the 
manner of an archetypical creation myth it tells a story which expresses powerful 
philosophical truths in symbolic form. The story is told of the primordial time in which 
Eckhart dwelled in the Godhead and of his ‘going out.’  Accordingly,   Als ich (noch) im 
Grunde, im Boden, im Strom, und Quell, der Gottheit stand ( when I stood in the ground, 
the soil, the river and the source of the Godhead) does not express an actual historical 
time but an ontological condition, the condition in which created existence is united with 
the infinite ground of its possibility.98 In this state, mythically expressed as primordial 
time,    the concept of a premium ens is quite impossible.  Indeed the concept of Gottheit 
is likewise impossible insofar as it represents an objectifiable ground which stands 
opposed to created existence.  The most that can be said of the Godhead is alles das, was 
in der Gottheit ist, das ist Eins, und davon kann man nicht reden (Everything that is in 
the Godhead is one, and of this nothing more can be said).  Concepts of the divine are 
only possible to the extent to which created existence is alienated from its ground.  Also 
reden alle Kreaturen von „Gott”  (Thus all creatures speak of God). The mythical 
context of the passage also allows for the expression of something of the human drama 
                                                 
97 Schürmann p. 111./Quint p.273.  
98 For this insight I am indebted to Paul Tillich’s interpretation of the Biblical story of the  fall of man In 
Genesis Chapters 1-3.  Cf.  Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 
1957), p. 29-31. 
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which accompanies issues of ultimate meaning. Als ich (aber) ausfloß die Sprachen alle 
Kreaturen „Gott!” (But when I went out, all creatures cried out:”God!”). 
Alienation from the ground can be described on a human level as a profound spiritual 
decadence.  A certain sign of this fallen state is the frenzy to articulate and defend God- 
concepts.   
     Although Eckhart does speak of Gottheit as the Grund  (ground) of God, from the 
above it should be clear that  Gottheit cannot be the ground of  God in the same way as 
Aquinas can speak of God as the ground of the world.  This cannot be the case because 
God and Gottheit are not two separate entities. Rather God is a founded mode which is 
destined to utterly dissolve.  Neither can we simply replace God with Gottheit, for this 
would be to miss the fundamental character of Eckhart’s criticism of God.  Gottheit  is  
preferable to God only because the former concept itself uniquely embodies something of 
the impossibility of all God concepts.  As we have seen, Gottheit  is not a substantive 
concept at all.  It is rather a symbol which leads us toward an ultimate conceptual 
asceticism, to the desert of the mind in which conceptual representation is replaced by 
unknowing.   
 
(V)  (WITHOUT A WHY)  (sunder war umbre)   
 
(a) The challenge to the ontology of grounding  
 
      One of the most significant and innovative concepts in Eckhart’s sermons is that of 
sunder war umbe.  The concept is significant for its striking originality.  The central 
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challenge which confronts any serious interpretation of Eckhart’s sermons involves the 
assignment of sorting out the tangled web of threads which intersect with and impinge 
upon any fundamental theme.  These historical roots, to name only the most significant, 
are Neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Patristic, and Biblical.  Doubtless a similar 
challenge confronts the attempt to understand any historical figure in the Western 
tradition.  Philosophical thinking arises out of an historical stream and often the point of a 
thinker’s greatest originality is that point at which historical roots converge in her 
intellectual life only to be abandoned when a radically new perspective beckons upon the 
horizon of creativity.  In this respect the concept of sunder war umbe is unique.  As we 
will discover, sunder war umbe is a revolutionary concept, and like all revolutionary 
concepts it is given in continuity with past forms of thinking, but this is not the continuity 
of a measured progression but of a mutation in which the presence of what is new is 
experienced with such powerful suddenness as to make the fact of continuity itself all but 
invisible.     In a sermon titled Mulier Venit Hora Eckhart provides a succinct 
introduction to this rather remarkable theme: 
         Someone could ask a good man: “Why do you seek God?”-“Because he is  
         God.”-“Why do you seek the truth?”-“Because it is the truth.”-“Why do you 
         seek justice?”-“Because it is justice.” Such people’s attitude is the right one. 
         All things that are in time have a why. Thus when someone asks a man: 
         “Why are you eating?”-“In order to gain strength.”- “Why are you sleeping?”- 
         “For the same reason.” And so with everything that is in time.  But if someone 
         asked a good man: “Why do you love God?”- “I do not know, because of God.”- 
         “Why do you love the truth?”- “Because of the truth.”-“Why do you love just- 
          ice?”-“Because of justice.” “Why do you love goodness?”- “Because of good- 
          ness.”  “Why are you living?”-“My word, I do not know!  But I am happy to be   
          alive.”99   
                                                 
99 Schur. P 54/Quint p. 384.  Wer zu einem guten Menschen spräche:„Warum suchst du 
Gott?”- „Weil er Gott ist!” .”„Warum liebst du die Wahrhiet?” „Um der Wahrheit 
willen” „Warum liebst du die Gerechtigkeit?”-„Um der Gerechtigkeit willen!” Um 
solche Menschen steht es recht. Alle Dinge, die in der Zeit sind, die haben  
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     In and through the playful tone it is possible to detect something deeply subversive in 
the above passage.  Clearly, here Eckhart is attempting to undermine the conviction that it 
is necessary to establish grounds for fundamental aspects of our human experience.    The 
attempt to establish grounds for what is livable has a long history in Western philosophy 
ultimately reaching at least back to the Republic  of Plato, and survives in various forms 
even to this day. We can illustrate the nature of this enterprise with the example of moral 
experience, which plays a prominent role in the above passage.     A fundamental 
presupposition of the quest to establish grounds for moral experience is that there is 
something essentially ambiguous about our most basic moral concepts.  Human beings 
don’t really know what goodness or justice or virtue is.  In the absence of clear moral 
concepts it becomes impossible to be certain that our actions are truly moral.  The 
philosophical attempt to establish enduring grounds for moral experience is thus more 
than merely speculative; it arises out of an urgent human need to find orientation in the 
practical affairs of moral life.  In the philosophical and religious world of the fourteenth 
century, following the great synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas, it was believed that the 
foundation of our moral experience is God. By the eighteenth century this transcendent, 
supernatural foundation had been replaced by reason.  Thus an understanding of the 
nature of a moral foundation has shifted throughout Western civilization, but what has 
remained constant is the manner in which moral life is grounded upon an ultimate 
                                                                                                                                                 
ein Warum. Wer beispielsweise einen Menschen fragte:„Warum esst du?”- 
„Damit ich Krafte habe!” .”„Warum schläfst du?”„Zu damselben Zweck!” Steht es mit 
allen Dingen, die in der Seit sind. Wer aber einen guten Menschen fragte:„Warum liebst 
du Gott?”-”„Ich weiß es nicht, um Gottes willen!” „Warum liebst du die Wahrheit?”  
„Um der Wahrheit willen!”Warum liebst du der Gerechtigkeit?”-„ Um der Gerechtigkeit 
Willen!” „Warum liebst du die Gutheit?”-„Um der Gutheit willen!”Warum lebst  du?” 
„Traun, ich weiß es nicht! (Aber) ich lebe gern!” 
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foundation.  The above passage is anomalous for the way in which it questions the need 
for any moral foundation whatsoever. 
       Eckhart’s context in these sermons is pastoral rather than purely philosophical, and 
this fact is not only methodologically significant but constitutive for the very identity of 
his enterprise.  Through use of some of the same rhetorical techniques that are present in 
a successful dramatic narrative, insights are unveiled with apparent suddenness rather 
than forming the conclusions of syllogistic arguments.  Even though Eckhart does not 
provide formal arguments for his position, it is not difficult to construct them from the 
material provided.  In the above passage the concatenation of questions represents the 
process which is entered into with the raising of the question ‘why?’  To pose a ‘why’ 
question in a formal way is to commit to a process of following a chain of reasoning to 
completion.  This itself presupposes that more intelligibility is to be found at the end of 
the chain than at any step along the way. However, in the case where we begin with 
fundamental issues such as Gott, Wahrheit,   Gutheit, or  Gerechtigkeit  the chain never 
actually  reaches completion in a self- illuminating basis or ground.  Thus any question 
about human motivation („Warum liebst du die Wahrheit?,” „Warum liebst du die 
Gerechtigkeit?”)   or action („Warum issest du?,” „Warum schläfst du?”)  inexorably  
leads to the most fundamental question that can be asked about human motivation: 
„Warum lebst du” (why are you living?) This question has formally completed the chain 
but has hardly brought it to closure in  a foundational mode of awareness. In the case of 
the question „Warum suchst  du die Gerechtigkeit?” the interlocutor refuses to follow a 
chain of reasoning toward what would hypothetically serve as its ground.  His response,  
„Um der Gerechtigkeit willen!,”exhibits an implicit awareness that if there is any basis to 
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justice it cannot reside at the end of a chain of reasoning but must be immediately known 
and experienced in the compelling power of justice.   
     In the second round of questioning the chain is followed to completion with „Warum 
lebst du?” If we were to pose this query in formal language the question ‘what is the 
purpose of human  existence?’  would have little trouble finding a response in the 
fourteenth  century scholastic world: ‘The purpose of human  existence is to see and 
know God.’ The „ich weiß es nicht!" of the interlocutor does not represent agnosticism 
concerning the formal answer.  Here the small word traun which precedes the phrase 
speaks volumes.  Der gute Mann  who exclaims it is too startled and amazed by the fact 
of existence to make easy reference to a formal response. Neither can this wonder and 
amazement be passed off as merely a subjective state. Rather it represents the inadequacy 
of formal responses to do justice to what includes these subjective states as phenomena to 
be explained.  Taking this fact into account it is clear that the correctness of a formal 
objective response is quite irrelevant. Thus the „Ich lebe gern!” speaks out of another 
mode of existence entirely--that of gratitude.    
 
(VI)  DETACHMENT/RELEASEMENT   
 
(a)        Eckhart and the Christian tradition/detachment vs. releasement  
 
       The most significant concept in Eckhart’s vernacular vocabulary is that of 
Gelâzenheit.(releasement).  Closely related to Gelâzenheit is the concept of 
Abegescheidenheit(detachment).  We have already encountered the latter concept in our 
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examination of the sermon Intravit Jesus in Quoddam Castellum. It refers to a state of 
being without any attachments (eigenshaft) which prohibit the perfect freedom to serve 
the will of God.   
     The concept of detachment has a long history in the Christian tradition, to say nothing 
of the Stoic and neo-Platonic traditions.  Even if Eckhart’s concept of detachment 
remains in continuity with its Christian roots while assimilating aspects of other 
traditions, it is also unique.100  Gelâzenheit is from the root word ‘let,’ so it can be 
translated as ‘letting be,’ ‘abandonment,’ or ‘releasement.’101 Once again it refers to a 
state of perfect freedom from all attachments, of being without any constraints that 
impede perfect union with God. From the foregoing it is evident that it is difficult to 
establish a hard and fast distinction between the concepts.  Indeed for many 
commentators they are entirely synonymous,102 while for others103 Gelâzenheit represents 
a more thoroughgoing state of abandonment to divine will.  In the latter view detachment 
is a matter of degree.  The soul might be on the pathway of detachment in which the goal 
of this journey is the perfect freedom of Gelâzenheit.  The latter view is problematic 
because of the way in which it imputes an autonomy to spiritual life, a view which we 
have already found questionable.  Fortunately for our purposes, it is not necessary to 
settle this dispute, so that with some attention to where a distinction might be necessary 
we may employ the concepts interchangeably.   
                                                 
100 Cf. Bernard Mcginn, “Eckhart’s Condemnation Reconsidered,” in The Thomist,  Vol. # 44 July 1980, 
pp. 390-414.   
101 Gelâzenheitt is  the actual middle high German word which Eckhart used.  The modern German form is 
Gelassenheit. 
102 Cf.  John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought(New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1986) p. 119. 
103 Cf. Tobmac. P. 399. 
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     The concept of Gelâzenheit intersects in a powerful way with Eckhart’s critique of 
God and religion as well as with his concept of sunder war umbe.  We will examine each 
of these aspects individually.   
 
(b)   Detachment and the critique of God and religion   
 
         We have seen how paradoxically familiar religious accoutrements,  whether 
conceptual or practical,  may provide an insidious obstacle to spiritual life. Yet religious 
concepts and practices, and above all the concept of God, are not casually or easily 
abandoned.  Gelâzenheit then represents an ideal of spiritual freedom.  Only when  
perfectly  released is one  able to abandon traditional religious practices.  It is certainly 
possible to support this view with isolated quotes from Eckhart, for example from the 
section quoted earlier from Intravit Jesus in Quoddam Castellum.  Yet we have seen in 
passages which followed, particularly in the ‘utilitarian argument’ extracted from Intravit 
Jesus in Templum, that the very notion of a spiritual goal or quest has become 
problematic. Accordingly we might expect to find that Gelâzenheit is likewise understood 
as a point of departure or presupposition of spiritual life.  In making this point Eckhart 
quotes the words of Jesus in Luke 14:26, “No one hears my words nor my teaching 
unless he has forsaken himself,” and then  comments upon the verse  as follows: “Who 
would hear the word of God must be totally detached”(Denn wer Gottes Wort hören soll, 
der muß vollig gelassen sein).104  Likewise reflecting on Luke 9:23, “Whoever wants to 
become my disciple must leave himself,” Eckhart writes: “If the spirit knew its utter 
detachment (Erkennte der Geist sein reines Abgeschiedensein), it could not incline itself 
                                                 
104 Tobmac p. 267/Quint p. 213. 
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toward anything (so könnte er sich auf kein Ding mehr hinneigen) but would have to 
remain in its utter detachment (er müßte vielmehr auf seinem reinen Abgeschiedensein 
verharren).105  
     The latter quotation obliterates the concept of Abegescheidenheit  as a project that is to 
be accomplished through strenuous effort.  If there is an sense in which 
Abegescheidenheit represents a project, its ultimate goal is to realize what has already 
been accomplished.  If this is the case, goal oriented action achieved by means of 
strenuous effort collapses into a fateful acceptance of divine destiny beyond all human 
comprehension and striving.   
     The fact that Eckhart can claim scriptural authority makes his perspective no less 
revolutionary.  Now spiritual life can no longer be conceived as analogous to practical 
endeavors with clearly defined goals. Without clearly defined goals the autonomy of 
spiritual life collapses into aimless activity.  
     The deepest challenge posed by Gelâzenheit is to the concept of God. We have seen 
how God-concepts are founded modes arising out of separation and distance from 
Gottheit.  Accordingly the presence of God-concepts becomes the deepest obstacle to 
perfect releasement(vollig gelassen sein). So much is this the case that Eckhart’s doctrine 
could be easily confused with that of atheism.106 
 
(c) Detachment and sunder war umbre  
 
                                                 
105 Tobmac p. 265/Quint p. 205. 
106 Cf. Denys Turner, “The Art of Unknowing: Negative Theology in Late Medieval Mysticism,” in 
Modern Theology: 14:4 (October 1998) 
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      We have seen how Eckhart undermines the claim that actions require an ultimate 
ground.  Yet once again the quest for ultimate foundations is not easily or casually 
relinquished.  Eckhart has comprehended that the quest to secure unshakable foundations 
represents a deep and abiding aspect of the human spirit, but in the final sense is one 
which  is on a continuum with more mundane aspects.  A higher or more authentic aspect 
is represented not by the drive to secure ultimate foundations, but by the ability to 
relinquish the demand for security inherent in the quest to establish ultimate unshakable 
grounds.  
     What then is the relationship between sunder war umbe and Gelâzenheit?   Our 
answer must comprehend the manner in which Gelâzenheit is a presupposition and  an 
aim.   Accordingly as an aim, only the soul that has achieved the level of perfect 
releasement can abandon the need for ultimate grounds and is thus able to act sunder war 
umbe.  Contrariwise as a presupposition, only one who is perfectly released can act 
sunder war umbe. 
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Chapter Three- Illuminating the question and meaning of Being in the early Heidegger. 
 
 
 
   (I)  THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING BEING IN THE .LATTER 
HEIDEGGER  
 
(a.) Understanding being in the light of the critique of metaphysics    
 
     We have seen how at least since 1927 Heidegger has been guided by the ‘single star’ 
of the question of being.  Nevertheless it is only in the later writings that Heidegger  
attempts to deal with the question of being without regard to its being grounded in 
beings,107 that is to say with the issue of being as such.  It is in the later writings then that 
we should be entitled to ask questions such as: Where has the long journey through “the 
neighborhood of being” taken us? What intelligibility concerning being which may have 
been absent at the start of our journey do we now possess?   In the final sense what can be 
said about being according to Heidegger?  Here it is essential to bear in mind that 
whatever significance concerning being that is present in the later Heidegger is provided 
in terms of a relentless criticism of metaphysics.  It would therefore be essentially 
misguided to expect from Heidegger one more theory of being in a manner which is on a 
continuum with those of Hegel, Plato or Spinoza.    Nevertheless the enterprise 
announced in Being and Time of raising anew the question of being requires that  there 
be  at least a minimum of intelligibility which has emerged from the inquiry, 
notwithstanding the fact that such intelligibility cannot be continuous with the type of 
                                                 
107 Cf.  Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being,  trans. by Joan Stanbaugh  (New York and San Francisco: 
Harper Torch books, 1972) p.  2.  
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systematic, discursive expositions of being which has characterized Western 
metaphysics. There are therefore two fundamentally opposed interpretations which we 
must inexorably come to terms with in understanding the later Heidegger: (1) The 
imperative to renounce or transcend any attempt to reify being and therefore to relinquish 
all attempts at systematic understanding of being.  (2) The need or requirement to extract 
some significance which can be expressed in a unified way from the enterprise of raising 
anew the question of being.108    To follow the first pathway over the second would 
involve wandering through the “forest paths” of the later Heidegger’s occasional 
writings, abandoning all attempts at unified or systematic understanding.109  Along this 
pathway we would never raise pointed questions such as:  how precisely is being 
understood in the later Heidegger? How does this understanding differ from that of 
traditional metaphysics?  Where precisely has the enterprise of raising anew the question 
of being led us? What understanding of being have we achieved, and in what way does 
this improve or correct the understanding of traditional metaphysics?   Following the 
second pathway would be to inevitably dull the edge of Heidegger’s critique of 
metaphysics.  Along this route the sharp edges of the Heideggerian text are polished until 
the whole body of work is able to fit the mold of a traditional theory of being.110  Is there 
                                                 
108 This dilemma is expressed and addressed in different ways by commentators.  George Patttison 
expresses it as the choice between renouncing all attempts to establish continuity in Heidegger’s project, 
dealing with the later Heidegger as a separate entity, and one in which continuity is preserved.  Only the 
second option allows us to address an issue such as where the question of being has led us. Cf. The Later 
Heidegger (London: Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks, 2000) Chapter One, “Is There a Later 
Heidegger?,” pp. 1-14. 
109 Most often where commentators have opted for this choice it takes the form of unifying Heidegger’s 
later writings around central themes such as the philosophy of art, or the critique of technology and culture, 
while marginalizing the philosophy of being.  Julian Young points out the shortsightedness of this approach 
since the Seinsphilosophie (philosophy of being) is the basis of all of the characteristic themes of the later 
Heidegger. Cf. Heidegger’s Later Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp.1-4. 
110 An example par excellence  would be Herman Philpse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: a Critical 
Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)  The author sees themes in the early and later 
period as inherently connected by a single preconceived concept of being, which  represents a thinly 
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a way to avoid this dichotomy--that is,  to maintain the pointed edge of inquiry into what 
significant intelligibility has been achieved by the last stages of Heidegger’s inquiry into 
being--while squarely coming to terms with the critique of metaphysics?  An attempt at 
an affirmative answer will require a solid grounding in the early Heidegger.  
 
  ( II.)  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEINSFRAGE       
 
(a) Clearing a pathway       
 
      It is not uncommon for texts treating of the later Heidegger to do so without 
substantial reference to the Seinsfrage.  Nevertheless, since the texts of the later 
Heidegger are essentially an attempt to address the Seinsfrage, the question about the 
meaning of being first announced in Being and Time, such an approach appears to be on 
very weak ground.  The shortcoming of such an approach is reinforced by Heidegger’s 
claim regarding the uniqueness of the Seinsfrage.  If the question of being were on a 
continuum with other metaphysical questions then an approach to the later Heidegger 
without reference to the question of being would not be problematic.  This however is not 
the case.  Squarely addressing the question about the meaning of being as a question 
affords the benefit of establishing a solid framework in terms of which a response to the 
question might be evaluated. In short it will become clear how clarity concerning the 
Seinsfrage, to use a Heideggerian metaphor, will “clear a pathway” in which the meaning 
of being in the early period unfolds.   
                                                                                                                                                 
disguised post-modernist concept of the sacred, in which  God is replaced by being.  For an excellent 
critique of this work see Taylor Carman, “On Making Sense (and Nonsense) of Heidegger,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 63, No. 3 (November 2001) pp. 561-572. 
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(b) Reevaluating the meaning/nature distinction 
 
In chapter one we saw how the attempt to clarify the Seinsfrage in terms of the  
meaning/nature distinction, while having some value, also has the potential of leading  us 
dangerously astray.  This insight might be developed to further advantage. Accordingly 
we shall now see if there is a way to obtain the value that this distinction offers while 
avoiding its pitfalls.  
      Upon reflection it should be clear that the problematic aspect of meaning/nature has 
to do with the inadequacy of this distinction, to do justice to uniqueness and irreducibility 
of being.  Heidegger is quite aware of this fact and in the early part of Being and Time 
adopts the hermeneutic method as an alternative approach.111  The hermeneutic method is 
characterized by a repudiation of the adequacy of the methodology of empirical science 
to deal with issues in the Geisteswissenschaften or human sciences. Practitioners of the 
hermeneutic method argue that in the ‘human sciences’ the observing subject is part of 
the horizon which is being observed. Accordingly the ‘hermeneutic circle’ replaces the 
paradigm of pure scientific objectivity in hermeneutic interpretation.112  Undoubtedly the 
hermeneutic method is at work in Being and Time.   Nevertheless there is an essential 
openness to the hermeneutic approach which would seem to invite and require further 
insight in order to come to fruition.  In this regard the hermeneutic method is often 
described as a project whose goal it is to ‘find’ a method which is adequate to issues in 
                                                 
111 Heidegger, Being and Time, op cit, p. 62. 
112 Cf. Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Heidegger 
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press,1969) p.55. 
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the human sciences.113  Strictly speaking hermeneutics should be described as an 
approach rather than a method because it does not carry with it the specific a priori 
directions for understanding which we associate with methodology.  In terms of  
nature/meaning the hermeneutic approach can indeed tell us that there is something amiss 
in this distinction.  One schooled in the hermeneutic approach is uneasy with this 
distinction because it rests squarely on the paradigm of empirical science even while in 
the dichotomy the priority is placed on meaning rather than nature.  The hermeneutic 
approach can also tell us that neither meaning nor nature can be an absolute starting 
point, and if there is any value in the dichotomy each aspect must be understood in terms 
of the other.  It does not however   provide us with any further direction on how this 
understanding is to be achieved. The hermeneutic approach then cannot be taken as a 
self-sufficient guide to the easy resolution of complex issues in Heidegger. The epistemic 
starting point in the repudiation of the adequacy of science and even of metaphysics in 
the realm of the human spirit makes for a kind of methodological openness which solicits 
illumination from sources outside the hermeneutic approach itself.   
 
       (III) INQUIRING INTO THE   BASIS OF THE SEINSFRAGE 
 
(a) The Ontological difference  
 
                                                 
113 Hans-Georg Gadamer, perhaps the world’s foremost proponent of the hermeneutic approach, argues that 
not only the paradigm of empirical science, but also  that of Western metaphysics is inadequate for 
understanding in the human sciences.  This position helps to support our point regarding the 
methodological openness of hermeneutics to the point of making for a powerful convergence at some 
points between hermeneutics and Derrida’s project of deconstruction. Cf., Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Text and 
Interpretation,” in Dialogue and Deconstuction: The Gadamer- Derrida Encounter, ed. by Diane P. 
Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press) pp. 22-51. 
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       Before we seek out sources of inspiration which might lie outside of Heidegger we 
must first be certain that we have utilized Heideggerian concepts to maximum advantage.  
We must therefore ask: is there a seminal concept in Heidegger which might provide a 
framework of understanding in terms of which we can locate the Seinsfrage?  The 
temptation is to answer in the negative, since time and again we are told that the question 
about the meaning of being is the most fundamental of all questions.114 Nevertheless this 
does not preclude the possibility that this question has presuppositions.  To elaborate on 
this with an example:  Heidegger traces ontological understanding, as every historian of 
philosophy does, to the early Greeks.115  Why, we might ask, did the sublime thought of 
being arise, take hold and flourish at that particular place and time?  Historians of 
philosophy and culture have long since attempted to address this question by identifying 
the constituents of the shift from a mythological to a philosophical  mode of thinking, that 
is a change in the underlying convictions concerning the basic intelligibility of what is 
real.116 But here we are asking about the ontological presuppositions of the thought of 
being.  Heidegger’s thinking is nothing if not ontological.  Whether he is treating of 
ethics, or science, or epistemology his methodology involves an attempt to “lay bare” or 
to expose the ontological basis in terms of which inherited modes of thinking arise. It is 
all too natural then that given the question of being Heidegger would attempt to find 
                                                 
114 Cf., Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2000) p.2. Although in this work the Seinsfrage is posed as Leibniz’s 
question: “Why are there beings rather than nothing?” As Richardson observes, the true essence of this 
question for  Heidegger  is not metaphysical, it is not a question about the ultimate origin of being, but one 
about the disclosure or unconcealment of being. “For Heidegger the question means: how is it possible that 
beings (independently of ‘where’ they might have come from, or ‘who’or ‘what’ ‘caused’ them, as 
metaphysics understands these terms) can be manifest as beings”.  William J. Richardson, Through 
Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) p. 14. 
115 Cf., Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment” in Early Greek Thinking, tr. by David Farell Krell and 
Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1975) p.27. 
116 Cf., H. and H.A Frankfort, John Wilson and Thorkild Jacobson , Before Philosophy: An Essay on 
Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East (Middlesex England: Penguin Books, 1967) pp. 252-262. 
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ontological presuppositions for it.  The inquiry might seem to be redundant but is not 
actually so.  We have already identified one ontological presupposition of any kind of 
explicit thinking about being to be in the fact that Dasein is a being for whom being is at 
stake.  Nevertheless Dasein’s being is no less at stake when a mythological mode of 
thinking dominates than in Pre-Socratic philosophical thought.  What then are the 
ontological presuppositions of the sublime thought of being?    To address this let us 
conceive of being in the widest possible sense. Whether being is conceived as a ground or 
as nature, or as God, or even as Heidegger holds it was actually conceived by the Pre-
Socratics117  in fundamental reciprocity with beings, in all of these the concept which is 
being aimed for, ‘being as such,’ inherently involves the exercise of distinguishing being 
from what it is not, or from what does not immediately show itself, or what is not 
immediately obvious or apparent.   We can imagine this type of awareness dawning on 
the shores of ancient Greece, shattering the unity of experience as the concepts of being 
as such, and of not-being as well as deep questions concerning their relation, were first 
formed.  Heidegger calls this awareness “the ontological difference” and describes it as 
“the difference between being (Sein) and beings (Seindes).” 118 It is clear that the concept 
of ontological difference has enormous significance for Heidegger.  It is cited as the basis 
of all genuine philosophical thinking.119  At times it is introduced as a preamble to the 
                                                 
117 The relationship between Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics is a complex matter. At the risk of 
oversimplification it might be said that Heidegger’s fascination with the thought of the Pre-Socratics has to 
do with the way in which these precursors of Western philosophy wrestled with the meaning of being, and 
the difference between being and beings, before an understanding of being was hardened into a doctrine. 
Cf. “Anaximander’s Saying,” in  Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 257-259.  Heidegger notes that the distinction between being and becoming, so important to subsequent 
philosophy, is nowhere to be found in Anaxamander.  Rather being and becoming are both aspects of the 
unconcealment of being.   
118 Cf.  Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstadter(Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988) p. 17 
119 Ibid. 
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being question,120 the clear implication being that the Seinsfrage itself is a response to an 
awareness of the ontological difference.   At other times the claim becomes much more 
direct and explicit.121 In the later period the importance of the ontological difference 
becomes transformed into an imperative.122 Raising anew the being question will require 
above all an attempt to rethink the ontological difference.   
     The above indicates that the concept of ontological difference occupies a seminal 
place in Heidegger’s project, nevertheless it remains problematic.   First, the fundamental 
characterization or definition of the ontological difference is still not entirely clear. At 
least in the early period, the “difference between being and beings” is the closest thing 
that we ever come to a definition. The reader is left to decipher this phrase, cryptic in its 
generality, as well as to understand its significance both for philosophical thinking 
generally and more specifically for the question of being. One commentator suggests that 
the ontological difference is an expression of the reflective ability of human 
consciousness, which in its purest expressions gives rise to philosophy, to an awareness 
of being as such and ultimately to the question concerning the meaning of being. 123   This 
appears to be consistent with our discussion of ontological difference above, yet it still 
leaves much to be desired. At this point we are compelled to ask: if the ontological 
difference is simply equivalent to the reflective activity of human consciousness, how 
then is it unique? Without understanding how ontological difference is unique it is 
                                                 
120 Cf., Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy tr. by Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis:Indianna University Press) pp. 5-8. 
121 In support of this claim Richardson in From Phenomenology to Thought op  cit.,  pp. 12-13 quotes from 
Heidegger’s Holzwege(Frankfurt:Klostermann, 1950) p. 336 “Die Seinsvergessenheit ist die Vergessenheit 
des Unterschiedes des Seins zum Seienden” (The forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the 
difference between Being and beings). 
122 We will deal directly with this claim in Thesis III. 
123 Cf. Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenology to Thing, (Illinois: Carus Publishing 
company, 2007) p. 46. 
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difficult to assess its significance for the question of being.  As the awareness of being in 
distinction from beings, ontological difference is significant in marking the beginning of, 
and of understanding, the requisite features of philosophical thinking. As such it deserves 
an honored place in introductory textbooks, but it is hard to see how this concept can 
represent any thing like a paradigm for philosophical thinking.  If it is a paradigm at all it 
is one which is already present in philosophical thinking rather than an ideal which 
guides thinking into new horizons.  
 
       (b)  “Reading Heidegger backwards”  
 
           One possible strategy for clarifying the meaning and significance of the 
ontological difference is to begin with how the concept is understood in the later period, 
represented by such texts as “The Ontotheological Constitution of Metaphysics.” We 
could then take the understanding of the ontological difference as it is present in the later 
period and read it back into the early Heidegger of Being and Time.   This strategy, first 
introduced by Reiner Schürmann, of “reading Heidegger backwards” has real 
hermeneutic plausibility.124  It is based on the fact that the coherence and even the 
identity of philosophical concepts are progressively developed by a thinker over time. A 
mature concept taken from a later period can illuminate concepts contained in an earlier 
work, even where the concept is not explicitly present in the earlier period at all. The 
hermeneutic plausibility of this approach is greatly enhanced if we can show that the 
fundamental identity of a concept found in an earlier period requires its mature form in 
                                                 
124 Cf., Lain Thomson, “ On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading Heidegger Backwards: White’s 
Time and Death,” in Inquiry 50:1 (2007), pp. 103-120.  
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order to inhere.  This is precisely the situation we are facing in Heidegger.  We began 
with the presence of ontological difference in the early period and found that it had the 
features of an inchoate concept lacking an essential identity and form. We hope to show 
that in the later period a recognizable characterization of ontological difference is 
realized.   In the case of Heidegger, although the concept of ontological difference is 
clearly present in the early period the fullest significance attached to the idea belongs to 
the later.  It is also significant that in the early Heidegger the “difference between being 
and beings” is often introduced as a seminal concept for thinking without being actually 
named as ontological difference.125 This strongly suggests that the character of the 
concept was only fully formed in the later period.   Moreover in the later period the 
ontological difference is indeed thought as a paradigm for authentic philosophical 
thought.  In the later period it is essentially failure to adequately think the ontological 
difference which gives rise to metaphysics and the neglect of the being question.126  Here 
the clear implication is that by holding up the ontological difference as a paradigm, by 
adequately thinking the ontological difference, we gain entrance into the Seinsfrage.    
 
         (c)  The Meaning of ontological difference in the later Heidegger 
 
             The question now becomes more pressing.  How precisely does Heidegger 
conceive of the ontological difference in the later period?  Although full support will 
have to wait until Thesis III, essentially in the later period Heidegger assigns for himself 
the enterprise of thinking the ontological difference as difference (Differenz alz 
                                                 
125 Cf. Heidegger, The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, op cit., pp. 5-8. 
126 This is quite clear in the statement from Holzwege, a work from the later period  quoted earlier. 
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Differenz). This is to say that the most essential feature of the ontological difference is 
difference, or negation. Upon reflection it should be clear that this is already implied in 
our attempt to understand the nature of ontological difference earlier. Earlier it was said 
that the attempt to conceive of being as such inherently involves an exercise of 
distinguishing being from what it is not. This requires that in the act of conceiving ‘being 
as such,’ what might initially be thought as a positive or affirmative act, negation 
essentially has priority.  The claim that there are different degrees of awareness of 
ontological difference also becomes explicit in the later period as well.127 By implication 
it follows that a more pure or paradigmatic form of ontological difference is one which 
more fully embodies, or is more thoroughly grounded in, negation. These claims are not 
only consistent with references to the ontological difference in the early Heidegger but 
also illuminate them in a new way.  Earlier we referred to the ontological difference as 
disturbing to the unity of experience. This is crucial.    For a non-philosophical mode of 
awareness experience is a plenum.  Philosophical thinking interrupts this unity with the 
thought of difference: the difference between beings as they are actually experienced and 
known and being as that in terms of which experience is possible.  Difference is also 
present in the form of not-being.  To illustrate this we have only to think of a non-
reflective mode of awareness, that of animal consciousness.  It might be said that what 
separates reflective human awareness from unreflective animal consciousness is an 
awareness of the radical contingency of experience.  Animal consciousness is once again 
a plenum. There is no awareness of the contingency of experience itself, of finitude, of 
the very possibility of not-being.   
                                                 
127 This is implied in the claim made in the later period that the ontological difference has not been 
adequately thought.  We will deal with Heidegger’s attempt to correct this deficiency in Thesis III. 
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     The claim that the key to ontological difference is negation also fits quite coherently 
with what we know of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, specifically with the charge 
that metaphysics reifies being.  When metaphysics thinks of being as an ultimate 
substratum the ontological difference as the difference between being and beings is 
indeed operative but not in a pure or paradigmatic form. On the one hand, where being is 
seen as an ultimate substratum we can observe the ontological difference at work as the 
difference between being as substratum and beings which are understood as the 
phenomenal basis of this substratum.  On the other hand, an ultimate substratum is clearly 
a paradigm which is taken from the realm of beings.  Therein being is understood in 
terms of beings and the ontological difference is lost. There would seem then to be a 
paradox at the very center of metaphysics which derives from the tension between 
thinking the difference between being and beings, and preserving this difference in an 
essential form.  The project of thinking the difference in order to come to closure would 
seem to require preservation of the difference in an essential form.  Nevertheless once 
this is achieved being has been reified and the sharp edge of ontological difference has 
been lost. Is there a way to overcome the paradox of metaphysics?  Heidegger’s thinking 
in the later period indeed suggests an affirmative answer.  
 
     (d) Overcoming the paradox of metaphysics  
             A mode of thinking which addresses the paradox of metaphysics would seem to 
require, to employ a very seminal word from Derrida, an “elliptical” approach.128  To 
adequately address the paradox of metaphysics above all requires a methodology which 
                                                 
128 Derrida will often use this word to describe his own approach in the context of a discussion of  the  
deconstruction of metaphysics. Cf., Jacques Derrida, Positions, tr. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981) p. 14. 
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has fully come to terms with and is adequate to the fact that being has a unique status in 
our experience. Being is simply not like any object of our experience. No straightforward 
approach to understanding the meaning of being can do justice to this insight. 
Contrariwise, to fully come to terms with this insight already brings into focus what the 
nature of this elliptical approach must be like. The fact that being is not like any object of 
our experience tells us that this approach must be negative. The ontological difference 
must be thought in such a way that the aspect of negation is fully expressed and 
embodied; thus the difference between being and beings does not easily collapse into the 
identity of being with some paradigm taken from the realm of beings. Operating with a 
cataphatic mode of thinking such a collapse is inevitable since, as we have seen, in a 
cataphatic mode of thinking negation acts as a mere corrective to affirmation.  In the 
dominant traditions of Western philosophy, both the method and the results which are to 
be achieved through the application of method, affirmation is primary.  The goal of 
philosophical thinking is to demonstrate or establish some aspect of what is real, be that 
reality ethical, ontological, religious, logical or political.  In this process negation plays a 
subordinate role to affirmation.   Negation tells us what is not true, correct or sound.  It is 
left to affirmation to bring the process of thinking to closure by forming conclusions 
about the nature of what is real.   It is clear that such a mode of thinking can never 
adequately address the paradox of metaphysics.   What is required is a mode of thinking 
which abides in the realm of difference even while difference is preserved in the form of 
a metaphysical concept.   
 
         (e) Problematic aspects of the above 
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          This line of thinking has promise but by no means provides us with smooth entry 
into the Seinsfrage, or an understanding of being which results from raising the 
Seinsfrage.  First,   the application of this approach requires that we squarely address the 
question: what does it mean for thinking to ‘abide in the realm of difference’ while 
thinking the difference between being and beings? Would not such a mode of thinking 
collapse into negation in the same way as a cataphatic mode collapses into affirmation?  
What type of understanding of being would a thinking which ‘abides in difference’ 
produce?  Fortunately, despite the above difficulties, a strategy begins to emerge.  If the 
center and ground of ontological difference is negation, if we could observe the working 
out of the ontological difference in a form of thinking in which difference is fully 
expressed or embodied this could provide us with a paradigm for how it is thought in 
Heidegger.  With this goal in mind we are now able to state Thesis I.  
 
         (IV)     STATEMENT OF THESIS I   
 
        The dialectic of negation as it is contained in the work of Dionysius and Eckhart 
expresses and embodies a paradigmatic form of what Heidegger calls the ontological 
difference.  The implicit presence of ontological difference in the negative theology of 
Dionysius and Eckhart, particularly as it functions in the attempt to rethink the concept 
of ground,  helps us to understand the nature and significance of  the ontological 
difference  in Heidegger, to clarify the meaning of the Seinsfrage, and to illuminate the 
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understanding of being which emerges in the early Heidegger in response to the 
Seinsfrage.  
 
(V)     DEFENSE OF THESIS I  
 
           (Va) Summary of relevant points concerning Dionysius and Eckhart covered in 
previous sections.        
               
                THE DIALECTIC OF NEGATION IN DIONYSIUS AND ECKHART  
 
          (I)Dionysius 
 
(a) In Dionysius the perspective of negation is first introduced in response to the 
darkness and incomprehensibility of the divine being. (Chapter Two A, III:a)  
Hence the Mystical Theology explicitly calls for an abandonment of anything 
either perceptible or understandable.  Based on these facts alone we might fully 
expect this text to follow a path of pure silence, but this is not the case. Instead 
the darkness and incomprehensibility of God are data for a thinking response to 
divine knowing. Hence immediately dialectic is established between the 
negative, apophatic (incomprehensibility and darkness) modes and the 
affirmative, cataphatic (imperative to know) aspects (Chapter Two A, III:a). 
(b) Dionysius’s path represents a kind of thinking which never comes to rest 
(Chapter Two A, III:c-d).  For this reason the relation between affirmation and 
93 
 
negation is truly dialectical.  The incomprehensibility of God inspires a negative 
approach to divine knowing.  Yet this negative approach is also deemed to be 
inadequate.  Hence it again gives rise to affirmation, but one which is now 
permeated by negativity (2A, III:e). There is no point at which the play between 
negation and affirmation reaches closure.  This fact will have powerful 
implications for the age-old issue of knowing or proving God.   
(c) The dialectic which is the basis for any thinking about God represents a new 
concept of ground, one which stands in marked contrast to the theory of ground 
as it is expressed and embodied in the major traditions of Western philosophy, 
where ground is understood after the metaphor of a rock or a foundation.  For 
Dionysius the dialectic is the basis of divine knowing because it is the ever- 
present concomitant, the ubiquitous context in which divine knowing takes 
place. Nevertheless as permeated with negativity this context is not a solid 
foundation.  If the dialectic is the basis of what we can know about God it is also 
the basis of unknowing, of uncertainty, of darkness and mystery. (Chapter Two 
A, III:h.  This new concept of ground as both a foundation and an abyss can only 
be indicated with language which is oxymoronic, e.g., “luminous darkness.”  
(d) There is an essentially iconoclastic thrust to Dionysius’s investigations, one 
which is expressed in terms of the dialectic of negation and directed against all 
conceptual idols.  Every positive image of God is refused, negated and 
destroyed, while the divine reality which transcends all images is affirmed  
(Chapter Two A, III:g). Since the God which is affirmed is not a being but is 
beyond anything which we can know or name as being (hyperousios), this 
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affirmation in no wise can represent a point of closure.  This fact makes 
Dionysius’s vision far removed both from all forms of skepticism and from the 
modern attempt to establish or prove the existence of God.  
 
(II) Meister Eckhart  
 
        Eckhart’s dialectical method is expressed in terms of finite and infinite, or 
creation and God.  Because we can draw on our summary of Eckhart from Thesis I 
we can be brief.  
 
(a) Eckhart’s critique of religion leads to a critique of God, and to the untenability of 
the concept of God as the highest and most perfect being. (Chapter Two B, IV: a 
and b). 
(b) Eckhart's attempt to rethink God leads him to develop a purely relational ontology 
where the poles of human being and God have no substantial or permanent 
identity; rather each is defined from out of the other. (Chapter Two B, IV:d). 
(c) Eckhart’s relational ontology,  an ontology which is fully dialectical,  where at no 
points are the poles of human being and God  known as autonomous or substantial 
centers of identity, contains a powerful critique of both substance ontology and 
representationalism.  (Chapter Four,  V:e) 
(d) The name of the dynamic reciprocity between finite and infinite, creation and 
God, human being and God, is Godhead. Godhead represents a basis for any 
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authentic or fundamental thinking about divine or human reality. (Chapter Two B, 
IV: c and d) 
(e) Although Godhead represents a basis for thinking, it stands in marked contrast to 
the concept of ground as it is expressed and embodied in the major traditions of 
Western philosophy.  If Godhead is the basis for knowing, it is also the basis of 
unknowing, of darkness, mystery and incomprehensibility; hence once again the 
only language which seems adequate to describe such a state of affairs is 
oxymoronic.  (Chapter Four, V:I) 
(f) As is the case with Dionysius, there is also a deeply iconoclastic thrust to 
Eckhart’s thinking expressed in terms of the dialectic of negation.      
  
          (V-b) The ontological difference in negative theology  
 
      Clearly in the texts of Dionysius and Eckhart which we have examined  an 
attempt is made to express and embody difference, but can it be accurately stated that 
the ontological difference is present in these texts, or more strongly that in a 
fundamental sense these texts involve an attempt to think the ontological difference? 
Based both on what we know about the texts of Dionysius and Eckhart, as well as 
about the ontological difference  itself, a quite plausible claim can be made to this 
effect. We begin with the fact that the ontological difference is already present in the 
traditional approach to God represented by St. Thomas’s Five Ways.129   To conceive 
                                                 
129 John Caputo supports this explicitly in claiming that St. Thomas’s doctrine of God as pure esse in 
distinction to ens has already invoked an incipient form of the ontological difference. Caputo  goes on to 
argue that the more mature form expressed by Heidegger in “The Ontotheological Constitution of 
96 
 
of God as the highest being and the basis of all being requires a conceptual clarity 
concerning the difference between created being and God as the basis of creation.  At 
the center of this difference is negation. Only when all claims regarding the autonomy 
of finite being are negated can there emerge an understanding of God as the infinite 
ground of what is finite.  It is clear that the Thomistic doctrine of God attempts to 
maintain, in Heideggerian language,  an ‘open space’ between God as pure being and 
finite or created beings, hence it contains at least an incipient form of the ontological 
difference. Nevertheless, to the extent that God is conceived as one particular being, 
albeit as the highest and the most perfect being, the highest potentiality contained in 
the Thomistic concept of God remains unrealized.   In Thesis II we will provide 
further support for the claim that the Eckhartian doctrine regarding the necessity of 
moving beyond God to Godhead involves an attempt to address the philosophical 
inadequacies of the Thomistic concept of God. Specifically these limitations have to 
do with the inadequacy of the concept of God as ground. Here we are at the very 
center of the ontological difference.  Because classical Thomism finally collapses the 
‘open space’ between God as the ontological basis of all being and created beings, it 
cannot serve as an adequate ground for created being.    If an incipient form of the 
ontological difference is already present in Thomism, if negative theology involves an 
attempt to bring the logic of Thomism to conclusion by rethinking the concept of God 
as ground, then it is apparent that a more paradigmatic form of ontological difference 
is present in negative theology.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Metaphysics” remains unthought by Thomas. Cf. John Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in 
Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982) p. 148. 
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      Let us now summarize how God is thought in negative theology.  As in classical 
Thomism we begin with an act of negation. God is not any aspect of the natural 
process.  Nevertheless we have seen that for Dionysius and Eckhart this ‘first act’ of 
negation is by no means sufficient. For Eckhart an affirmation of the authentic ground 
of what is finite requires a transcendence of God into Godhead ( this chapter,Va, II:a, 
d, e and f).   For Dionysius the authentic ground of what is finite can only reside in 
God who is beyond being (hyperousios) (this chapter, Va I:d).   Thus God and being 
must be surpassed. Essentially then the ontological difference is thought in Dionysius 
and Eckhart through a series of sustained and systematic negations such as occur in 
the exercise of iconoclasm.  These negations are systematic in the sense that the 
exercise of iconoclasm, in order to be successful, requires above all rigorous 
consistency. Each and every objective representation of God must be negated.  
Nevertheless the method of Dionysius and Eckhart is not purely negative.  Their 
method remains dialectical.  In the exercise of iconoclasm, while every objective 
image of God is negated the God which transcends objective representation is 
affirmed, even if this affirmation is itself permeated by negativity  (this chapter, Va, 
I:d) and Va, II:f).   
     It is important to reflect on where the dialectic of negation in Dionysius and 
Eckhart has led us.  Unlike the results of binary, linear thinking the results of 
dialectical thinking are difficult to characterize. On the one hand thinking in 
Dionysius leads us to God beyond being, or in Eckhart to Godhead; on the other hand 
these are not resting places or fixed destinations.  Each is characterized by relentless 
motion (this chapter, Va, I:b and Va, II:c). Attempts to describe Godhead or God 
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beyond being in binary terms consistently fail, inevitably giving rise to the language 
of paradox (Va, I:b and Va, II:a and b)        
 
    (V-c) Seinsfrage clarified        
                                                                                                                                                                        
     If the key to understanding the Seinsfrage lies in the ontological difference, then 
negation lies at its very center (this chapter, III, a-c). Following the paradigm of 
negative theology, negation is given in a dialectical relation to affirmation (this 
chapter, Va, I:b and Va, II:c).  Entry into the question of the meaning of being thus 
begins with an act of negation. This is not a simple act of negation, as it is present in a 
cataphatic mode of thinking, but following the Dionysian and Eckhartian paradigm it 
is a series of systematic negations such as is operative in the exercise of iconoclasm. 
We have seen how the series of negations required by the exercise of iconoclasm 
already contains an affirmation at its very center.  Iconoclasm would not be what it is 
apart from the drive to preserve the God- concept from idolatry.   This paradigm is 
repeated quite clearly in Heidegger.  It is the imperative to preserve the ancient and 
venerable question of being inviolate from reification and triviality which gives rise 
to the series of negations.    Above all it is necessary to understand that being is not an 
entity or substance, or a universal concept.   A response to the question of being 
cannot involve positing the nature of being according to a theory and then elaborating 
its essential features. From the beginning this affirmative method proves impotent to 
understand the nature of Heidegger’s project in raising anew the question of being.  
Heidegger tells us that the question of being must be raised anew because it has been 
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neglected, trivialized, and forgotten.  Operating in the affirmative, cataphatic mode of 
thinking the conclusion is unavoidable that the problem of traditional metaphysics is 
essentially one of lack of focus.  Philosophy has pursued political, ethical and logical 
and epistemological  issues while neglecting those of ontology.  Doubtless this aspect 
is present in Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, but it is hardly adequate.  
Moreover, following this line of interpretation makes it impossible to understand two 
aspects of the Seinsfrage:  (1) The question of being has been the driving issue in 
philosophy even in its neglect.130  (2)  The question of being has been neglected, 
trivialized and forgotten even where issues of being are thought about most explicitly, 
namely in metaphysics.    
     We saw in chapter one how standard commentators, recognizing that the ‘nature of 
being’ alternative leads to an impasse, immediately seize upon the ‘meaning of being’  
as the key to the Seinsfrage.   Doesn’t Heidegger explicitly tell us that the Seinsfrage 
is a question about the meaning of being? What could be plainer?  Why should this be 
made into a problem?  We saw in Chapter One that this is in fact problematic, since in 
our inherited vocabulary meaning is contrasted with nature. Indeed we saw how 
commentators accept this implication explicitly and proceed to articulate the 
Seinsfrage as an issue concerning the meaning of being, where meaning is opposed to 
nature.  The problem with this is that it reduces any intelligibility which might be 
ascertained about the meaning of being to solipsism.     Instead of following the 
                                                 
130 Much evidence can be adduced in support of this claim. For example, the ‘nature of truth’ has not been 
thought to be an ontological problem. Since the time of Aristotle, truth has simply been defined as an ad- 
equation between intellect and thing.  Attempting to ‘lay bare’ the ontological foundation of truth leads 
Heidegger to the conclusion that the issue of truth and that of being are one and the same. The clear 
implication of this is that to the extent that philosophy is driven by the quest for truth, the issue of being lies 
at the core of philosophical thinking.  Cf. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by Michael 
Heim(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992) pp.128-138.  The corresponding 
sections of Being and Time are pp. 256-273.   
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meaning/nature distinction, once the first act, or rather series of negations is 
performed, following the paradigm of negative theology, negation immediately gives 
rise to affirmation (this chapter Va, I:b).  This affirmation becomes the meaning of 
being, or rather the context in which the meaning of being is thought.  This meaning 
is not the other side of nature, the simple opposite of nature, but rather its dialectical 
opposite.  As such the meaning of being which arises in response to the first act of 
negation is only given in and through nature. When Heidegger talks about the 
meaning of being, this is not phenomenological meaning given on the side of 
consciousness but meaning which only emerges in the actuality and specificity of 
Dasein’s involvement with being.  The fact that meaning is the dialectical opposite of 
nature also tells us that the meaning which emerges from the inquiry is permeated by 
negativity.  Here however we have gotten ahead of ourselves.  We must take a step 
back and ask: how does the meaning of being emerge for the early Heidegger?  
 
          (V-d)   The meaning of being in Being and Time        
 
           In Being and Time being is given in various existentials--for example  being-
in-the world, (in-der-Welt- Sein)  being-towards death (Sein-zum -Tode), worldhood 
(Weltlichkeit) and being-with (mitsein ) which are uncovered in the analytic of 
Dasein. The most primordial of the existentials is care (Sorge), whose basis is 
temporality.  A case can be made to the effect that the existentials are all ways in 
which being is at stake for Dasein. This derives from the fact that at least the ontical 
priory of being which launched the analytic of Dasein  has to do with the fact that 
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Dasein is not merely a being  who understands being but one for whom  being is 
always at stake.  What does it mean to say that Dasein’s being is at stake?   This 
phrase replete with meaning suggests a fate which is continuously ‘weighed in the 
balance.’ Dasein’s fate is never decided but always to be determined.  Being at issue 
inevitably involves the possibility of a loss.  If a person’s health is at issue it might 
improve, or it might worsen.  Being is never given for Dasein as a static presence but 
as a dynamic process which is always underway.  Sorge is the most primordial 
existential because it represents the ecstatic character of Dasein’s projection toward 
being which is embodied in each of the others.  These existentials describe not 
substantial structures but possibilities of Dasein’s being.  The possibility which is 
most determinative and which is most uniquely Dasein’s own is being-towards- 
death.    
     It is impossible to understand Being and Time without developing a sense of how 
for the early Heidegger being is permeated by negativity.  This becomes fully explicit 
in such phenomena  as being-towards-death  and anxiety (Angst).131 Anxiety is 
disclosive of Dasein’s being-in-the-world in its pure facticity as well as its  fallenness 
(Verfallen ) and thrownness (Geworfenheit). 
      In section 19 of Being and Time  Heidegger took direct aim at the substance 
ontology which resides implicitly at the basis of Western ontology.  Heidegger argues 
there that the ontological identity of things is not to be found in things at all, but in 
how they function in a relational context.  Accordingly entities we encounter in our 
everyday dealings are “equipment” (das Zeug), “ready-to-hand” (zuhandenheit). The 
hammer, a piece of equipment “ready to hand,” is employed “in order-to” (etwas um-
                                                 
131 Heidegger, Being and Time, section 40 page 228-235. 
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zu) hold something fast, towards building a house.  The “towards which” (das wozu) 
aims toward the “for-the-sake-of which”(warum-willen). A house is built for the sake 
of securing a place for Dasein to dwell. The upshot of the analysis is that being is not 
something “present at hand.” The “presence-at-hand” of things, what some 
commentators translate as “occurrence,” is a founded mode. Its deeper ontological 
basis is the concernful absorption of Dasein in the referential nexus of equipment.   
The real ontological identity of things cannot be established by the exercise of 
isolating and identifying substances.   
      The phenomenon of anxiety considerably deepens and transforms the 
understanding of being contained in the earlier analysis. We are told that anxiety 
discloses being-in-the-world as well as fallenness and thrownness. These are 
essentially aspects of being-in-the-world. Dasein is anxious for its being-in-the-
world. In the state of anxiety it is as if the referential nexus, the for-the-sake-of- 
which is Dasein suddenly loses its significance.  “Here the totality of involvements of 
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world  is,  as such of 
no consequence; it collapses into itself.”132   Each of these are fundamental 
expressions of finitude. Here it is critical to understand how these differ from the 
obvious fact of human finitude which must be expressed in any accurate and 
reflective philosophy of human existence.  The phenomenon of anxiety offers us a 
powerful and practical refutation of the ‘worldless’ subject by providing an insightful 
glance into the unique placement of human being in relation to being. Anxiety “lights 
up” or illuminates the dispersion of Dasein into multiple ways of being-in-the-world.  
Through the lens of anxiety the world appears not as a modern or medieval cosmos, 
                                                 
132 Ibid., p. 231. 
103 
 
an objective arena into which we step, but the realm which opens from within the 
concern of human Dasein. This is in effect Heidegger’s doctrine of disclosure.   
World is not juxtaposed beside Dasein’s being but disclosed in and through Dasein.  
     It should be clear how the insights above make a traditional theory of being 
impossible. Nevertheless the phenomenon of anxiety provides us with a fundamental 
insight into the meaning of being.  Through the mood of anxiety Dasein’s being-in-
the-world is experienced and known in a direct and intuitive manner.  This is likewise 
the case with thrownness.  Dasein is thrown into the world not as a determinate object 
into an objectively defined context, but thrown in the sense of dispersed or scattered 
into multiple ways of involvement with the world.   Thrownness then is connected  to 
the complex web of associations which make up the referential nexus whose ultimate 
end is the “for-the-sake-of- which” of human  Dasein. Here we must remember that 
this complex web of associations is historical or rather temporal, owing to the fact 
that they are encompassed by the most primordial existential which is Sorge. The 
roots of Dasein’s thrownness then extend into the past and project into the future. 
Temporality however is ecstatic.133  This means that correctly understood Dasein’s 
thrownness also projects into a past from out of the future.    In this light Heidegger’s 
doctrine of thrownness has little to do with subjective psychological states.  It is an 
attempt to describe the meaning of being, albeit through insights which invalidate an 
objective theory of being.  Throwness reveals that, precisely because of the way in 
which Dasein is involved in being,  the meaning of being can never be given as a self- 
illuminating plenum.  The ‘riddle of being’ can never be definitively solved in the 
manner of a puzzle.  
                                                 
133 Ibid., p. 377. 
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      We should reflect for a moment on this analogy.  A puzzle is  defined by the 
paradigm of a complex objective problem. In solving a puzzle the player aims toward 
the moment of insight in which it is clear how all of the pieces fit together in the 
whole. If being is a puzzle, Dasein is an aspect of the puzzle itself. Moreover human 
Dasein is connected to other aspects in limitless and inextricable ways.  A vision of 
how all of the pieces fit together in a whole becomes ontologically quite impossible. 
There is then something opaque, a darkness and void, an incomprehensibility which is 
at the center of anything we can know or name as being. For this reason Heidegger 
will often refer to being as “the mystery.”  Here we should not fail to note how this 
paradigm contrasts with that of the tradition. In traditional understanding the aspects 
of finitude, of mystery, of negativity and void appear as features of finite being which 
require illumination from a ground. For Heidegger, by contrast, anything we can 
know or name as being appears as permeated with aspects of negativity.  
     The powerful influence exerted by Kierkegaard on Heidegger’s doctrine of anxiety 
is well known.134 Kierkegaard’s doctrine of anxiety is in turn significant because of 
the way in which anxiety is thematized as an expression of human finitude, a finitude 
which resides at the center of human existence and is constitutive of our identity.  It is 
therefore instructive to ask: How is Heidegger’s perspective on anxiety unique? 
Briefly expressed, in Kierkegaard the finitude of human existence which is reflected 
in the experience of anxiety is thematized against a background which is infinite, an 
infinite which is realized in the depths of human subjectivity.  In Heidegger the 
                                                 
134 Cf. Mark A. Tietien, “Being-Anxious for Nothing: Heidegger and Kierkegaard on Anxiety,” in 
Dialogues: Journal of Phi Sigma Jav (Vol. no. 47, April 2005,  no. 2-3, pp. 67-78. 
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background of the infinite over and against what is finite disappears.  One can say 
that in Heidegger finitude has become radicalized135.  
     Is negativity and finitude then the last word about being in the early Heidegger?  
Following the lead of many commentators, a reader is easily led in this direction. 
Nevertheless to answer in the affirmative would be to miss something essential in 
Heidegger. What this answer misses is that despite the collapse of the finite-infinite, 
founded-foundational, becoming-being, grounded-ground distinction there is much 
more to Heidegger’s understanding of being than that of an original plenum which is 
now permeated with negativity.  This ‘more’ is essentially a sense of the meaning of 
being which transcends or rather is given in and through negativity. Once again this 
follows the Eckhartian and Dionysian paradigm. Thinking can no more come to rest 
in negation than it can in affirmation. The relation between affirmation and negation 
is always fully dialectical.  We will comment on this latest aspect in terms of a 
summary of previous elements. Entry into the Seinsfrage required a series of 
systematic negations such as are operative in the exercise of iconoclasm.  In and 
through these negations the ‘meaning of being’ was affirmed as a ‘transcendent’ 
ideal. The meaning which emerges is itself permeated by negation. Full adherence to 
the dialectical method requires that this negation cannot be the last word about being 
but is given in a dialectical relation to affirmation.  Indeed this is the case in 
Heidegger. The radicalization of finitude, the darkness and void which is at the center 
of being, represents nevertheless a genuine disclosure of being. Once again negation 
gives rise to affirmation, or rather in and through negation affirmation arises. The 
opening toward being which arises from the center of negation and void is found at 
                                                 
135 I am indebited to Reiner Schürmann for this insight.  
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many points, most notably in Heidegger’s understanding of truth. The permeation of 
truth with untruth immediately stands out as the most significant way in which 
Heidegger’s understanding of truth contrasts with that of the tradition.136 But taken as 
a ‘last word’ it is sorely inadequate.  Truth is famously defined as “unconcealment”137 
(alētheia). Yet this taken alone is also inadequate. Understanding Heidegger’s theory 
of truth requires that there be a dialectical relation between the negative aspects 
represented by untruth and hiddenness and the affirmative aspects represented by 
disclosure. Disclosure which is the essence of truth is simultaneously a concealment 
of the vast and mysterious background out of which truth arises.  Concealment of this 
vast background is the ontological basis which makes disclosure possible. Truth only 
arises out of unconcealment.  Heidegger’s understanding of truth frustrates any 
attempt to see concealment and unconcealment as simply binary opposites. Moreover 
the nature of truth in Heidegger is inherently connected to his understanding of the 
meaning of being. The doctrine of truth is essentially an attempt to “lay bare” the 
ontological horizon out of which truth arises.  Earlier we remarked on the permeation 
of   being with negativity exhibited in the phenomenon of anxiety.  While this is an 
essential ingredient in understanding the meaning of being, at this point it should be 
clear how this is inadequate as a final word about being.  If there is a final word about 
being in Being and Time it is that being is unconcealment.  
 
 ( V-e) The Uniqueness of Heidegger’s perspective  
                                                 
136 Cf. Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition  (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971) pp. 
248-256. Marx views this fact from a very unfavorable perspective which nevertheless serves to highlight 
the uniqueness of Heidegger’s doctrine of truth in relation to the tradition.  
137 Ibid., p. 256-273.  
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         Understanding the Seinsfrage as grounded in negation provides us insight into the 
limitations of traditional metaphysics as well as into how Heidegger’s perspective is 
unique.  Briefly expressed, the negative ground of the Seinsfrage ultimately frees our 
approach to being from conceptual fabrications so that the meaning of being can emerge 
in its essential form. Once again we have seen the paradigm for this in negative theology; 
the negative turn frees the concept of God from utilitarian calculation.  In a similar way 
the perspective of negation frees thinking from solipsism in two forms:  (1) The solipsism 
of traditional metaphysics purports to understand being in an objective manner. We have 
seen how this betrays the character of being as well as the unique situatedness of human 
beings in relation to being. Traditional metaphysics views being through the a priori 
requirements of human systematic understanding.  ( 2) The Phenomenological solipsism 
reduces being to what is presented to consciousness.  
      In distinction from these Heidegger’s perspective is unique. Paradoxically this 
perspective can embody the intention of traditional metaphysics to comprehend the 
nature of being without succumbing to the solipsism which is implied in making being 
into an entity. The negative turn avoids this pitfall by rejecting from the start the point of 
departure of cataphatic thinking, which is in the isomorphic identity between thinking 
and being. Renunciation of the ideal of total intelligibility creates a context for the 
affirmation of being in its concreteness and specificity.   A response to the question about 
the meaning of being includes being as it is actually disclosed to Dasein.  Its starting 
point is with Dasein who already dwells in being.  Likewise the negative ground of the 
Seinsfrage also overcomes phenomenological solipsism.  In effect the meaning of being 
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includes the ‘nature of being’ which is bracketed by the phenomenological suspension of 
the natural standpoint.  
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                 Chapter four- The Critique of Ontotheology 
 
 
(I) THE PROBLEM OF TEXT SELECTION  
 
(a)  The value of The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics for our  
project.  
        Our route into the later Heidegger will be through the text of The Onto-Theo-
Logical Constitution of Metaphysics ( henceforth referred to as OM  ),  which forms the 
conclusion to a lecture course in Hegel given during the winter semester of 1956-1957. 
Since there are many texts which might represent the later Heidegger to choose from, 
why select this particular text? The answer has to do with both the richness and 
complexity of OM and the manner in which its central themes converge with 
fundamental insights of negative theology. In this text a number of characteristic themes 
of the later Heidegger are present in a very explicit and powerful form. Contained there is 
a critique of metaphysics, a critique of our inherited God concepts, an attempt to address 
the question of being, an awareness of the critical importance of negation, and the 
centrality of the ontological difference. Moreover, as we will discover, these themes are 
connected in ways that illuminate the intrinsic identity of each concept as well as 
Heidegger’s project as a whole. Of special significance will be the critique of 
ontotheology.  Our strategy has been to illuminate Heidegger’s understanding of being 
through the work of Meister Eckhart and Dionysius.  These however are essentially 
theological thinkers.  Their project fundamentally involves an attempt to think about the 
nature and limits of our human knowledge of God. Heidegger’s project involves an 
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attempt to think about the meaning of being.  How then can the theological projects of 
Dionysius and Eckhart illuminate the ontological project of Heidegger?  They  can do so 
based on the ontological priority of the being question. We explored this theme in some 
detail in Chapter One.  There we discovered that since the being question is ontologically 
prior to all other questions, a study such as theology already brings with it 
presuppositions concerning the meaning of being.  We saw how the ontological priority 
of the Seinsfrage was meant to reinforce the imperative of raising anew the question 
concerning the meaning of being.  However the ontological priority of the Seinsfrage also 
indicates that since an understanding of being is already present when theological issues 
are thought about, the projects of Dionysius and Eckhart have an ontological basis. This 
leaves open the possibility that when this ontological basis is made explicit and explored 
it might illuminate the ontological project of Heidegger.  In carrying out this endeavor we 
will discover that negative theology’s critique of God involves a critique of the 
ontological presuppositions of our inherited God-concepts, an attempt to replace an 
inadequate ontology with one which is more adequate and cogent. Our aim is to see how 
negative theology’s critique of God can illuminate Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, 
his critique of metaphysics, and finally the attempt to address the question about the 
meaning of being.  For these reasons the text of OM,  when employed in conjunction with 
the texts of negative theology, commends itself as a uniquely powerful tool for entry into 
the work of the later Heidegger  Accordingly we will regard this text as primary for 
understanding the meaning of ontotheology and supplement it with other relevant texts as 
required.   
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       (II )  THREE MEANINGS OF ONTOTHEOLOGY IN HEIDEGGER  
                                                                                                                                                                              
               The first question to address is: what precisely does Heidegger mean by the 
term ontotheology? 138  In the   text of OM, which contains Heidegger’s fullest statement 
on ontotheology, the term has at least three essential meanings.  
 
              (a )Ontotheology as a critique of our inherited God concepts  
 
               The first meaning refers to a concept of God.  Heidegger charges that in the 
Western tradition our fundamental understanding of what the concept God means, as 
embodied in our religious traditions and reflected in philosophical awareness,  has been 
formed under massive influence from the enterprise of metaphysics. Our God concepts 
are thus ontotheological.   Accordingly the philosophical category of being becomes an 
inevitable concomitant of an understanding of God.   Once the fateful choice has been 
made to understand God in terms of the category of being, this enacts a progression 
which inevitably leads to God as causa sui.  For this reason Heidegger will frequently 
simply identify the God of ontotheology with causa sui.   This can lead to genuine 
perplexity.  What is it about causa sui which Heidegger finds so objectionable?  The 
answer has nothing to do with causa sui in and of itself; causa sui is a consequence.  The 
original mistake which results in causa sui is the apprehension of God in terms of the 
philosophical category of being.     Accordingly the philosophical category of being 
becomes an inevitable concomitant of an understanding of God.   
                                                 
138 The term ontotheology is a neologism which originates with Kant. Kant first coined the term to indicate 
a kind of pure a priori argument for the existence of God as exemplified by the ontological argument. See 
Critique of Pure Reason  A 629. 
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     The above raises many intriguing issues and problems, the most obvious of which is 
that the metaphysical influence upon theology described by Heidegger is not an original 
observation but a universally acknowledged fact.  Nevertheless in the major traditions of 
Western theology this influence has not been seen as anything problematic.  The common 
opinion of theologians at least since the time of Aquinas is that theology and philosophy 
can and must work together.  Philosophy provides theology with a complex language and 
system of thought in which to express and articulate its basic concepts. From this 
perspective theological concepts which are essentially based on revelation, biblical 
traditions, sacred history and personal experience require a   fully formed conceptual 
vocabulary, and a mode of logical and systematic thought such as the language and 
system of philosophy in order to be fully realized and expressed.139  One might argue that 
the paradigm for the expression of theological concepts in philosophical language was 
established not by Aquinas but by the author of the New Testament Gospel of John, 
where in the very first verse Jesus Christ is identified with the Greek logos.  If 
ontotheology consists essentially in understanding God in terms of the philosophical 
category of being, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the author of the gospel 
of John was the first ontotheologian.   These difficulties notwithstanding,   speaking of 
God as causa sui Heidegger  says scornfully:   
     This is the right name for the god of philosophy.  Man can neither pray nor sacrifice  
     to this god.  Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he  
                                                 
139 Addressing the issue from a Thomistic perspective, Jacques Maritain  claims the theoretical 
independence of theology from philosophy but admits that such a state of affairs is practically impossible. 
Interestingly enough Maritain credits the practical impossibility of a fully autonomous theology to the 
difficulties of speaking about and knowing God. An autonomous theology would continuously risk the 
danger of slipping into idolatry by speaking about God equivocally. Philosophy when seen from a 
theological perspective then essentially contributes an analogical aspect to speech and knowledge of God. 
Cf. Jacques Maritain , An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. by  E.I. Watkin  (London and New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1959) p. 97-99.  
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     play music and dance before this god.140   
 
.      How and why the God of ontotheology is problematic is then obviously something 
that needs to be addressed.141    Nevertheless, a critique of ontotheology is essentially a 
critique of God or at least a critique of our inherited God-concepts and in that sense it 
might be inscribed in the history of such critiques, a history which began in the 19th 
century and includes such figures as Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.  We must 
nevertheless attempt to discern to what extent Heidegger’s critique of God is unique.     
 
       (b)     The critique of ontotheology as a critique of metaphysics      
 
        The second meaning of ontotheology has to do with metaphysics.  According to 
Heidegger Western metaphysics is ontotheological.   Here metaphysics is defined as an 
enterprise which thinks of beings as such and being as a whole. “Metaphysics thinks of 
the Being of beings both in the ground giving unity of what is most general, what is 
indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of all that accounts for the ground, 
that is, of the All-Highest.”142  The first part of the sentence is not different from what 
can be found in any philosophy textbook.  It tells us that metaphysics thinks about the 
general features of being in such a manner as to establish grounds. Here the essentialist 
understanding which is at the center of metaphysics is itself a ground-giving enterprise. 
Once the most essential features of being are known they will then be understood to form 
                                                 
140 Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, 
trans. by Joan Stambaugh  (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 72. 
141 Merold Westphal spends the first chapter of his book Overcoming Ontotheology (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2001) wrestling with the issue of precisely what constitutes ontotheology. This is more 
evidence that this is not something which is  fully explicit in Heidegger and needs to be addressed.  
142OM ., Ibid., p. 58. 
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the enduring basis of beings in various phenomenal manifestations.  The second part of 
the sentence tells us why ontological understanding must inevitably transcend its own 
concepts and categories.  It is as if once the metaphysics of grounding is set into motion, 
the essential features of being which once appeared adequate now themselves become the 
object of metaphysical inquiry.  A new round of questioning is initiated.  How does 
being, now understood in terms of essential features, arise?  What sustains and supports 
it? What is its essential origin?  What is its basis and ground? Is there some principle 
which justifies and explains being as a whole?   The only place in which the relentless 
inquiry which drives the metaphysics of grounding can come to rest is in a principle 
which serves as the ultimate explanatory basis of being and is also the sufficient 
explanation of itself. “The Being of beings is represented fundamentally, in the sense of 
the ground, only as causa sui. This is the metaphysical concept of God. Metaphysics 
must think in the direction of the deity because the matter of thinking is Being….”143  
      The second meaning of the term ontotheological is also inseparable from a critique.  
What needs to be criticized is the tendency of Western metaphysics to think about being 
in terms of grounds.  It is this understanding of being in terms of  grounds which enacts a 
progression which leads from grounds to causes, from causes to ultimate cause, 
inevitably ending with causa sui and the god of ontotheology.   Here the critique required 
is a critique of the ontotheological character of metaphysics.   Nevertheless once again it 
is not immediately or obviously apparent from OM how an understanding of being in 
terms of grounds is misguided or flawed, except that such an understanding inevitably 
leads metaphysics to ontotheology in the first sense described. It is possible to maintain,  
as classical Thomists have long done,  that an understanding of being in terms of grounds 
                                                 
143 OM, p. 60. 
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represents a legitimate exercise of reason, and that God as causa sui is precisely the 
place, or rather the only place,  where  the relentless questioning of philosophical reason 
can come to rest.144  In short, to make any sense of Heidegger’s critique of the 
ontotheological character of metaphysics it will be essential to obtain some insight into 
precisely how an understanding of being in terms of grounds is misguided or flawed.  
 
            (c)  Ontotheology and the project of addressing the question of the meaning of 
being.             
            The third sense which ontotheology has in Heidegger does not really represent a 
meaning of the term properly speaking, but how it is employed.  In OM the 
ontotheological character of metaphysics is employed in such a way as to rethink the 
issue of being.  Implied in this endeavor is the claim that ontotheology in both the first 
and the second senses is a serious error.    By taking a reflective step back from the 
enterprise of doing metaphysics we learn how the original issue of being became 
expressed as metaphysics with its inevitable descent into ontotheology.  In the process 
Heidegger will discover a new way of thinking about being: as the “difference as such,” 
(Differenz als solche) and finally as perdurance (Ausdrag).  
 
(d)  The relation among the three meanings of the term ontotheology 
 
      From the foregoing it should be clear that no strict separation of the three meanings 
associated with the term ontotheological is possible. Granting the inevitable movement of 
                                                 
144 Cf. Daniel J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Philosophy: the perennial principles of the classical realist 
tradition,(Illinois: Tan books, 1992), chapter 17. 
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ontology into theology, a critique of   ontotheology as  metaphysics already involves a 
critique of our inherited God-concepts.  Likewise it would be short-sighted to attempt a 
critique of the God of ontotheology without attempting to understand how our inherited 
God-concepts are fundamentally rooted in metaphysics.  Finally it is essential to 
understand that for Heidegger’s project in OM what he calls “the ontotheological 
constitution of metaphysics” includes ontotheology in both the first and second senses, 
and forms the basis of his attempt to rethink the issue of being. 
      In this second thesis we will attempt to focus specifically on ontotheology as a 
critique of God,  one which highlights the movement from theology to ontology within 
the ontotheological constitution of metaphysics.   
 
        ( III)   ADRESSING THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS PROBLEMATIC ABOUT  
         ONTOTHEOLOGY  
 
       (a)  The claims of Heidegger’s argument  
 
        At this point we should be willing to accept at least two claims   of Heidegger’s 
argument.  (1)   In Western civilization our major theological traditions have developed 
under massive but unexamined influence from metaphysics. The result has been that our 
God concepts are understood in and through the metaphysical category of being, and 
more specifically of being as ground. The following God concepts--the  idea that  God is 
the basis of being,  the plentitude of being, the uncaused or self caused cause of all being,   
the highest and most perfect being,  being itself--are all evidence of this  ubiquitous  
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metaphysical influence. (2)  The metaphysical concept of being as ground does not 
represent an irreducible context for thinking about God. To make sense of Heidegger’s 
argument requires an at least implicit awareness that there are ways to think about God 
other than as ground, although to do so in any systematic manner is by hypothesis 
impossible within the concepts and categories of the dominant philosophical and 
theological traditions.  Our work in Meister Eckhart and Dionysius should provide some 
intimation that this is the case.  
       .     Neither of these presuppositions appears to be invincibly problematic.  They 
might easily be accepted by most historians of philosophy or philosophers of religion. We  
might go so far as to say that Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology has elicited such a 
powerful critical response because it begins with an obvious fact, the fact of the historical 
and conceptual connectedness of our religious and philosophical traditions, rightly 
suggesting that this simple fact deserves some serious thought and explanation.   What is 
however not present in any of this is some explicit reasoning as to precisely why the God 
of ontotheology is untenable or problematic, incoherent or unacceptable.   This is a claim 
which hovers tantalizingly on the borders of Heidegger’s argument in OM.  Without a 
clear understanding of why ontotheology is flawed any imperative to overcome, 
transcend, or go beyond it is rendered superfluous.  In response to this situation our 
strategy is to illuminate the missing piece of Heidegger’s argument through the work of 
Meister Eckhart.  
 
        (b)   Avoiding one possible danger  
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         Here the chief danger to be guarded against is that we might find cogent reasons for 
rejecting ontotheology within Eckhart which are nevertheless foreign to Heidegger.  
Contrariwise our highest ideal should be to employ Eckhart as a way of making 
Heidegger’s own thinking more explicit.  Only the latter can be properly named as an 
exercise of illumination.    Based on our work in Chapter Two we can formulate at least 
two reasons why the route through Eckhart might have promise:  (1)  Eckhart’s thinking 
contains a powerful critique of our inherited God concepts. (2) Eckhart’s critique of God 
is closely connected to a keen awareness of the inadequacy and the limitations of 
traditional metaphysical language and conceptual categories for thinking about God.  In 
short, the necessity of moving from God to Godhead which lies at the center of Eckhart’s 
critique of God is impossible to effect within the inherited metaphysical concept of 
ground.  It is only by rethinking the concept of God as ground that Godhead can emerge.  
The above gives us significant reason to think that Eckhart’s critique of God is on an 
ontological continuum with Heidegger’s critique of the god of ontotheology, and that 
where there is a missing piece in Heidegger’s argument the former might illuminate the 
latter.  To effectively apply this strategy requires that we extract a maximum of 
intelligibility from the text of Heidegger before seeking the assistance of Eckhart.  This 
will insure that no aspect of Heidegger will be ‘illuminated’ by Eckhart which is not 
already clear and accessible, and also that what aspects are not transparent are thus 
genuinely illuminated.  This strategy has the added benefit of keeping us close to the 
Heideggerian text so that we are better able to evaluate our results.  In keeping with this 
approach we now formulate two ‘lines of defense’.   These represent what we hope are 
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the best possible responses within the Heideggerian text for answering the question ‘what 
is problematic or untenable for Heidegger about the god of ontotheology?’   
 
         (IV) POSSIBLE DEFENSES  FOR WHAT IS PROBLEMATIC ABOUT     
          ONTOTHEOLOGY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HEIDEGGER      
           
         (a.) Defense one   
Ontotheology is a serious error because it violates the methodological distinction 
between philosophy and theology.   
 
        Going as far back as far as 1927, the period of  Being and Time ,  Heidegger has 
exhibited unflinching   support for the methodological distinction between philosophy 
and theology.145  Indeed his persistent silence about God, in the form of the conviction 
that ultimately philosophy has nothing to say about God, follows from this 
methodological distinction.146  In what might be considered Heidegger’s fullest statement 
concerning the relation between philosophy and theology, “Phenomenology and 
Theology,” taken from a series of lectures given in 1927, the reasons for this 
methodological distinction become explicit.    In phenomenological language philosophy 
and theology each have their proper “object domains,” the realms of which are the proper 
                                                 
145 This methodological  distinction in was in  fact already formed as early as 1921 when Heidegger gave a 
series of lectures on the phenomenology of religion. At one point he laments the influence of Greek 
philosophy upon Christianity and applauds Luther for exercising a contravening influence. See Heidegger, 
The Phenomenology of Religious Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) p.67. 
146 This point is developed systematically and with much textual support by Lawrence Paul Hemming in 
Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice (Indiana: University of Note Dame Press, 2002) 
pp. 65-70. 
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and natural objects of these studies. This is a doctrine which goes back to Husserl;147it 
originates with the conviction that each object domain has a determinate way of revealing 
itself.  Our methodologies must be adequate to the unique and specific way in which 
respective domains are disclosed.  Music, rock formations, subatomic particles and 
numbers each disclose themselves in different ways, and hence require different 
methodologies for the disciplines which make them objects of investigation.  We have 
seen this doctrine at work in the early part of Being and Time  where Heidegger 
meticulously struggles to develop a method which is adequate to the way in which being 
discloses itself.  In “Phenomenology and Theology,”   the proper object domain of 
philosophy is determined to be being, that of theology the Christian life, that of the ontic 
sciences various respective beings.148 Theology is then grouped among the ontic sciences, 
in distinction to philosophy which is ontological.  Based on this framework the 
distinction between any empirical science and theology is only relative, since they are 
both ontic.  On the other hand, the distinction between philosophy, which is ontological, 
and theology, which is ontic, is absolute.149 In methodological terms theology would have 
more in common with biology or mathematics than with philosophy 
 
        (b) Problematic aspects of defense one  
 
         The above classification would seem to produce some results which are 
counterintuitive to say the least.  Chief among them is the conclusion that theology, the 
                                                 
147 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by  Boyce Gibson (New 
York and London: Collier Books, 1962) p.45. 
148 Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology” in Pathmarks, William McNeil (ed.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp 41-43. 
149 Ibid., p. 41 
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‘science of God,’ is not really concerned with God at all.  Theology, an ontic science, is 
ultimately concerned with beings.  Heidegger does not attempt to avoid this 
counterintuitive conclusion, instead maintaining and developing the above claim that the 
object of theology is a very determinate aspect of beings namely “Christianness”  
(Christlichkeit).150   By Christlichkeit  Heidegger means the Christian life, or the life of 
faith, a life which is centered upon the events of Christ’s crucifixion, death and 
resurrection.  This is the proper object domain of theology rather than with issues 
concerning the nature and being of God.  At least one of Heidegger’s most explicit 
statements in OM which we will have occasion to examine shortly supports this earlier 
view of the methodological distinction between philosophy and theology. 
      This ‘line of defense’ can go some distance in making explicit some of the reasons at 
the basis of Heidegger’s criticism of ontotheology  There is a methodological distinction 
between philosophy and theology at work generally in Heidegger, and  OM is no 
exception.    However, we would like to do more than make Heidegger’s own reasoning 
explicit.  We would like to take Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology as a critique of our 
inherited God concepts which has some intrinsic merit.  To accomplish this we must not 
lose sight of the issue of what might be intrinsically problematic about ontotheology.  If 
our best answer to this question is that it violates the methodological distinction between 
philosophy and theology, this view is itself very highly problematic since the type of 
methodological distinction required to support this answer is a radical one, which is by no 
means universally acknowledged or accepted by theologians and philosophers, and is 
difficult to defend apart from a rigorous adherence to the phenomenological method.  
This view would have as at least one of its implications that theological concepts, no 
                                                 
150 Ibid., p. 43. 
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matter what paucity of evidence they are based on or how incoherent they may be, are 
impervious to criticism.151  It is difficult to conceive that many modern philosophers of 
religion would support this view.   A more common view tracing back to Thomas 
Aquinas and supported by modern Thomists152  involves a   fundamental correlation as 
well as a methodological distinction between philosophical and theological claims.153  In 
this view theology must respect legitimate demands of reason.  Likewise philosophical 
reason is entitled to examine the coherence and plausibility of theological claims.  
Perhaps the most telling argument against the adequacy of this line of defense is that it 
would make a critique of ontotheology impossible.   If philosophy and theology are 
strictly methodologically distinct then there would be no basis except from the 
perspective of theology to criticize God concepts.  Moreover such a critique would have 
no philosophical way of being determined to be cogent.    In short, if we had to depend on 
a strict methodological distinction between philosophy and theology a critique of 
ontotheology as a critique of God would be on very weak ground.  Furthermore, when we 
examine some of Heidegger’s more explicit statements on the matter it becomes clear 
                                                 
151 Hugo Meynell, “Philosophy and Theology,” in Philosophy of Religion, Brian Davies (ed.) (Washington: 
Gregorian University Press, 1992) p. 234. In this part of the essay Meynell is actually responding to an 
extreme version of the methodological distinction between philosophy and theology represented by  Alvin 
Plantinga, indicating that this position when consistently held leads to absurd conclusions. He does not 
actually discuss Heidegger, but by virtue of holding to an extreme version of the same methodological 
distinction it would appear that Heidegger’s position would also share some of the same unacceptable 
consequences.  
152 Cf. Alicia Jaramillo, “The necessity of raising the question of God: Aquinas and Lonergan and the quest 
for  complete intelligibility,”. The Thomist Vol. 71(2007) pp. 221-267. Using Longergan as an example of a 
modern Thomist the author argues that the primacy of the five ways in Thomism is at bottom a quest for 
the intelligibility of being. This orientation which arises from reason but only finds fulfillment in a 
transcendent horizon involves a profound and ongoing correlation between faith and reason and hence 
between theological and philosophical methodologies.  
153 The concept and the term “theology of correlation” was famously expressed by Paul Tillich in the first 
volume of his Systematic Theology.  Nevertheless Thomism has always been a theology of correlation as 
expressed and embodied in the great Thomistic synthesis.  The nature of Thomism as a theology of 
correlation and its similarity to Tillich’s method is made fully explicit in a study by Donald J. Keefe,  
Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich (Netherlands:E.J. Brill, 1971) See especially 
chapter 1, “The Relation Between Ontology and Theology,” pp 7-39. 
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that there is more basis to his critique than an issue of method. Consider for example the 
following: “Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the theology 
of the Christian faith and that of philosophy, would today rather remain silent about God 
when he is speaking in the realm of thinking.”154   Apart from the very cryptic comment 
concerning what appears to be a philosophically based theology   the clear implication is 
that ontotheology is an error because it is somehow theologically inadequate.   The 
metaphor of a root can be viewed as evidence of a methodological distinction, yet it 
contains much more.  It suggests a wellspring, or source of power, implying that theology 
when it is not deflected by extraneous considerations, when it is solidly in tune with the 
source of its intelligibility, discerns something which is inherently flawed or untenable 
about ontotheology.   Based on this implication we are able to formulate a second, more 
promising line of defense for the problematic character of ontotheology 
 
      (c)   Defense two 
 
        Ontotheology is theologically flawed because it is not based on autonomous or 
authentic religious thinking or experience but rather on the unexamined influence of 
metaphysics.  Specifically it is based on the implicit assumptions of representationalism,  
substance ontology,  and the ontology  of grounding.   
 
      This second line of defense is solidly based on the nature of Heidegger’s project in 
OM   which is to think being as the “difference as such.”  Implied in this endeavor is that 
the ontological difference, as the difference between being and beings, has not been 
                                                 
154 OM, p. 54. 
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adequately thought.  Neglecting to heed the difference between being and beings, instead 
metaphysics represented being in terms of beings.  Representationalism  then forms the 
basis of substance ontology.   From substance ontology there is only one short step to the 
ontology of grounding where grounds are conceived after the paradigm of substance.    
The exercise of thinking being as the “difference as such” is in part an attempt to 
overcome this representationalism in  substance ontology and the ontology of grounding,  
which have all been  implicit in the historic enterprise of metaphysics.      
        At this point the question ‘what is wrong with the God of ontotheology?’ is 
beginning to appear answerable within the context of Heidegger.  Given the connection 
of God concepts with metaphysics, given Heidegger’s understanding of the limits of 
metaphysics, by implication the three outstanding suspects are representationalism, 
substance ontology, and the ontology of grounding.  The God of ontotheology is 
represented as an entity or substance where this substance is understood as ground.   
 
        (d)  Problematic aspects of defense two  
 
         The problem with this response is that although it will turn out to be technically 
sound, it provides a mere textbook kind of response, and one which is finally not very 
illuminating.  To consider representationalism first: It would appear that the ability to 
represent an object before a knowing subject is a requisite feature of all knowledge. It is 
not clear how anything which we can name or know as knowledge can subsist apart from 
this prerequisite.  With regard to grounding ontology we have already seen how from a 
theological perspective the theology of grounding can be viewed as a legitimate exercise 
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of reason.  With regard to substance ontology, it is not clear why the philosophical 
category of substance, if properly understood, that is, as a non-material substance, does 
not at all apply to God.  Finally, in an attempt to address the issue of ontotheology within 
the context of Heidegger one begins to develop a powerful suspicion that concepts such 
as substance ontology, ontology of grounding, and representationalism cannot be 
criticized in the manner of common philosophical errors or fallacies.  
     Consider the case of representationalism.   One is clearly able to define the fallacy of 
solipsism or of false cause and to illustrate by example how and why they are mistaken.  
By contrast, the objective representation of objects before a subject is not an erroneous 
practice.   It only becomes erroneous when it is proposed as a doctrine which claims that 
in order to be real anything whatsoever must be capable of being objectively represented.  
If this is a philosophical error, and Heidegger believes that it is, a critique of it must not 
be in the abstract but with reference to specific cases.    The above suggests that it is not 
possible to have an insightful or detailed understanding of why a concept of God, or even 
of human beings  which are  objectively represented, is erroneous based on the concept of 
representationalism itself.  Here what is required is some insight concerning why God is 
one of those concepts which cannot or should not be objectively represented.  What is 
required as well is some insight concerning what a non-representationalist understanding 
of God would be like and how this non-representationalist understanding is more 
adequate than a representationalist one.   Something similar can be said with regard to the 
ontology of grounding.  Extending insights from the text of Heidegger as far they will 
take us leads us to conclude  that failure to adequately think the ontological difference 
leads to the ontology of grounding.  This indeed provides us with a clue to what is 
126 
 
misguided about an understanding of God as ground.  Nevertheless this is only a clue. 
What is required is some detailed insight concerning what is inadequate about an 
understanding of God as ground.  What is required as well is some concrete 
understanding of what the ontology of grounding is to be replaced with.   
      Having demonstrated that the two best defenses for what is problematic  about  
ontotheology,  although containing much truth still require support outside the 
Heideggerian text, we now posit thesis two:  
 
        (V)    STATEMENT OF THESIS II 
 
         Meister Eckhart’s investigations help to complete Heidegger’s argument in OM  by  
first informing us as to precisely what is problematic and untenable both philosophically 
and theologically about ontotheology.  
  Second, Eckhart demonstrates that God understood as the supreme being, as a 
determinate entity in the horizon of possible experience, is wedded to finitude and cannot 
in principle serve as an authentic ground, thus philosophically requiring a transcendence 
of God into Godhead.   
   Eckhart further clarifies what is problematic and untenable about the god of 
ontotheology by providing a paradigm, represented by Godhead, of what a non-
ontotheological God concept is like and why this is more adeqate than an ontotheolgical 
one.  
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  In enacting the movement from God to Godhead Eckhart clarifies Heidegger’s critique 
of metaphysics by demonstrating the necessity of and providing an exercise in rethinking 
the concept of ground.  
  Eckhart’s new understanding of God as ground represented by Godhead also helps to 
support Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by providing a paradigm of ground in terms 
of which the assumptions of representationalism and substance ontology implicit in the 
historic enterprise of metaphysics are illuminated as inadequate.    
   Eckhart’s reflections also clarify Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology as a critique of 
metaphysics, by providing us with a paradigmatic case--God as ground--in which the 
ontology of grounding fails.  Insofar as we can accept by hypothesis Heidegger’s claim 
regarding the centrality of God as ground in grounding ontology generally, by 
demonstrating the inadequacy of God as ground Eckhart illuminates Heidegger’s 
critique of metaphysics by providing us with an intuition of  the inherent weakness and 
instability of metaphysical systems.   
 
(VI)     DEFENSE OF THESIS II 
 
(a)        Why God as ground is problematic for Eckhart 
 
     Despite the fact that we will never find the term ‘ontotheology’ in Eckhart,   
nevertheless it is clear that Eckhart’s polemic is directed against a certain understanding 
of God which coincides with what Heidegger has named “the god of ontotheology.”  
Moreover this polemic is reinforced by powerful insights which, when made fully 
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explicit through the support of systematic arguments, are fatally disabling to the position 
of ontotheology. 
      Here we will engage Eckhart with careful reference to our investigations in section IV 
of Chapter Two B, which concern the doctrine of sunder war umbe (without a why),  and 
also Eckhart’s sermon Mulier Venit Hora.   In the latter Eckhart considered possible 
grounds for such phenomena as goodness, justice, and even human existence itself.  As a 
13th century scholastic Eckhart’s understanding of grounds was powerfully influenced by 
a synthesis of classical Greek and Christian experience.155  The concept of grounds itself 
as an ontologically constitutive realm of being was an inheritance from the Greeks.  With 
the Thomistic synthesis of the thirteenth century this higher ontologically constitutive 
realm of being came to be identified as God.  The reader is immediately startled by 
Eckhart’s refusal to identify God as the ground of human experience.  In Chapter Two we 
analyzed the text of Eckhart’s sermon Mulier Venit Hora in detail. (Chapter Two B, V:a); 
what follows is a succinct summary of that analysis.  
(a)   The traditional identification of God as ground is not immediately obvious from the 
data of experience. Rather it is inadequately supported by a formal process of reasoning 
which assumes and requires that there be more intelligibility at the end of the process  
than at any point within  it.  
(b.)    The requirements of the formal system specified in (a) are never actually satisfied.  
The most intelligibility is present at points along the chain of reasoning, where these 
points are based on the immediate data of experience.  These points are represented by 
such things as the compelling power of love, justice and goodness. These points, or the 
                                                 
155 Cf. Oliver Davies introduction in Meister Eckhart:Selected Writings (London: Penguin books, 1993) 
xvii-xix. 
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human experiences to which they refer, are self-authenticating rather than the conclusion 
‘God as ground’ in which they are adduced as ‘founded’ elements.   
(c.)       Based on the above it should be clear that in the ontology of grounding God 
serves as a kind of formal axiom,  the point to which ‘founded’ elements are referred, 
from which they ostensibly derive their meaning.  Nevertheless ‘God as ground’ is never 
apprehended in a manner which is truly axiomatic or self-evident in a way which 
illuminates, justifies and grounds ‘founded’ elements. 
   
     (b)     A second level of critique  
 
     A thoughtful response to Eckhart’s critique of God as ground must inevitably raise the 
question of why the enterprise of establishing God as ground is so dysfunctional.  The 
question is more pressing given Eckhart’s essentially Thomistic assumption regarding the 
oneness of truth.  From this perspective philosophical and theological insights are 
inevitably correlated.  Nothing is more foreign to Eckhart than an a priori rejection of the 
claims of reason in favor of supernatural faith.156  Why then do ‘founded’ elements of 
experience not inevitably recognize their ground in God?  This question is addressed in a 
second, more potent critique of God as ground.  Eckhart’s second level of critique might 
be summarized as follows: 
 In the ontology of grounding God understood as the highest or most perfect being 
cannot in principle satisfy the requirements inherent in the most authentic concept of 
                                                 
156 Many commentators will point out that Eckhart in fact held a very extreme form of the Thomistic 
doctrine of the oneness of truth, one which neither classical Thomists nor Thomas himself would support. 
In Eckhart’s doctrine even supernatural or revealed truths could be demonstrated by reason. Cf. Benard 
McGinn, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries Treatises and Defense (NY: Paulist Press) p.27. 
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ground as the essential   origin and source of all finite being, thus requiring a 
transcendence of God into Godhead.  
 
(c)   Rethinking the concept of ground  
 
       From the foregoing it should be clear that to enact the movement from God to 
Godhead it was necessary for Eckhart to rethink the concept of ground.  Indeed it 
might be said that two questions are deeply present though not explicit in Eckhart’s 
reflection on God contained in the passages we have examined in the sermon Mulier 
Venit Hora; these are: what must the nature of God be such that God can be   
understood as the originary basis and source of finite being?  And secondly:  What 
does it mean to say that finite being is grounded?  Thus Eckhart’s reexamination of 
the nature of God’s being becomes radically dependent on establishing criteria for an 
authentic ground. Here it will be helpful to think about how these questions are 
addressed in terms of the way in which the concept of ground functions in the 
Thomist argument from first cause. Both classical and modern Thomists have long 
maintained that the concept of God as an uncaused cause represents a ground of 
experience in the sense that it is the only place where the relentless demands of 
philosophical reason can come to rest.157  Even granting, as St. Thomas himself did, 
that the series of natural events might be infinite,158 philosophical reason can never 
come to rest with nature as a brute fact.  Toward this end modern Thomists have 
seized upon Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason to argue that if not in the order of 
                                                 
157  Once again  Alicia Jaramillo’s article “The necessity of raising the question of God, Aquinas and 
Lonergan on the quest for complete intelligibility”, op cit  is helpful here. 
158 Qoodlibet 12,q.2,a.2.  
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time, at least in the ontological order the series of natural events must have, 
ontologically, an ultimate a constitutive principle.159  For this principle to be final, 
that is, to bring the incessant striving of reason toward grounds to closure, it must 
simultaneously explain the series and be the sufficient explanation of itself.  This can 
only be the concept of God as causa sui.160   
      Here it is not difficult to imagine how Eckhart would respond to this neo-Thomist 
version of the argument from first cause.  Like the modern Thomist, Eckhart 
identifies the driving force in the quest for grounds as intellect (Chapter Two B, 
IV:b).  The penetrating character of the intellect is a symbol for the way in which 
intellect is driven beyond founded elements toward their ultimate basis and ground.  
Nevertheless,  once we have identified a recognizable entity in the horizon of possible 
being, be it the highest or most perfect being, as a determinate entity it has effectively 
been reduced to the level of something finite and can no longer serve as the basis and 
ground of all finite being.  Essentially Eckhart rejects the concept of God, the highest 
being, as ground for what might at least be called an analogous reason why the 
Thomist rejects any event in the natural series, or the series itself as adequate to 
reason.  In none of these cases can reason ‘come to rest,’ in all of them it is provoked 
to drive onward toward a more originary basis and ground.  Here the statement that 
intellect “never rests”(Chapter Two B, IV:b) is clearly hyperbole.  It cannot rest, as 
Eckhart explicitly tells us, in goodness or justice or even God, but is driven to the 
                                                 
159 The principle of sufficient reason becomes quite explicit in modern Thomism, but  as William Rowe 
demonstrates all versions of the argument from first cause known today as the “cosmological argument    
presuppose PSR. Cf. William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998) pp 60-110. 
160 Cf. Mark Nowacki, “Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be: A Thomistic defense of the 
principle of sufficient reason,”  “The Thomist,” July, 1962, pp 291-302.  
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source out of which these arise.  Here causa sui,  the place where intellect comes to 
rest in Thomism, has become one more founded mode itself in need of explanation.    
 
(d)     Attempting to make sense of the paradox of Godhead  
 
      The personal God of the Judeo-Christian tradition has traditionally intersected 
with philosophical reason at the junction of proof and demonstration.  The concept of 
Godhead presents itself as a special challenge to reason because it represents 
something which in principle cannot be known as a determinate entity or substance.   
 Perhaps the best way to approach the paradox of Godhead is in terms of Eckhart’s 
understanding of the necessity of moving from God to Godhead and to see that 
necessity as what in terms of modern understanding is known as a transcendental 
argument. A transcendental argument attempts to establish the reality of something X 
based on the conditions of the possibility of Y, where Y itself is universally 
acknowledged to be real.161 The classical form of this argument was presented by 
Immanuel Kant in Critique of Pure Reason.162.  Against Hume’s skeptical arguments 
concerning causality163 Kant argued that causality must be real because it represents 
the very conditions for the possibility of experience.  For this argument to succeed it 
was first necessary for Kant to disable the view that causality is a feature of things.   
Either causality is a feature of things, in which case it is prone to Hume’s skeptical 
arguments, or it is not a feature of things at all but belongs to the condition of their 
                                                 
161 Cf. Barry Stroud, “transcendental arguments,” in “Journal of Philosophy,” Vol. 65 #9, (May 1968) 
pp.241-256. 
162 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A95-96, A111 -  A114. 
163 Cf. David Hume, “Special doubts concerning the operations of the understanding,” in An Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963) pp.36-63. 
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possibility. It is only the latter which can endow causality with a true universality and 
necessity which is impervious to skeptical attack.  A form of this disjuncture, hence  
what we might call at least  a quasi-transcendental argument, is present in Eckhart’s 
understanding of the necessity of moving beyond God to Godhead.  Here the premise 
which Eckhart assumes to be universally acknowledged is that God must be 
understood as the originary basis of all being, the source from which all things derive 
and receive their meaning, the ultimate constitutive principle of experience and life.  
Once this premise is granted it will be necessary to steadfastly oppose any claim that 
this principle can contain any specific, determinate, objective features which belong 
to things.  As the condition of the possibility of finite being, the source out of which 
finite being emerges, the ground of finite being, must be incommensurable with what 
is finite.  The most authentic concept of ground will require a systematic refusal and 
negation of any recognizable entity which can be named or known as God. From this 
perspective it becomes clear that the negative images of God, images of abyss and 
desert, are symbols for what is required by an authentic concept of ground.  Here we 
might go so far as to say that a form of this disjunction and hence of a quasi-
transcendental argument  is present in the Thomist’s insistence that the completion of 
the argument from first cause requires  not simply a numerically first member of the 
natural series of causes but an uncaused cause.  It is only an uncaused cause, 
something which transcends the determination by nature and causality entirely, which 
can serve as the condition of the possibility of causality and the entire natural process.  
In this light, in arguing for the necessity of moving from God to Godhead, Eckhart is 
simply bringing the logic of Thomism to conclusion.   
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(e)    Confronting the challenge of pantheism  
 
      The necessity of transcending our inherited God-concepts into Godhead which 
cannot be known in any objective form inevitably summons the specter of pantheism.  
It is not possible to develop an understanding of the meaning of Godhead in Eckhart 
without seriously engaging this alternative.  The first step in this process is an 
acknowledgment that pantheism is at least fully compatible with the movement from 
God to Godhead.  Moreover, some of Eckhart’s most explicit statements concerning 
Godhead make this interpretation very tempting.  Recall the statement from the 
sermon Nolite Timere Eos:  “everything in the Godhead is one and of this nothing 
more can be said” (Chapter Two B, IV:d). While it is not impossible to find some 
support for the pantheist reading of Eckhart,164 this reading is rejected by the 
overwhelming body of scholars.165  In the final analysis pantheism, like the dualism 
which it opposes is a very simple concept; it is simply a variation of substance 
ontology--one substance instead of two.  Such an ontology is at loggerheads with 
Eckhart’s dialectical method, which is as incompatible with simple identity as it is 
with unqualified difference.166  Where identity is present in Eckhart it is never the 
simple identity of monism, but rather what Schürmann calls “operative identity.”167  
                                                 
164 It is actually very difficult to find real detailed textual support for a pantheist reading of Eckhart.  Where 
Eckhart is identified as a pantheist or a monist it is most often in the context of arguing for a larger thesis 
where very little textual support is actually given. Cf. C.T. Chan, “On the dialectical affinities between East 
and West,” in Philosophy East and West, Vol. no. 3, no. 3, pp. 199-221. 
165 Both Schurmann and Bernard McGinn soundly reject the pantheist reading. Cf. Bernard McGinn, The 
Essential Sermons, Commentaries and Treatises and Defense. op cit p.33., Reiner Schürmann, Wandering 
Joy,(Massachusettes: Lindisfarne Books, 2001) p.218. 
166 Bernard McGinn, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries and  Treatises  and Defense, op cit., p.56. 
167 Reiner Schurmann, Wandering Joy, op cit., p. 23. 
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This is defined as an identity which is not based on the selfsameness of an underlying 
substratum, but an ideal which is to be achieved on the road to detachment.   
 
       (f)      Eckhart’s alteration of the concept of ontology 
 
           It should be obvious that such a shift in the meaning of the concept of identity 
is not possible without a profound alteration in the concept of ontology itself. We can 
see this alteration at work in the way in which for Eckhart the traditional roles of 
substance and accident are reversed.  Ontology is now about relations; issues 
concerning underlying substance involved in those relations are merely accidental. 
Here it is crucial to indicate that Eckhart’s reversal of traditional ontological 
categories is not based on mere creative innovation but is required by his renewed 
understanding of ground.  Once the concept of God as ground is rethought as the most 
originary basis of experience, then the concept of substance can no longer apply to it 
accept in an accidental way.  Eckhart’s attempt to rethink the notion of ground 
involves a rethinking of the ground of human existence and hence a rethinking of 
human being which is grounded.  Once Godhead is understood as the originary basis 
of human existence the relation between human being and Godhead is no longer a 
relation of two kinds of substances. The concept of substance becomes as irrelevant to 
understanding the essential nature of human being as it is to Godhead.  Thus human 
being is no longer thought in an entitative way.  Recall the series of questions from 
the sermon Mulier Venit Hora (Chapter Two B, V:a).  We saw how Eckhart refuses 
the traditional answer to the question ‘what is the purpose of human life,’ in favor of 
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“I don’t know but I’m happy to be alive.”  In terms of a casual reading this suggests a 
profound breakdown of philosophical reason, an abandonment of objectivity in favor 
of subjective whim.  We observed how a more astute reading reveals an ambitious 
philosophical deliberateness (Chapter Two B, V:a).  Once again the appeal to 
subjectivity is adduced as evidence that the data to be explained is not an entity or 
substance which can be comprehended with an objective response.  The subjective 
human depths which are disclosed in the expression of gratitude can never find a 
purely objective explanation which can do it justice.  Having rethought the nature of 
ground, Eckhart challenges the adequacy of the concept of substance for 
understanding both human being and the Godhead. Eckhart’s rethinking of ground 
also involves a rethinking of the relation of human being to ground. Once both 
ground and human being are no longer to be understood after the model of substance, 
the relation of human being to ground can no longer be the relation of two substances.  
Therein lies the meaning of the phrase “when I stood in the river, the soil of the 
Godhead” from the sermon NoliteTtimere Eos ( Chapter Two B, IV:d).  Godhead is 
not a supreme substance after the model of a rock upon which finite substances reside 
but an encompassing context in which finite substances are thought.  Finite things can 
be known from within Godhead; nevertheless as the encompassing context of all 
knowing Godhead cannot itself be objectively realized and known.   The pathway 
then lies open for Eckhart to develop an ontology of relations.   
 
     (VII )     DIRECT APPLICATION TO HEIDEGGER   
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      (a) The failure of a defense against Heidegger’s charge of ontotheology  
 
     To summarize Eckhart’s reflections provides us with powerful insight into the 
limits of the God of ontotheology.  If we return for a moment to the Thomist defense 
against Heidegger’s charge of ontotheology, this defense assumes and requires that 
there be an effective passageway from theology to philosophy and vice versa.  It 
requires that categories such as human existence, human actions and the natural 
world, which are understood from a theological perspective as requiring grounding,  
can effectively be grounded in ontological reality.  This is to say that the ontology of 
grounding appears from a theological perspective as a response to legitimate demands 
of reason.  To be fully intelligible, aspects of human existence and the natural world 
require placement in a broad conceptual context which it is the job of ontology to 
provide.  Likewise this defense requires that this context can never be fully adequate.  
Ontological categories expressed as the most general aspects of being, and the nature 
of being as a whole, themselves require grounding.   This endeavor of grounding 
ontology can only come to closure in the nature of God as an uncaused cause.  We 
can think of the passageway from ontology to theology and back as a kind of circuit 
or circle.  The essential unity of ontology and theology which is required for a 
minimalist defense against Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology requires a free flow 
of concepts, that is to say a free movement in both directions along the circuit.  From 
a theological perspective Eckhart challenges the free movement from theology to 
ontology, but his thinking has implications for the reverse as well.  Let us summarize 
what we have learned about each of these aspects separately.   
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(b)  From theology to ontology :   
 
.       Our study in Eckhart provided   insight into precisely why the ‘ontology of 
grounding’ is so ‘dysfunctional.’  It became clear how in this ontology God understood as 
the highest being,  by virtue of being a recognizable and determinate entity,  is wedded to 
finitude and cannot serve the requirements implied in the most authentic concept of 
ground represented in modern language as the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of finite 
being.    Eckhart’s critique of God was then presented in the context of an attempt to 
rethink the concept of ground.  We have argued that an understanding of ground as 
‘conditions of possibility’ is already implied in the logic of Thomism as expressed in the 
classical Thomist doctrine of first cause. Insofar as this drive represents the natural aim  
of human reason to comprehend the widest conditions of the possibility of experience, 
reason can never find fulfillment in a penultimate explanation and hence requires  a 
transcendence of God into Godhead.    
        Eckhart’s reflections help to answer a question which hovers on the borders of any 
serious reading of OM, namely: what would a non-ontotheological God-concept be like?  
This is a question which is inevitably raised and must be raised in any critique of 
ontotheology.  Would a rejection of the God of ontotheology require an adoption of 
primitive, totally unreflective God concepts, a return to biblical literalism?   It is easy to 
misread Heidegger and think that this might be the case.  Nevertheless, the objections to 
this alternative are quite formidable.  Among them are the fact that this would require a 
renunciation of all metaphysical concepts except those which are implicit, a position 
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which is obviously problematic to say the least, and one which is incompatible with 
Heidegger.    But this only makes the question more pressing.  Once we have rejected 
ontotheology, what is it to be replaced with?  A powerful and coherent response to this 
question is provided by Eckhart as an essential aspect of his critique of inherited God- 
concepts, and of his rethinking of the concept of ground.  The alternative to the God of 
ontotheology is Godhead. Godhead provides us with a paradigm of an authentic God- 
concept, one which has been purged of ontotheological elements.   Not accidentally, 
Godhead is an essentially negative concept,   one which represents an iconoclastic refusal 
of all concepts and images which might represent God in any affirmative manner.  From 
the perspective of Godhead we are able to understand why images of God must be 
negative--one of the things that are misguided about ontotheology. Hence from the 
perspective of Godhead we are able to discern precisely what is problematic and 
untenable in the   concept of God as causa sui.  Causa sui is wrong not because the 
concept of causality does not apply to God, it is wrong insofar as and because it purports 
to represent God in an essential manner;  to express the essential identity of God as an 
uncaused cause  when this aspect is  merely penultimate.  To that extent causa sui is a 
conceptual idol which blocks a more authentic access and openness to the sacred.   
Godhead represents a paradigm for the overcoming of all such conceptual idols. 
 
(c)    From ontology to theology  
 
          We have seen in Eckhart how, when God is conceived within   the categories of   
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 metaphysics, specifically after the inherited model of  ground, a convincing connection 
cannot be made between ‘founded’ elements of experience and God as ground in a 
manner which authentically illuminates the  founded’ elements.   By extending insights 
gained from Ekhart’s critique of religion to a critique of God (Chapter Two B, IV:a- d)  
we come to suspect that the concept of God as ground functions   in the service of very 
human needs for systematic unity, without commending itself as   the inevitable place 
where reason comes to closure.  Insofar as we can accept by hypothesis Heidegger’s 
claim that the historic enterprise of grounding inevitably requires causa sui in order to 
come to completion.  Eckhart’s conclusions block the movement from ontology to 
theology which is necessary for a minimalist defense against Heidegger’s claim that 
Western metaphysics is ontotheological.  Heidegger’s claim thus emerges as more 
credible.  This is accomplished in three ways:  (1) Eckhart tells us why, as we have 
already seen, causa sui is flawed and hence cannot function as an authentic ground. (2)  
Essentially by working  ‘backwards’ from the concept of  an authentic ground which is 
Godhead,  Eckart’s reflections have the potential to illuminate how grounding ontology is 
misguided and flawed from the start.  To a limited extent we have already seen how this 
is the case with substance ontology and  representationalism,  both of which are implicit 
presuppositions of the ontology of grounding.  In OM Heidegger operates with the 
understanding that these presuppositions are flawed, although elsewhere he attempts to 
demonstrate why this is the case.168 Operating from the perspective of Godhead we are in 
                                                 
168 Heidegger’s doctrine of language can be understood as a critique of representationalism. His argument is 
essentially that language is one of those aspects of what is real which cannot with insight be represented 
objectively.  To represent language as an objective phenomenon, e.g. as a system of relations or as a tool, 
essentially misses the essence of language as well as the relation of human beings to language and the 
relation of human being  to  the world. Cf. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. by Peter D. 
Hertz  (San Francisco and New York:Harper and Row Publishers, 1971) pp.112-136.  
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a unique position to understand their flaws and limitations and hence why it would be 
misguided to employ these concepts in an ontology of grounding.  Indeed with this 
insight the entire ontology of grounding becomes called into question.  The same is the 
case with the ontology of substance.  The attempt to coherently think the concept of 
Godhead inevitably involves a challenge to the ontology of substance.  Godhead is not a 
substance, but the encompassing context in which everything including substances is 
conceived. Immediately this changes our conceptual landscape. The dissolution of the 
substantial identity of God casts a shadow over the claim that the essential character of 
human being can be known through the category of substance.  If substance cannot be 
properly predicated of God then its value as a concept or category of understanding is 
reduced to the level of impotence.     Human beings can no longer be finite substances 
juxtaposed beside a divine substance.  The grounding of human existence cannot take 
place according to a physical model in which a supreme substance supports a lesser one. 
Rather the grounding of human existence will require us to think about the meaning of 
being human from out of the context of Godhead. Such an understanding must be 
relational rather than substantial.   
 
        (d) Shaking the foundations of substance ontology  
 
         (3) Although Eckhart’s thinking is not essentially methodological, the 
methodological implications of his thinking have the potential to shake the foundations of 
all grounding ontology.  In thinking through the critique of God as ground with Eckhart, 
it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that grounding ontology generally functions in a 
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similar way.  In each case we have what purports to be a self-sufficient, self- 
authenticating basis of experience from which founded elements are derived and receive 
their meaning.  If this paradigm does not work in the case of ‘God as ground,’ for the 
specific reasons Eckhart suggests, what reason is there to have confidence that it will 
work for any others? The fact that grounding ontologies employ the same methods and 
involve the same limited presuppositions suggests that it will not.  This question is more 
pressing given Heidegger’s insight concerning the importance of God as ground in any 
grounding ontology.  In OM and elsewhere Heidegger tells us that the claims of  
grounding ontology are never actually realized or embodied.  For this reason metaphysics  
is epochal. One ground commends itself in a particular age as an exemplary principle in 
terms of which everything else is intelligible.  With time the attractiveness of this 
principle erodes and a new ground is posited.  The history of metaphysics is therefore a 
history of the rise and dissolution of ultimate grounds.  Thinking through the critique of 
‘God as ground’ with Eckhart gives us some insight into why metaphysics is epochal.  
Eckhart provides us with a powerful intimation of how the exercise of establishing 
grounds is an expression of deep human needs and expectations rather than the objective 
endeavor it purports to be.  Since a ground is not an embodiment of purely objective 
meaning, no ground can be ultimate or final.   
 
    (e)  Derrida and the instability of metaphysical systems 
 
     Doubtless at least some of the interest of Derrida in the work of Eckhart and other 
thinkers in the tradition of negative theology stems from the implication of Eckhardian 
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thinking for the instability of the texts of all metaphysical systems.169  One of the reasons 
Derrida continues to resist the label “deconstruction” is because the term implies a 
systematic a priori methodological procedure which is to be applied in a formulaic way.  
In actual practice Derrida demonstrates how the elements of deconstruction are already 
present with metaphysical texts.170   Deconstruction is then a matter of reading a text in a 
way in which these are made explicit.  Deconstruction has added considerable richness 
and detail to Heidegger’s understanding of the epochal character of metaphysics.  The 
problem with this is that Derrida introduces a complex language and vocabulary in the 
context of his own project which does not always overlap with that of Heidegger. With a 
limited vocabulary, and with an apparent innocence of ambitious methodological 
ambitions, Eckhart provides cogent insight into the instability of metaphysical systems. 
This insight can be illuminating to the projects of both Derrida and Heidegger.    
 
      (f)   Are our conclusions consistent with Heidegger?  
 
        Employing Eckhart in this way raises the question of whether the illumination we 
have received concerning the errors of ontotheology and its overcoming is ultimately 
compatible with Heidegger.  We have learned from Eckhart what is problematic and 
untenable about what Heidegger calls ontothelogy.  If Heidegger were more explicit on 
this issue, would the reasons and arguments we have expressed concur with those of 
                                                 
169 Jacques Derrida, “Post Scriptum,” in Derrida and Negative Theology, Harold Coward and Toby Foshay 
(eds.) (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992) p. 290. Perhaps this point is best supported 
by part C of the essay, “How to avoid speaking: denials,”( contained in the same book ) in which Derrida 
attempts to read Heidegger and the attempt to overcome metaphysics  as in the tradition of negative 
theology. See pp.122-131. 
170 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s introduction to Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore and 
London: John Hopkins University Press, 1974) pp.lxxviii 
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Heidegger?  This is to ask, have we genuinely illuminated not only what is problematic 
about ontotheology but what is problematic about it in the context of Heidegger?   This 
can be answered in the affirmative. This claim is supported by the fact that Heidegger’s 
critique of ontotheology is provided in the context of and intimately related to his critique 
of metaphysics, or more specifically to a critique of both the metaphysics of grounding 
and representationalism.   For this reason Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics does not 
lead to an abandonment of all metaphysics in the manner of positivism, or of operating 
only with an implicit metaphysics, but rather embodies  a new way of thinking about 
being as ground.   This enterprise began in Being and Time  with the analytic of Dasein.      
It is clear that the fundamental ontology which constitutes the analytic of Dasein is meant 
to provide a kind of basis for thinking about being. Yet this basis is in no wise a ground 
in the traditional sense, hence the difference between fundamental and foundational 
ontology.   If we take our cue from  Being and Time,  where a clarification of the 
meaning of being is the route to a more primordial relation to God which theology is 
seeking, then there is every reason to believe that the main obstacle which stands in the 
way of this goal is an unreflective and unclarified  understanding of being.  We have seen 
that where this is the case some understanding of being prevails by default.  From this it 
is just one short step away from naming the same prejudices which have contaminated an 
understanding of the meaning of being in general and of human Dasein as blocks to a 
more primordial relation to God. These are none other than substance ontology, 
representationalism and the ontology of grounding.  With regard to the later Heidegger 
represented by  OM,  this attempt to rethink the meaning of being as ground is named 
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“difference as such.”  In Thesis III  we will see how Godhead as a groundless ground 
represents a kind of paradigm for understanding “difference as such.”  
     With regard to representationalism, it might be said that in the final sense the most 
fundamental mistake of metaphysics is the presupposition that being can be represented 
as an object. Yet Heidegger’s critique of representationalism does not end with being. It 
is clear that an understanding of being in general and human being share the same fate. 
For this reason the enterprise of raising anew the question of the meaning of being has the 
benefit of bringing with it the potential to free our understanding of what it means to be 
human from the tyranny of representationalism.    Based on the above, it should be clear 
that when Heidegger names the God of ontotheology as causa sui there is again every 
reason to think that what is most problematic about this is the fact that God is represented  
as an object.  We then conclude that there is good reason to think that employing Eckhart, 
as a route to understanding what is wrong about ontotheology in the context of 
Heidegger, puts us solidly on the right track.   
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Chapter five- Thinking being as the "difference as-such." 
 
 
(I) THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIFFERENCE  
 
(a) Heidegger and Hegel  
 
 
 
     Let us begin by attempting to follow the path of Heidegger’s thinking in OM.  He 
begins by asking how the approach of Hegel’s philosophy is different from his own. The 
contrast is clear:  “For Hegel the force of each thinker lies in what each has thought, in 
that their thought can be incorporated into absolute thinking as one of its stages…  We, 
however do not seek that force in what has already been thought: we seek it in what has 
not been thought and from which what has been thought receives its essential space.”171 
  Heidegger’s contrast between a Hegelian and a Heideggerian approach to the texts of 
the tradition is a typical example of his approach to the history of philosophy.  Heidegger 
can never be relied on for providing a straightforward exegesis of a text.  In each case the 
text under examination becomes the occasion for developing his own thinking.  In Being 
and Time Heidegger provides a simple but compelling justification for this type of 
creative exegesis. The goal of textual interpretation is not simply to understand what 
another thinker has thought but to rethink the issue which is examined in the text.172  
                                                 
171 OM, p. 48. 
172 Being and Time, p.42. 
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Earlier on in OM  Heidegger provided an added dimension to this novel approach to 
textual interpretation based on the concepts of identity and difference.           
 
    Therefore when we attempt a thinking conversation with Hegel, we must speak  
    with him not just about the same matter, but  the same matter in the same way. 
    But the same is not merely the identical.   In the merely identical, the difference  
    disappears.  In the same the difference appears, and appears all the more press- 
    ingly the more resolutely thinking is concerned with the same matter in the same 
    way.173  
 
 
       Suddenly the imperative to think the same matter in the same way has 
metamorphosed into difference. How did we move from identity of the enterprise of 
thinking being   to difference?  Although the move is quite startling, the argument for it is 
already implied in the concept of thinking through the issue of being with Hegel.  In any 
straightforward exegesis of Hegel the goal would be to explicate an understanding of 
being as it was thought by Hegel.  In such an endeavor the specter of difference would at 
least not explicitly appear.  Heidegger’s goal on the other hand is to think the issue of 
being and to do so with Hegel as a guide or point of reference. The clear focus is not on 
Hegel, but on being.  Clearly then a difference emerges between being and what Hegel  
thought. Thinking the matter of being through with Hegel, if it is genuine thinking and 
not merely a perfunctory repetition of what Hegel thought (this would be the merely 
identical), takes place in the space of the difference between what Hegel thought and the  
matter of thinking which is being.  
     The natural question to raise at this point is, how then is thinking about being in 
conversation with Hegel different from merely thinking the matter of being? We must 
bear this question in mind as we attempt to illuminate the significance of difference in 
                                                 
173 OM., p. 45. 
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Heidegger.  It turns out that difference will have a critically important role in OM.  We 
must follow this insight concerning the importance of difference and see how it is 
developed.  For now we may be permitted only a minimal observation, that Heidegger’s 
method in OM begins with and highlights a remarkable fact, namely that difference, 
although it is not often understood to be an essential ingredient in major philosophical 
thought, nevertheless has an important role to play in philosophical and specifically 
metaphysical thinking. At the very least difference forms an essential background out of 
which philosophical thinking arises.  Although Heidegger does not do so, we can attempt 
to apply this insight to Hegel. Hegel was focused not merely on understanding thinkers of 
the past, but on how their thinking represented moments in the coming to be of absolute 
spirit. Once again difference appears as a basis of Hegel’s thinking.  Without difference 
Hegel would have been merely an historian of philosophy.  Heidegger’s insights give us a 
new perspective on the history of thought. Upon reflection it would appear that the most 
creative innovations in the history of thought require difference.  Consider for example 
the philosophy of Kant.  The greatness of Kant’s philosophy resides precisely in the way 
it blazes a new path, a different path from previous forms of thinking, most notably those 
of rationalism and empiricism.  In time the sharp edge of this difference was dulled and 
the thinking of Kant hardened into a system. Descartes’ can also serve as a good 
example.  One can say that Descartes’ thinking was grounded in difference. Descartes’ 
aim was not to clarify particular aspects of experience, but to establish a sound basis for 
knowing in experience. In carrying out this ideal it was not possible to presuppose that 
any knowledge was possible.  Descartes had to question the very foundations of 
experience, and in doing so overturned centuries of scholastic philosophy.  The greatness 
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of Descartes’ thinking  consists in the way it presents us with both a paradigm and an 
exercise of thinking without presuppositions. In time the difference which formed the 
wellspring of Descartes’ thinking was hardened into the identity of the Cartesian system, 
a system not unlike the one which Descartes had overturned.  
 
     (b) Derrida and différance    
 
     The paradox of difference has been a persistent concern of Jacques Derrida. 
Différance is a neologism coined by Derrida based on the French stem différ, which 
means both to defer and to differ.  The French word différence is indistinguishable in 
sound from Derrida’s différance. There is a polemical function to Derrida’s wordplay, 
namely to call attention to the aspect of deferring   which is at work in difference and to 
do so in a way which challenges the established primacy of speech over writing. What is 
the significance of the act of deferring?  It has to do with negation. Derrida wants to say 
that in every act of differing there is also a deferring. Here we can think of the differing 
as an affirmative aspect, deferring as the negative.  The act of indicating a difference 
aims toward the affirmation of meaning, but in the act of indicating a difference 
affirmative meaning is also deferred. Let us take one of Derrida’s own examples, that of 
the unconscious mind. The act of indicating a difference of the unconscious from the 
conscious mind might aim toward establishing an integral identity of the unconscious 
through a contrast with the conscious mind.  Nevertheless there is also the working of 
deferring in this act of difference. The unconscious is thus indicated as a vast and 
unknown realm which is nothing like the conscious mind.  Derrida’s understanding of 
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difference forms an integral part of his program of deconstruction.  Although Derrida  
will go on to develop an understanding of différance within the context of his own 
project, an understanding which departs in significant ways from Heidegger’s 
“difference,” the original inspiration of différance as a topic of thought was none other 
than the idea of  difference in  OM 174.  This is true in the same way that Derrida’s 
deconstruction was originally inspired by the Destruktion of Being and Time.  The fact 
that différance begins with Heidegger’s difference offers us the advantage that différance 
in its most general form might provide us with an insight into difference. What is it that 
Derrida sees as significant about différance?  An answer to this question can be provided 
in terms of Heidegger’s own project.  Addressing Heidegger’s concern with being,  
Derrida writes, “Since Being has never had a  ‘meaning’ has never been thought or said 
as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then difference is in a certain and very 
strange way,  ‘older’ than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being.”175  If 
being requires non-being for its inherence then there can be no ultimate ontological basis 
for the privileged status of being. This suggests that when in metaphysics being is made 
the explicit object of investigation,  it is ‘non-being’, ‘becoming’, ‘beings’—all  of the 
aspects which are classically distinguished from being—which  are at work in the 
background making the inherence of being possible. Derrida’s point is that this is the case 
not only with being, but with philosophical concepts generally.  The focus of 
philosophical reasoning is upon those integral affirmative concepts, e.g. energia, ousia, 
essence, origin, which form the center of a philosophical system, a center toward which 
                                                 
174 Douglas L. Donkel in The Theory of Difference,(Albany: The State University of New York Press, 
2001) p. 9. 
175 Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in The Theory of Difference, op. cit.  p. 296. 
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all other concepts are referred and in terms of which they derive their meaning.176 For 
Derrida this is enormously problematic, since as indicated above it is only the 
marginalization of the lesser concepts—opinion by knowledge, existence by essence, 
sensibility by reason—which grants the center the semblance of a privileged status. 
Inherence of the center, then, requires and presupposes difference.  
       Derrida cites Nietzsche as a significant figure in the development of insights which 
became explicit in the form of différance.  In the writings of Nietzsche we witness a 
continual assault upon identity, be it the identity of human being, of philosophy, of 
reason, of good and evil.  Thereby the primary centers of meaning which have been the 
guideposts for Western thinking collapse into many fragments   and differences. The 
ideal of reason serves as a primary example.  Under Nietzsche’s analysis the primacy of 
the conscious mind is challenged, as it is in Freud, by tracing its roots to unconscious 
instinctual life energy.177   For Derrida, what he has named as différance then represents 
an attempt to make explicit insights which have been developing since the nineteenth  
century and are even to a limited extent present in ancient thought.178 These insights have 
to do with the way in which the primary identities which are often presupposed and 
which philosophical reason simultaneously attempts to establish and ground—mind, 
reason, God, being, good—are  not integral identities at all, but each requires and 
presupposes qualification and difference. If we might be permitted to trace the 
inauguration of the turn toward différance back to Kant, it might be said that from Kant 
                                                 
176 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences,” in Writing and 
Difference trans. by  Alan Bass  (London: Routledge) p. 278. 
177 Ibid. p. 291. 
178 Derrida traces the origins of différance as far back as Plato, specifically in the Khora of the Timaeus as 
the “third species” between the sensible and the intelligible, and the concept of “The Good” which 
transcends being or essence in  the Republic. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in 
Derrida and Negative Theology ed, by  Harold Coward and Toby Foshay  (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1992) p.p. 101-108. 
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to Derrida the status of difference has been steadily enhanced. Whereas negation has a 
strictly limiting function in Kant, by the nineteenth century negation increasingly takes 
on the role of genuine disclosure. Once again Nietzsche serves as the best example.  It 
might be said that there is a dynamic driving impulse toward negation, différance at the 
very center of Nietzsche’s project. Nevertheless Nietzsche’s violent assault upon Western 
identity, values and metaphysics is virtually incomprehensible in purely negative terms.  
In virtually every case where we find Nietzsche ‘philosophizing with a hammer,’179 
negation is a route to the discovery and affirmation of higher value.   
 
      (c)  A  paradigm shift occurs     
 
      Once difference becomes fully explicit with Derrida in the form of différance it 
becomes clear that more is at stake than the thematizing of difference as a limiting 
function or as a background of thought.   Here it would be no exaggeration to claim that 
with any measure of conceptual clarity the correct conclusion to draw from our 
consideration of Derrida and difference is that thought itself has become a background to 
différance.  Now difference itself is understood as an originary basis of meaning.  Clearly 
a major paradigm shift has occurred in Derrida, or rather in Heidegger, since Derrida is 
merely attempting to develop in his own way the insights about difference contained in 
OM.   The claim that difference forms a background to meaning might not require a 
paradigm shift and could perhaps be incorporated into our dominant ontological and 
epistemological modes of thought. But what would it mean to say that difference, 
                                                 
179 The metaphor is taken from Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols, the subtitle of which is “how to 
philosophize with a hammer.” 
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something essentially negative, forms the actual basis of meaning?  Would not the 
presence of affirmative meaning not be required in order to be negated?  In such a case 
difference would not actually be primary.  Moreover, when it is claimed that difference is 
the basis of meaning are we not using the concept of a basis in a way in which it is never 
used, either in a philosophical or in an ordinary language context?  In fact this will turn 
out to be the case; hence the meaning of “basis” must be made explicit.  Here our 
problem is one which always accompanies paradigm shifts, namely that the alteration of 
the conceptual landscape is so profound that established meanings no longer function in 
the familiar manner in which they once did. To insist on understanding a paradigm shift 
in terms of inherited and familiar meanings is a strategy which is doomed to failure. 
Nevertheless, we must either find answers to the above questions, or find a way to 
explicate the shift in paradigm which makes questions of this sort superfluous. Since we 
are concerned principally not with Derrida but with Heidegger, it would be more fruitful 
to address the above issues in terms of how the paradigm shift is expressed in Heidegger.   
 
(II) FROM “DIFFERENCE” TO “DIFFERENCE AS SUCH”   
   
(a) The transcendental-phenomenological step back   
 
      Following the course of Heidegger’s thinking in OM, one of the primary ways in 
which the paradigm shift from meaning to difference is expressed is in terms of the 
attempt to think being as difference (Differenz) or “difference as such” (Differenz als 
solche). 
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    …what do you make of the difference if Being as well as beings appear by virtue 
    of the difference, each in its own way?  To do justice to this question, we must  
    first assume a proper position face to face with the difference.  Such a confron- 
    tation becomes manifest to us once we accomplish the step back.  Only as this  
    step gains for us greater distance does what is near give itself as such, does nearness 
    achieve its first radiance. By the step back, we set the matter of thinking, Being as 
    difference, free to enter a position face to face, which may well remain wholly  
    without an object.180 
 
.     On the next page Heidegger will cite one of the primary goals of OM to be the 
thinking of the “difference as such.” “In our attempt to think the difference as such, we 
do not make it disappear; rather we follow it to its essential origin.”181 
      We have moved from an awareness of difference as a background of thinking, to the 
imperative to think being as difference.  Here the many problems associated with an 
understanding of difference as a basis of meaning remain and are only compounded, as 
what we might call the turn toward difference is intensified.  Now difference becomes a 
primary route to the disclosure of being.  Without attempting to minimize the profound 
paradox in the idea of negation disclosing being, let us postpone consideration of the 
major problems which the deepening of the turn toward difference engenders and attempt 
to glean whatever intelligibility is here present.   
      Apart from attempting to explicate the full meaning of the term “difference as such,” 
why does Heidegger think that difference or negation would be a route to the disclosure 
of being?  What type of methodology is employed to reach this very counterintuitive 
conclusion?   
        The metaphor of a “step back” inevitably suggests the transcendental-
phenomenological step back from experience, in this case from the experience of doing 
                                                 
180 OM., p. 63-64. 
181 Ibid., p. 65.  
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metaphysics to the conditions of its possibility.  Yet if this is what Heidegger has in mind, 
the transcendental-phenomenological must be taken in quite a loose sense. In a strict 
sense the transcendental-phenomenological technique is a step back from the enterprise 
of doing metaphysics into a kind of reflective space in which it becomes possible to view 
something concerning the essence of metaphysics. In both the Kantian and the Husserlian 
senses the goal would indeed be a type of meta-philosophical awareness.182 Heidegger’s 
step back follows the classic phenomenological-transcendental pattern in the first aspect, 
in which a move is initiated away from the activity of actually doing metaphysics.  What 
is achieved however is not something about the nature of metaphysics generally, but a 
more authentic disclosure of being than that which occurs in metaphysics.       
       Essentially Heidegger’s strategy is the following. Since difference lies at the roots of 
whatever understanding of being is present in the tradition, while all the while the 
contribution of difference has been neglected, the result can only be an understanding of 
being which is solipsistic. From what we know of Heidegger’s criticism of metaphysics, 
this comes as no surprise.   Expressed in the traditional language of metaphysics 
reification of being is at bottom a form of solipsism.  What is new however is 
Heidegger’s response to this solipsism.  That response is to focus specifically upon that 
element which has been neglected by the tradition, that of difference, in the expectation 
that it offers a potential never seen before for the disclosure of being.  Here we might be 
permitted a colloquial example.  If certain minorities have made a significant though an 
unrecognized and unacknowledged contribution to American cultural life, we should 
expect to find that our reflective awareness in the form of cultural history should be, by 
                                                 
182 Because of the way in which it functions as meta-philosophy many analytic philosophers are expressing 
a renewed interest in phenomenology.  Cf. Harold Allen Durfee,  Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology 
(London: Springer Press, 1976) p.1-10. 
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virtue of this neglect, somewhat superficial and inaccurate. Likewise specific attention to 
those cultural contributions which have been omitted should yield a more in-depth and 
accurate understanding of the nature and origins of our cultural life. Nevertheless the 
power of our analogy is limited since its terms, mainstream and minority contributions to 
cultural life, are both intrinsic identities which can be made the object of investigation. 
By contrast,  Heidegger’s terms are being and negation.  What does it mean to say that 
negation, which is not an intrinsic identity but the refusal and rejection of identity, should 
be the explicit object of inquiry?  
 
(b) The specter of nihilism  
 
       Once the boldness of Heidegger’s move is made fully apparent, questions about it 
become impossible to ignore.  By any account, a methodology which has negation 
function as a primary tool for the disclosure of being must appear at the very least to be 
counterintuitive. To make this explicit let us take a step back to the early period of Being 
and Time. In attempting to ‘get a handle’ on being Heidegger’s primary route was  
through Dasein, the place where being is lit up or disclosed.183 To the extent that this 
strategy is clear, that of OM must appear opaque.  Here we are actually underestimating 
our difficulties, since it is not the case that negation will disclose being but that being is 
thought of as negation, as difference.  In a real sense, difference has displaced the 
question of being, precisely the state of affairs suggested by Derrida.  The goal is no 
                                                 
183 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. by  Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press, 1985) pp 144-150.  
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longer to articulate the significance of being, but to think being as difference.  Now 
negation is no longer a route to affirmation but has become an end in and of itself.   
     The concept of the predominance of negation over affirmation suggests the presence 
of nihilism, where negation is inevitably understood in terms of a loss or depletion of 
being, meaning, or identity.  Within the context of Heidegger nihilism does not merely 
represent a perspective on reality, but is an aspect of the self-disclosure of being which 
occurs in and through human beings. The connection of human being and being leads 
Heidegger to the point of claiming that human being has an essential share in nihilism.184 
Based on the above it should be clear that nihilism is a complex theme in Heidegger. The 
threat of nihilism cannot simply be banished or refuted, as it can in the context of an 
Aristotle or a Kant. Nevertheless, in the final sense nihilism is an aspect of the 
forgetfulness of being and so is a pejorative term in Heidegger.  Where nihilism 
threatens, being appears “within the horizon of what is calculable.”185 This suggests that 
in nihilism human beings are in a distorted relation to being.  Indeed an understanding of 
being in terms of technology and nihilism is closely connected. In The Question of Being 
Heidegger responds favorably to the Marxist Ernst Junger’s claim that nihilism results 
from technological domination.186 A good part of the work is addressed to the question of 
how technological domination and hence nihilism are to be overcome. “A  topography of 
nihilism, of its processes, of its overcoming is certainly needed.”187 
     Based on this it should be clear that any attempt to understand what we might call the 
negative turn which occurs in OM within the framework of the classical   ontology of 
                                                 
184 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being, trans. by  Janet T. Wilde and William Kluback  (New Haven 
Conn: College and University Press, 1958) p.83. 
185 OM, p.35. 
186 Heidegger, The Question of Being, op cit., p.33. 
187 Ibid., p.85. 
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nihilism must be deemed to be fundamentally misguided.  The problem here however is 
that there is no paradigm within the dominant traditions of Western philosophy with 
which to understand the primacy of negation which is not nihilistic.  This is the case 
whether the phenomenon in question is Derrida’s différance or Heidegger’s attempt to 
think “difference as such.”  As witness, it is difficult to think of what Derrida means by 
deconstruction apart from a breakdown or a loss of meaning, an interpretation which 
Derrida has persistently rejected188 and one which is refuted by his texts.189   Why this 
persistent misunderstanding in spite of the texts? Why is it necessary to reject an 
interpretation which the texts themselves explicitly refute?  The answer is that nihilism 
has deep ontological roots. For Derrida these roots reside in the binary opposition 
between being and non-being in terms of which being is privileged. The ontological 
framework which supports nihilism is already brought to the texts, even if the texts 
themselves are meant to challenge it. If refuting nihilism were a matter as simple as 
locating the presence of a logical fallacy, then the relentless effort to rethink inherited 
meaning which occurs in Derrida’s texts would be superfluous. Likewise for Heidegger 
the thinking of “difference as such” will shatter and surpass nihilism, but to reach that 
point it will be necessary to rigorously resist and oppose a view of negation which is 
nihilistic.  Once again however this is problematic since we have no paradigm for how 
this can be accomplished, at least within the dominant traditions of the West.   
                                                 
188 John Caputo, (ed.) Deconstruction in a Nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida, (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1997) pp 8-10. 
189 After explaining the loss of center which has occurred since the nineteenth century.   Derrida concludes 
with a joyous Nietzschean kind of affirmation of freeplay “of the world and without truth, without origin, 
offered to an active interpretation…” “This affirmation then determines the non-center otherwise than as a 
loss of center.” Cf. “Structure, sign and play in the human sciences,” op cit., p.294. 
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      How then do we gain insight into the meaning of the essential concepts of 
“difference” and “difference as such” which are critical to understanding Heidegger’s 
argument in OM?  While a careful analysis of the text is always the first line of defense, 
this proves inadequate since no broad-based introduction is provided. Neither does 
Heidegger provide any real insight into the meaning of “difference” and “difference as 
such” before they are put to work in a critique of metaphysics and an attempt to 
overcome ontotheology. Accordingly the reading proves to be quite challenging.  
 
(c) The alternative of illuminating Heidegger through other texts   
 
      We might attempt to illuminate the thinking of “difference as such” which occurs in 
OM by attempting to trace the development of this decisive turn toward negation in 
earlier texts. In this regard perhaps the ideal candidate would be the earlier (1927) piece 
“What is Metaphysics?” since there Heidegger for the first time makes negation the 
explicit theme of an entire piece. This is however problematic since the fact that a 
concern with negation becomes explicit does not in and of itself indicate a deeper or more 
thoroughgoing form of negation. A careful examination of the work will reveal that the 
doctrine of negation contained there is on a continuum with that of Being and Time, 
where negation forms the background in terms of which being appears. “For human 
existence, the nothing makes possible the openness of beings as such.”190  Alternatively 
we might select other works of the later period which embody the negative turn in its 
mature form such as The Question of Being, in which the concept of the ‘crossing of 
                                                 
190 Marin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Basic Writings, ed. by  David Farrell Krell  (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1977) p. 104. 
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being’ is featured.191 Undoubtedly this route could be helpful, yet it is not unproblematic 
since we would ultimately run up against the same problem, namely how to understand 
the meaning and significance of a mode of thinking in which negation is primary.  At 
some point this issue must be encountered, whether it be with the ‘crossing of being’ or 
with “difference as such.”  
 
(d) The primacy of the ontological difference     
 
       In Thesis I of Chapter Three we attempted to explicate the sense and the significance 
of ontological difference as it lies at the basis of the Seinsfrage.  We saw that in the early 
Heidegger the concept of the ontological difference as “the difference between being and 
beings,” was a somewhat inchoate concept whose value in philosophical reasoning was 
not entirely clear. It is only in the later period represented by OM that the identity of the 
concept of the ontological difference comes sharply into focus.  In the later period the 
essence of ontological difference is difference or negation.  We saw this fact as highly 
significant for understanding the issue of the meaning of being.  The imperative of doing 
justice to the irreducible uniqueness of being requires a unique and subtle methodology, 
one which above all respects the integrity of the fact that being is neither on a continuum 
with other objects of experience, nor a concept which is able to be subsumed under other 
concepts.  Based on these considerations, the apophatic tradition represented by the 
thinking of Dionysius and Eckhart appeared as a powerful modality for gaining entrance 
into the Seinsfrage.  In Chapter Three we also argued that an incipient form of the 
ontological difference is present in the traditional approach to God represented by St. 
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Thomas Aquinas’s five ways, and a purer form of the ontological difference is realized in 
Eckhart’s enactment of the movement from God to Godhead.  At this point it becomes 
clear that the apophatic tradition has the potential to provide us precisely what is required 
for the completion of our goal of illuminating the meaning of being for the later 
Heidegger, namely a broad-based conceptual framework or paradigm with which to 
understand Heidegger’s project in OM of thinking the ontological difference as 
“difference”.  Accordingly we now posit Thesis III: 
 
(III)    STATEMENT OF THESIS III 
 
     The dialectic of negation,  particularly as it functions in the exercise of iconoclasm in 
Dionysius and Eckhart,  illuminates   (1) the way in which negation forms a basis for and 
“frees” thinking in OM;  (2) the identity of “difference” (Differenz) and “difference as 
such” (Differenz als solche) as forms of pure negation which are employed in 
Heidegger’s attempt to adequately think the ontological difference; and (3) the sense in 
which the attempt to think being as the “difference as such” becomes expressed as 
“perdurance” (Austrag.)  
 
(IV)    DEFENSE OF THESIS III 
 
(a) Negation as the basis of meaning: the opening up of ontological space 
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Negation as it is operative in the exercise of iconoclasm (Chapter Three Va, I:d and 
Va, II:f) helps to illuminate Heidegger’s understanding of difference in two senses.  (1) It 
helps to illuminate the sense in which difference is the basis of meaning. (2) It helps to 
free us from the false assumption of the isomorphic identity of thinking and being.  
       This first aspect is thematized by Derrida and we should already have some sense of 
how it can be supported.  Here it is not accidental that we described this earlier in terms 
of a loss of meaning wherein affirmative meaning collapses into difference. This once 
again has to do with the inevitable temptation to see difference through the ontology of 
nihilism, a framework which is not adequate either to Derrida or to Heidegger.   
     To understand how difference forms a background or a basis for thinking in Heidegger  
we must first ask: how does difference form a background or a basis for thinking in the 
negative theology of Dionysius and Eckhart?  Operating in terms of the cataphatic mode, 
the starting point in the incomprehensibility of God ( Chapter Three Va, I:a) leads to an 
impasse. Here we have only to think of Kant. The phenomenal realm represents a limit 
beyond which thinking cannot go. In Dionysius and Eckhart the first act of negation, 
which is a response to the incomprehensibility of God, is made in the context of a 
relentless drive toward divine illumination. We have seen especially in the case of 
Dionysius that this situation essentially opens up an ontological space in which meaning 
operates.(Chapter Two A, III:e)  Meaning rushes in to fill the void created by the first act 
of negation.  This meaning is itself permeated by negation.  Because this meaning is 
permeated by negation it cannot be taken at face value, that is, it cannot be taken in the 
manner of an unequivocal affirmation. We have seen how the relentlessly dialectical 
relation between affirmation and negation makes for a type of thinking which never 
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comes to rest ( Chapter Three Va, I:b), resulting in a new concept of ground, a ground 
which is both a foundation and an abyss (Chapter Three Va, I:c and Va, II:e).   Here we 
would do well to reflect on the character of this ontological space opened up by negation, 
since in some ways it represents the center of the paradigm which will illuminate 
Heidegger. The main thing to observe here is the profoundly paradoxical character of this 
state of affairs: negation opens up a space. How can negation, something which is 
intrinsically limiting, magnify anything at all?  By what mechanism does this operate? 
Can we find any analog for it in ordinary experience?   Like any true paradox, the 
paradox of negation opening up a space is replete with meaning, hence there are perhaps 
many ways in which the question can be answered.  One possible answer is already 
contained in our description of the process in Chapter Two.  Negation opens up a space 
because it frees thinking in the same manner as a thought experiment.  A thought 
experiment frees thinking but it limits thought as well.   The hypothetical starting point of 
a thought experiment automatically limits the findings and implications of that 
experiment.  If a starting point is hypothetical so must be its implications and findings.  
Yet a thought experiment initiated in response to a complex dilemma which seems to 
defy a more straightforward approach can be a very powerful methodological tool.  It 
frees thinking from the demand to either immediately demonstrate its authenticity or be 
dismissed as out of hand.192 In a similar way the ontology of negation represents a 
powerful methodological tool for thinking about issues of meaning. Here it would be no 
exaggeration to claim that the entire project of negative theology takes place in the space 
                                                 
192 Here no better example can be given than that of Kant’s first critique. In the preface to the second 
edition Kant is quite explicit about the experimental thrust of the critical philosophy. “We must therefore 
make a trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics if we suppose that objects 
must conform to our knowledge.” Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi.  
164 
 
opened up by negation.  In short, this insight answers the riddle of negative theology 
which is: why does the impossibility of speaking and knowing about God not lead to an 
impasse?  Indeed in the cataphatic mode, given the starting point of negative theology, all 
knowledge and speech about God comes to an end. Nevertheless these continue in the 
apophatic mode. In this manner we can think of the perspective of negation as freeing 
thought. It also frees thought by showing us the limits of binary logic which is at the basis 
of cataphatic thinking.  
 
     (b)   A challenge to the isomorphic identity of thinking and being  
 
            At this point we have stumbled upon yet a second way in which negation opens 
up a space for thinking. Negation opens up a space for thinking because it frees thought 
from the false assumption of the isomorphic identity between thinking and being. 
(Chapter Three, V:e).  Here we have once again reached a fundamental insight of the 
negative theology of Dionysius and Eckhart, and one which stands in marked contrast to 
that of the dominant traditions of Western philosophy: thinking and being are not 
isomorphic. There is no assurance that either language or thought precisely correspond to 
what is real. The fact that the reality of God infinitely transcends human knowledge 
shatters all presumption concerning the isomorphic identity of thinking and being.      
     We saw in the case of Dionysius how in the exercise of iconoclasm the relentless 
negation is given in a dialectical relation with affirmation (Chapter Three Va, I:c). In 
these terms it is clear how negation opens up a space in which thinking takes place.  
Viewed in the light of the paradigm of negative theology Heidegger’s reflections provide 
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us with real insight into the basis of thinking.  We come to understand how critically 
important negation is to the generation of positive meaning.  Authentic thinking, which is 
to say thinking which is truly reflective and not determined by an implicit facticity, is one 
which is forged in the fires of negation. 
 
(c) Negation and freeing thinking of the past    
 
           It is only a systematic form of negation which can protect against both the ever 
present danger of reification of being, and the identification of thought with that of past 
thinkers.    In the context of Heidegger negation frees thought from an imperative it can 
never fulfill, the imperative to adequately represent being in thought. It is significant that 
Heidegger speaks of the criterion of what has not been thought, which we have identified 
as difference, as freeing thought.  “The criterion of what has not been thought does not 
lead to the inclusion of what has not been thought into a still higher development and 
systemization that surpasses it.  Rather the criterion demands that traditional thinking be 
set free into its essential past which is still preserved.”193   The inclusion of previous 
thought in a system refers to Hegel, but we can read into that any speculative system of 
philosophy. In such systems thinking of the past is viewed through the lens of the system. 
Such systematic thinking must fail to do justice to the specificity and the uniqueness of 
determinate expressions of thought. By contrast, and very paradoxically, thinking which 
is grounded in difference is able to honor the integrity and the uniqueness of historical 
expressions of thought. In these terms, thinking is set free.  Heidegger tells us above that 
thinking is set free into its past because individual expressions of thought belong to and 
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arise out of a very particular historical context. “Being ever and always speaks as destiny 
and is thus permeated by tradition.”194  Only thinking which is grounded in difference has 
renounced all necessity of co-opting expressions of thought for the purposes of 
systematic unity, and hence is able to honor the integrity of thought in its historical 
context.         
     Based on the above, the profound distance between Heidegger’s thinking which is 
grounded in difference and the a-historical thinking which attempts to operate outside of 
the past should be obvious.  Once again a paradox emerges. Thinking which ignores its 
roots is haunted by the past in the form of the continuous threat that attempts to think 
anew in fact reproduce the mistakes and trivialities of the past.  Thinking which is 
grounded in difference preserves the past. It is instructive to reflect on the roots of this 
paradox.  These lie in none other than the identity of difference as a pure form of 
negation which is nevertheless given in a dialectical relation to affirmation. Thinking 
which is grounded in difference must begin by squarely encountering the ‘other’ of its 
past.  “But only what has already been thought prepares what has not yet been thought, 
which enters ever new into its abundance.”195   This is true in the same way that the 
attempt to transcend God into Godhead is only possible based on the most serious 
encounter with our inherited God concepts.  Thinking which is grounded in difference is 
never identical to its past.  In affirmation of what has not yet been thought the past is 
simultaneously transcended, yet preserved by being set free from the conceptual 
manipulations of philosophical reason.   In another work, Conversation on a Country 
Path, in explicit reference to Eckhart Heidegger adopts the term releasement 
                                                 
194 Ibid., p. 51.  
195 Ibid., p. 48.  
167 
 
(Gelassenheit) for the freeing of thought.  For our purposes here it is sufficient to note the 
connectedness between what might be deemed to be a classical religious or spiritual 
doctrine, a doctrine of detachment, and philosophical reason.  As we briefly explored in 
Chapter Two (Chapter Two, B, VI:a), Eckhart’s doctrine of releasement grasps this 
fundamental connectedness in the form of an awareness that philosophical reason, like 
spiritual life, is not independent of subjective human interests. In the language of 
Conversation on a Country Path, it can be said that difference releases thinking into its 
past.   
        (d)     Negation and thinking the “difference as such”       
 
        (2) Negation as it is operative in the exercise of iconoclasm also helps us to    
understand the significance of one of the central goals of OM, which is to think being as 
the “difference as such.”  Essentially the terms “difference” and “difference as such” are 
on a continuum.  They each represent an attempt to replace the cataphatic mode which is 
operative within the dominant traditions of Western philosophy with an apophatic one. 
The difference between the two is essentially one of emphasis.  Heidegger most often 
employs the term“ difference” in the context of making a contrast between his method  
and that of Hegel.  This  occurs in the early part of the essay, roughly in  sections 42-50. 
The purpose of this, as indicated earlier, is to thematize the way in which difference 
forms a basis of meaning.  Once this point has been made attention is turned toward the 
more fundamental goal of thinking the “difference as such,” as a way of thinking about 
being.  Here the term “difference as such” indicates that the focus will be on difference 
itself rather than on naming the specific differences which are the stock and trade of 
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metaphysics.  Where metaphysics names specific differences, e.g. ‘being is ground, 
beings are what is grounded,’ difference acts as a mere corrective in the process of 
establishing affirmative meaning.  In metaphysics difference functions in a manner which 
is accidental rather than essential. Heidegger’s method involves reversing this order of 
priority, making what is for metaphysics an accident into an essential object of inquiry.  
 
      (e)   The problem of thinking “difference as such” 
 
       How can difference--something negative--be made the explicit object of inquiry? We 
have seen how difference forms a basis of affirmative meaning, nevertheless the 
assignment of making difference the explicit object of inquiry remains counterintuitive.  
Heidegger attempts to articulate this difficulty: 
 
      Thus we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its difference with  
      beings, and of beings in their difference with Being.  The difference comes speci- 
      fically into view. If we try to form a representational idea of it, we will  at once be  
      misled into conceiving of difference as a relation which our representing has added 
      to Being and to beings.  Thus the difference is reduced to a distinction, something  
      made up by our understanding (Verstand).  But if we assume that the difference is  
      a contribution made by our representational thinking, the question arises: a contrbu- 
      tion to what? One answers: to beings.  Good.  But what does that mean: “beings?” 
      What else could it mean than: something that is.  Thus we give to the supposed con- 
      tribution, the representational idea of difference, a place within Being.  But “Being”  
      itself says: Being which is beings.196 
 
   Heidegger concludes this discussion  with a rare and amusing example: “It is as in 
Grimm’s fairytale The Hedgehog and the Hare: “I’m here already.”197 
      Here the issue is that although as we have seen, difference is essential to meaning, 
and we neglect difference only at the peril of the neglect of meaning itself, nevertheless if 
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we try and objectify difference it seems to vanish into the unity of being.  This should 
come as no surprise.  We turned toward difference as a way of doing justice to the 
irreducibility of being.  Hence the reification of difference must be deemed to be as 
ontologically misguided as the reification of being.  How then do we make difference 
into the explicit object of inquiry, without either reifying difference in the way in which 
metaphysics reifies being, or having difference collapse into the identity of being?   
 
(f)   Addressing the problem of thinking the “difference as such:” the primacy of 
negation in Dionysius and Eckhart  
 
     We have seen the same problem in the negative theology of Dionysius and Eckhart.  
Inadequacy of the cataphatic mode leads to a decisive turn toward negation.  Yet this  
move appears as counterintuitive. If the affirmative mode is inadequate how can negation 
contain any efficacy except to express the impotence and despair of knowing?  Does the 
turn toward negation not lead us to an impasse?  We have seen how negative theology 
deals with this problem: the depth and power of negation is realized in negative theology 
in a dialectical relation to affirmation.  
      Essentially Heidegger’s attempt to think “difference as such” in OM follows this 
same paradigm.  After demonstrating how difference isolated from affirmation leads to 
an impasse, Heidegger explores a second option.   
 
       While we are facing the difference, though by the step back we are already re- 
        leasing it into that which gives thought, we can say: the Being of beings means 
        Being which is beings.  The “is” here speaks transitively, in transition.   Being  
        here becomes present in the manner of a transition to Beings.  But  
        Being does not leave its own place, and go over to beings, as though beings  
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        were first without Being and could be approached by Being subsequently.  
        Being transits (that), comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as some- 
        thing of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over. Arrival means: to keep  
        concealed in unconcealedness—to  abide present in this keeping—to  be a being.198 
 
        Here the attempt to think of the “difference as such” is expressed as a pure 
reciprocity between being and beings.  We began with the ontological difference, the 
imperative to think being in its difference from beings.  Yet this assignment leads us 
back to beings.  “Being itself says Being which is beings.”199 Likewise it is 
impossible to think of the autonomy of beings.  Beings only come to be in the 
unconcealment of being, an unconcealment which is simultaneously a concealment of 
being as such. Thus any attempt to think being or beings within the ontological 
difference is characterized by negation. Both the pole of being and that of beings are 
negated as intrinsic or autonomous identities. Once again the paradigm for this is 
established by negative theology.  The turn toward negation is expressed in terms of 
the dialectic of negation, which involves a deeply dialectical relation between 
affirmation and negation. We have seen this at work in Eckhart, where the poles of 
God and creation are dissolved as autonomous, intrinsic identities and are defined in a 
manner which is purely relational (Chapter Three Va,  II:b). The name of this pure 
relation in Heidegger is “perdurance” (Austrag). 
 
(g) From the “difference as such” to “perdurance” 
 
      The difference of Being and beings, as the differentiation of overwhelming and  
      arrival, is the perdurance of the two in unconcealing keeping in concealment. 
      Within this perdurance there prevails a clearing of what veils and closes itself  
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      off and this its prevalence bestows the being apart, and the being toward each 
      other, of overwhelming and arrival.200 
 
 
       The concept of perdurance might suggest something which endures, a stable center. 
There is indeed something stable in perdurance, but it is the stability of relentless motion: 
“Perdurance is a circling, the circling of being and beings around one another.”201 
Heidegger will speak of perdurance almost as if it is a force or a power which 
operates independently of human action. “The onto-theo-logical constitution of 
metaphysics has its essential origin in the perdurance that begins the history of 
metaphysics, governs all of its epochs, and yet remains everywhere concealed as 
perdurance, and thus forgotten in an oblivion which even escapes itself.”202 
     How should we understand this curious statement, and how did we move from 
“difference as such” to “perdurance?” The move appears to be required by what is 
implied in thinking being as pure negation.  Pure negation leads us, as we have seen, to a 
dialectical relation between affirmation and negation. If the relation between affirmation 
and negation is truly dialectical it takes thinking out of the realm of knowing subject and 
object known. The latter is the prerogative of metaphysics. It is metaphysics which 
represents being as an entity to knowing subjects. Once again Heidegger’s thinking takes 
place in the transcendental step back from the enterprise of actually doing metaphysics. 
On that level the working of negation comes into focus.  We are able to observe the 
importance of negation in the formation of metaphysical concepts even while in the 
metaphysical tradition itself negation is neglected and suppressed.   
       (h) The historicity of the terms “being” and “beings.”  
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       We have seen how Heidegger uses the terms “being” and “beings” in order to 
explicate the reciprocity which is at the basis of metaphysics.  It should be clear why this 
is problematic.   The terms “being” and “beings” arise out of the metaphysical tradition, 
they indicate concepts which are univocal and fully formed, whereas Heidegger is 
attempting to reflect on the process whereby the formation of metaphysical concepts  
occurs. We have already encountered Heidegger’s awareness of this fact. “It is still 
infinitely possible to represent ‘Being’ as the general character of particular beings. There 
is being only in this or that historic character.”203   Nevertheless these historic characters 
did not come into existence fully formed.  In the transcendental step back Heidegger is 
attempting to articulate the ontological basis of this metaphysical history.  It is on the 
ontological level that we observe the profound reciprocity between being and beings.  At 
any stage of the history of metaphysics there is some understanding of being. Likewise at 
any stage there is an understanding of beings.  Each of these is formed and developed in a 
continuous reciprocity with the other.  In the actual history of metaphysics the reciprocity 
is frozen at a particular point in time.  Being comes to be represented in a timeless 
historical manner as “Substantiality,” “Objectivity,” “Subjectivity,” “the Will,” the “Will 
to Power,” “the Will to Will.”204   We have seen in part how this process operates in 
terms of the ontotheological constitution of metaphysics.  We begin with the general 
character of being.  
      Inasmuch as Being becomes present as the Being of beings, as the difference, 
      as perduration, the separateness and mutual relatedness of grounding and of  
      accounting for endures, Being grounds beings, and beings, as what is most of all, 
      account for Being.  One comes over the other, one arrives in the other. Overwhelming 
      and arrival appear in each other in reciprocal reflection… 205 
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      On this level, the level of the ontological priority of the question of the meaning of 
being, a dynamic reciprocity is already present.  We should note as well the presence of  
negation at the center of this reciprocity.  This reciprocity tells us that being which 
grounds itself requires grounding in beings. As a true reciprocity there is a dynamic 
movement in both directions. Nevertheless this reciprocity is one short step away from 
ontotheology.  “The deity enters into philosophy through the perdurance of which we 
think at first as the approach to the active nature of the difference between Being and 
beings.”206 
     To understand this passage it is necessary to clearly separate different levels of 
activity.  There is the level of the reflective step back from metaphysics—the ontological 
level of the origins of metaphysics, and the level of the actual enterprise of metaphysics 
itself. On the ontological level we have perdurance expressed as a fundamental 
reciprocity between being and beings. This reciprocity is actualized through the subtle 
play of difference.  Being is different from beings. Being is ground, beings are what is 
grounded. On the ontological level this rigid separation fails to inhere as they dissolve in 
a dynamic reciprocity.  Moreover on the ontological level of difference, a form of 
negation is always balanced or countered by one of affirmation.  “The perdurance of that 
which grounds and that which is grounded, as such, not only holds the two apart, it holds 
them facing each other.”207  On the metaphysical level difference assumes a binary form. 
The insight that being itself requires grounding translates grounds to causes, leading 
inevitably to causa sui. Difference now appears final and irrevocable. Earlier Heidegger 
contrasted the two levels in terms of difference in a succinct way: “Since metaphysics 
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thinks of being as such as a whole, it represents beings in respect of what differs in the 
difference, and without heading the difference as difference”208  The stilling of the 
reciprocity between being and beings marks the beginning of metaphysical concepts, 
ideally suited to expression through the categories of binary logic.   
 
       (i)   Reexamining the ontological difference   
 
        Viewed in the context of negative theology it becomes clear why the ontological 
difference and with it negation is as it were unimpeachable in character.  The 
unimpeachable character of the ontological difference is rooted in the reflective character 
of human consciousness. Consciousness will always resist and oppose an identification of 
reality, truth, being, and the good with what is given on the phenomenal level of 
experience. The concepts of truth, reality, being and the good already presuppose the 
ontological difference, since it is only a human being with a reflective consciousness 
which can formulate them.  In this way the concept of Godhead or of being beyond being 
is merely a systematic working out of the qualitative difference between being and its 
ground which is implied in the ontological difference.  Here the point is that, given the 
starting point of ontological difference, it is only an ontology of negation which can do it 
justice.   
     It should now be clear why the methodology of negative theology is essential to 
Heidegger’s project of thinking the ontological difference, and why a pure form of 
negation such as is operative in the exercise of iconoclasm provides a paradigm for this.  
Outside of the context of negative theology the concept of “difference as such” appears 
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unintelligible. How can difference be conceived purely, without terms of difference?  
Within the context of negative theology we become familiar with a mode of difference 
which is systematic, that is, constituted not by a single act but by a series of negations. In 
these terms, given together with the fact that negation operates in a dialectical relation to 
affirmation, the concept of a negatively grounded form of thinking becomes fully 
intelligible.  Such thinking does not operate in a void but in the space which is opened up 
by the a priori starting point of the incomprehensibility of God, or in the case of 
Heidegger in the a priori refusal to reify being.  Here we can think of Heidegger’s term 
“difference as such,” as a polemical response to the threat of the collapse of difference 
into identity.  This threat is realized in the form of thinking coming to rest in a specific 
difference between being and beings. In the context of theology it comes to rest in a 
specific being which embodies that difference.  The concept of “difference as such,” like 
the concept of Godhead, reminds us that the ontological difference is an ideal which can 
never be embodied in any concrete form. “Difference as such” is insurance against the 
danger that the rigorous exercise of thought involved in the thinking of being should ever 
come to rest. It maintains the open space between being and beings as required by the 
ontological difference.  
 
         (j) Transcending  metaphysical language     
 
         If metaphysical language is language which has been developed in order to describe 
being qua being, an endeavor which Heidegger has always maintained is on a continuum 
with the attempt to describe particular aspects of being, e.g., science, then it is clear that 
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the terms “difference as such” and “perdurance” are  beyond the scope of metaphysical 
language. “For what these words name, what the manner of thinking which is guided by 
them represents, originates as that which differs by virtue of the difference.  The origin of 
the difference can no longer be thought within the scope of metaphysics.”209   The origin 
of the difference can no longer be thought within the scope of metaphysics because 
origins, like causes and explanations, are all aspects of a metaphysical language which 
must be negated and surpassed as required by the logic of pure negation which is 
“difference as such.”  
 
        (k)  The historicality and epochality of being  
 
      “Difference as such” can also help us to understand the true sense of being as 
historical and epochal, and indeed Heidegger connects the two concepts in OM.210. 
Understanding “difference as such” after the paradigm of Godhead or “being beyond 
being” in Dionysius,  what in each case emerges from the exercise of systematic negation 
helps to insure against understanding the historicity and epochality of being 
metaphysically.  If Godhead is not a metaphysical concept but emerges from its 
overcoming, then this is likewise the case with “difference as such.” On the surface, 
being as historical and epochal would appear to be worlds removed from the concept of 
Godhead. As many commentators have indicated, there is little historical sense in either 
Dionysius or Eckhart. Nevertheless what is at issue is again ontological difference.  
Godhead which emerges from the exercise of iconoclasm resists and opposes all attempts 
                                                 
209 Ibid., p.71. 
210 Ibid., p. 67. 
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to ground beings in a source which is on a continuum with beings. In Dionysius this 
becomes quite explicit.  God what, corresponds to Godhead in Eckhart, is beyond  being ( 
hyperousious) (Chapter Three Va, I:d). Likewise for Heidegger, being as historical and 
epochal resists and opposes all attempts to characterize being in terms of universal 
objective features and categories. Historicality and epochality are not features of being, 
but as expressions of the ontological difference they are that in terms of which being 
appears. Being appears as logos, as ground, as Absolute Spirit, as historical, dialectical 
matter, but can never coincide with any of these expressions.  The effect of the 
historicality and epochality of being is to shield being from reification.  This is precisely 
what requires the move from God to Godhead. Each time being is thought as historical 
and epochal it is removed from the realm of what can be objectively identified and 
known.   
         (l)  Summary of Thesis III     
 
         Negation as it is operative in the exercise of iconoclasm helps to illuminate 
Heidegger’s concept of difference and “difference as such” in OM in two ways. First, it 
provides us with a paradigm of the necessity of a negative turn.  This necessity begins in 
Dionysius and Eckhart with a deep awareness of the profound limitations of the 
affirmative, cataphatic mode of thinking.  In Dionysius it takes the form of the 
incomprehensibility of God, in Eckhart of the impossibility of establishing God as ground 
(Chapter Three Va, I:a and Va, II:a). Essentially Heidegger’s introduction into thinking 
of the concept of difference follows this paradigm. The turn toward difference is initiated 
precisely because the cataphatic mode of thinking has become untenable. It is impossible 
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to understand the concept of difference in Heidegger without first coming to terms with 
the radical impotence of the affirmative, cataphatic mode to do justice to the issue of 
being. To be sure, the impotence of cataphatic thinking has an historical aspect in 
Heidegger which is not present in Dionysius and Eckhart. Affirmative, cataphatic 
thinking has essentially run its course in the history of philosophy. Apart from the 
historical aspect, the paradigm of reaching an impasse through cataphatic thinking is 
powerfully embodied in the work of Dionysius and Eckhart. We might even say that in 
these authors there is embodied something like an originary or pure form of impasse 
insofar as cataphatic thinking when faced with its object, which is God, becomes utterly 
impotent. The impotence of the cataphatic mode becomes for Heidegger the unexpressed 
starting point of OM. .Being able to clearly view this paradigm and make it fully explicit 
helps to illuminate Heidegger’s argument.  
     Secondly, the dialectic of negation as it is embodied in the exercise of iconoclasm 
helps us to see the identity of “difference as such” as a purely negative concept, a concept 
of pure negation. The manner in which negative concepts function in the Dionysian and 
Eckhartian paradigms in a fully systematic way, a way which is  given in a dialectical 
relation to affirmation and  is not merely methodological but ontological, resulting in a 
radically new understanding of ground,  provides a key to understanding the meaning of 
the concept of “difference as such” in Heidegger. Finally, understanding the identity of 
“difference as such” as a concept of pure negation in OM  helps us to understand the 
sense of thinking “difference as such” as a way of thinking a pure form of the ontological 
difference.  Since the ontological difference is itself grounded in negation, it is only a 
mode of thinking which is wholly negative which can express the ontological difference 
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in pure form, one not characterized by the inner contradiction which plagues 
metaphysics. Thus the paradigm of pure negation as expressed in the exercise of 
iconoclasm helps to illuminate both the ontological difference itself as well as its relation 
to traditional metaphysics and how it is employed in Heidegger. Since metaphysics 
operates in the affirmative, cataphatic mode, the presence of the ontological difference in 
metaphysics will always be characterized by contradiction. Insofar as the ontological 
difference is an aspect of the reflective character of human consciousness it is at the basis 
of all philosophical thinking.  Yet insofar as metaphysics operates in the affirmative 
mode, the ontological difference can never be fully realized in metaphysics. In the 
concept of Godhead or “being beyond being”(hyperousios) which emerges from the 
exercise of iconoclasm  we glimpse for the first time a pure form of the ontological 
difference, expressed as the infinite qualitative  difference between beings and their 
ground, a difference which is established and maintained by a systematic act of negation. 
This pure form of the ontological difference which is present outside of Heidegger 
provides us with a paradigm for how it is to be thought in Heidegger.  
 
(V) TESTING THESIS III 
 
(a) The ontological difference and  the highest ideal of ethics 
 
         Given Heidegger’s claim that the ontological difference is at the basis of all 
philosophical thinking, together with our own hypothesis expressed in Thesis III that 
negation as it is operative in the exercise of iconoclasm is at the center of the ontological 
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difference, we should then be in a better position to detect the presence of the ontological 
difference outside of Heidegger and even outside of metaphysics. Moreover with the 
insight which our thesis provides we should be able to approach those expressions of 
thought in which the ontological difference is discerned with renewed understanding.   
        This is the case as can be demonstrated with the concept of ‘the good’ as the highest 
ideal of ethics. As the highest ideal, in principle no actual good can ever be equivalent to 
it. Here the fact that each expression of good is in principle different from the ideal 
insures us that only an act, or rather only a process, of systematic negation can open and 
maintain the distance between the two.  An awareness of this is already present in Kant 
insofar as Kant welcomes the objection that it is not possible to adduce a single act which 
is a verifiable instance of acting for the sake of duty.211Thus the categorical imperative is 
grounded in ontological difference as the infinite qualitative difference between the ideal 
of duty and any acts which aspire to actualize that ideal.  Here we should not fail to miss 
the deeply ontological intention of Kant’s ethics.  At the beginning of the Groundwork 
we are told that only a good will is good without qualification.212  At last the ancient 
metaphysical ideal to find absolute and unconditioned being is realized; yet there is no 
contradiction between Kant’s ethics and his first critique. The good will as an absolute 
and unconditioned reality is never actually given in experience. 
 
(b) Derrida and the highest good of ethics  
 
                                                 
211  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indiana: The 
Bobbs-Merill Company, 1959) p, 23. 
212 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Jens Timmermann  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 7.  
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      Here it will be helpful to view the categorical imperative from the perspective of 
Derrida, whose thinking as we have seen has been powerfully affected by Heidegger’s 
ontological difference.  What follows is not Derrida’s actual analysis of the categorical 
imperative, but a reading which is inspired by Derrida’s own understanding of the nature 
of human ethical experience to which the categorical imperative is a response.  Derrida 
makes a distinction between responsibility, which appears closely connected to the 
Kantian notion of duty, and obligation. Obligations are specified in a determinate way.  I 
am obliged to return a book to the library, or to shovel the snow in front of my walkway. 
Responsibilities, on the other hand, have a complex and ubiquitous claim on us, in a way 
which makes them impossible to fulfill in a simple univocal manner. We are responsible 
to our parents, to our children, to future generations, to society, to individuals, to 
ourselves, even to past generations.  Responsibility at no point comes to closure in the 
performance of specified acts.  As Derrida puts it:“one is never responsible enough.”213 
       What then does the categorical imperative tell us? It tells us that as rational agents we 
are compelled by a higher order of meaning, an ethical order, one which is qualitatively 
different from the hypothetical one which governs our daily endeavors.  Nevertheless as 
qualitatively unique, the dimension of the ought can never in principle provide us with a 
finite list of actions to be performed, or of those which are prohibited which are 
equivalent to the moral ought.  The imperative of duty will always transcend and exceed 
particular specifications. Because it exceeds specifications, it likewise contains much less 
than a casuistic principle which can be employed for the easy resolution of moral 
                                                 
213 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. by David Wills  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 
p.51. 
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difficulties. Moreover it is never entirely clear that any particular specifications embody 
duty at all.    
       All this is a way of saying that for Derrida in principle a categorical imperative 
resists the ontology of full presence. It is marked by the same essential paradox which we 
saw exhibited in both the ontological difference itself and Godhead.  To insist on forcing 
the categorical imperative into the framework of the ontology of full presence would be 
to rupture the integrity of the qualitative uniqueness which defines it and from which it 
draws its power.  It would be to reduce the categorical to the level of ordinary obligation.   
All too naturally the attempt to conceive of an absolute and unconditional dimension of 
meaning represented by the categorical imperative gives rise to negative language, indeed 
to an ontology of negation. A negative term is initiated  in response to the impotence of 
the affirmative mode. The negation involved is not a single act of negation, but 
systematic and given in a dialectical relation to affirmation. The deeply dialectical 
relation between affirmation and negation involved in thinking the categorical imperative 
involves a kind of thinking which never comes to rest.  Needless to say, all of this calls 
into question Kant’s claim that ethics is based on pure reason. At most reason can only 
provide a penultimate basis. What makes ethics possible makes it in the strict sense 
impossible.   Once again a ground is both a foundation and an abyss.  
     We can also detect the presence of the ontological difference in political philosophy as 
the qualitative difference between the ideal society and attempts to actualize or achieve 
that ideal.  It can be detected as well in the difference between the ideals of political 
philosophy—ideals such as democracy, justice and equality—and  attempts to realize 
those ideals. Once again Derrida is helpful. His political philosophy is based on the 
183 
 
radical displacement of political ideals from their inherited context in the ontology of 
presence. Accordingly the concept of the ‘messianic,’ with its inherently futuristic 
orientation, becomes a key political concept.214 Before Derrida  ‘critical theory’ 
represented by such figures as Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse essentially made 
the ontological difference, in the form of a relentless critique of modern technological  
society in terms of the highest ideals embodied in the Western tradition,  the centerpiece 
of its political philosophy. Accordingly the term and the concept of negation became 
irreducible for critical theory. Significantly enough, it is a negation which is always given 
in a dialectical relation to affirmation215.  
     The presence of the ontological difference outside Heidegger lends much support to 
its legitimacy as a philosophical concept.  Our thesis that negation lies at the center of the 
ontological difference allows for an insightful reading of traditional texts in which the 
presence of the ontological difference is discerned.  While Heidegger’s claim that the 
ontological difference lies at the basis of all philosophical thinking would be more 
difficult to support, the exposition above suggests that this seminal concept is indeed 
present in some of our most reflective and enduring texts.  By way of example, it would 
be difficult to argue the case that the ontological difference plays a central role in 
utilitarian-based ethics.  However, the endurance of Kantian ethics against the utilitarian 
onslaught suggests something about its irreducible value in doing justice to our ethical 
experience. It is significant that in defending this value against utilitarian criticism 
Kantians will time and again point to the way in which an unconditional ought defines 
                                                 
214 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx,  trans. by Peggy Kamuf  (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) 
p.163. 
215 Herbert Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) 
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what is most essential about our ethical experience.216Despite the many problems of 
Kant’s ethics, some of which Derrida’s reading actually addresses, no results-oriented 
approach can ever do justice to our moral experience.  
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